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Preface 
Once again it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of Touche 
Ross Foundation that has made it possible to continue this series of biennial 
auditing symposia at the University of Kansas. The 1982 symposium was the 
sixth of the series, with about fifty invited practitioners and educators coming 
together for two days to consider the eight papers that were presented. 
As co-chairmen of the symposium and editors of these Proceedings, we 
assume full responsibility for the selection of topics for both the invited papers 
and those selected from the papers submitted in response to the call for papers 
for the symposium. 
With the exception of the paper on the evolution of audit reporting, which 
continues the historical coverage of auditing that has opened each of the 
symposia, the papers reflect no unifying theme or purpose, other than that the 
topics addressed or the research reported hold promise of being of interest to 
the invited participants from both practice and academe. All papers, except for 
the traditional evening address on a more general topic, were distributed in 
advance, making it possible for the preparer to limit comments to summary 
remarks or observations about the paper so that more than an hour was 
available for the prepared response of a selected discussant and the ensuing 
open discussion. Although these discussions invariably have been one of the 
highlights of the symposia, unfortunately it has not been feasible to attempt to 
capture and report these discussions for the benefit of the wider readership of 
the proceedings. For those who might like an opportunity to participate in the 
discussions at a future symposium, however, we would be pleased to receive 
an indication of your interest. 
The proceedings of each of the six symposia are in print and may be 
purchased from: 
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
The title and prepaid price of each of the volumes is as follows: 
1972 AUDITING LOOKS AHEAD $5.00 
1974 CONTEMPORARY AUDITING PROBLEMS $5.00 
1976 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM III $5.00 
1978 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM IV $6.00 
1980 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM V $7.00 
1982 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM VI $7.00 
In conclusion, we should like to acknowledge the encouragement, advice, 
and personal support of the symposia so generously provided by Jerry Jackson, 
partner in charge of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & Co. 
Donald R. Nichols 
Howard F. Stettler 
September, 1982 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence 
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The Evolution of Audit Reporting 
D. R. Carmichael 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Alan J. Winters 
Academic Fellow, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind. 
—Rudyard Kipling 
The words the auditor dispenses are a powerful drug. They influence 
resource allocation in our society. Thus, the auditor's report represents a drug 
that should be dispensed and used with great care. Its purpose and limitations 
should be understood by users and they should be made aware of undesirable 
side effects and the dangers of misuse. 
Like all drugs the auditor's report should be subjected to continuous 
scrutiny to evaluate its effectiveness over time. Perhaps steady use creates a 
tolerance that reduces the report's potency. Perhaps it has uses beyond its 
primary purpose. 
Indeed the auditor's report has been evaluated and revised. Since the first 
authoritative guidance for audit report wording was given in 1917, the report 
has been revised seven times. This represents, on the average, a revision 
every 10.6 years. Averages are deceiving, however. The last revision 
occurred 33 years ago in 1949. What this statistic tells us is the report revision 
occurred much more frequently in the early days of the profession and much 
less frequently as the profession matured. A crucial question is why. 
The auditor's report also has been used for purposes other than to assist in 
the allocation of resources. The report has been used to stimulate change in 
professional practice and to influence the auditor's legal liability. A crucial 
question is how, if at all, these ancillary uses have affected the primary use. 
This paper traces the evolution of audit reporting in the United States and 
identifies the major forms of the auditor's standard report and the pivotal 
events and circumstances leading to the development of those reports. It also 
explains the evolutionary process that has shaped present reporting practice, 
created reporting controversies, and that may influence future reporting 
developments. The paper is organized around what we consider to be the 
landmarks in audit report evolution, with discussion of what we consider to be 
the primary environmental influences leading to the landmarks. 
Landmark I—1917 Federal Reserve Bulletin 
Until 1917 there were no authoritative accounting or auditing standards 
established in the United States. In addition, no generally recognized standards 
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had evolved from professional organizations, statutory requirements, or 
litigation. The lack of defined responsibilities applicable to the American auditor 
resulted in a diversity of audit reporting practices. 
Since the profession of accounting was introduced to the United States by 
British accountants, the report form used in England formed a basis for 
American auditors' reports. Although there was no predominant report form, 
an example of a typical "certificate" of the early days is one given by Price 
Waterhouse & Co. on St. Louis Breweries Ltd. 
We have examined the above accounts with the books and vouchers 
of the company, and find the same to be correct. We approve and 
certify that the above balance sheet correctly sets forth the position of 
the company. 
The flexibility in reporting permitted by the lack of defined standards was 
accentuated by the service-to-the-client philosophy that pervaded early ac­
counting practice. In the absence of statutory requirements for an audit, early 
practitioners of public accounting had to justify engagements on the basis of 
economic benefits to the client. Since clients did not have to have audits, an 
auditor was not in a position to dictate the extent of work that a client required. 
The scope of the examination was flexible, but the auditor would, accordingly, 
restrict the report wording to conclusions justified by the scope of the work 
performed. 
Inadequate financial reports and unsatisfactory audits were not uncommon. 
Without authoritative guidelines, without control over the admission standards 
of its members, and without disciplinary authority there was little control over 
the quality of accounting or auditing. The financial panic of 1907 discredited big 
business in the eyes of the public and created a political environment favorable 
to government regulation. 
The legislation that created the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in 1913 and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914 was of overriding importance to 
the profession. The formation of these regulatory agencies started a move­
ment that fostered standardization of auditors' reports. 
Both the FTC and the FRB shared a dissatisfaction with financial state­
ments audited by public accountants. The chairman of the FTC suggested 
three steps to improve audited financial statements: 
• The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) should formulate 
uniform guidelines expressing its judgment as to how alternative 
accounting principles should be handled. 
• The FTC should develop a register of accountants acceptable to the 
FTC and the FRB. 
• The AIA should exercise greater disciplinary control over public 
accountants. 
To avoid political control of the profession, the AIA, through its committee 
on federal legislation, conferred with the FTC and the FRB. The committee 
successfully argued that it could provide guidelines for the conduct of 
independent audits that would overcome the FTC's concerns. The committee 
also persuaded the agencies that it could exercise control over its admission 
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requirements and the ethical conduct of its members, thus precluding the need 
for a federal register of accountants. Finally, the committee suggested that the 
FRB might recommend and give preference to commercial paper accompanied 
by balance sheets "certified" by professional accountants. As a result of these 
discussions came the first authoritative guide for the conduct of independent 
audits, the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917, "Uniform Accounting."1 
The committee seems to have taken advantage of the confusion between 
uniform accounting and standard audit requirements. The Federal Reserve 
Bulletin mixed the two concepts. The preface said "The following tentative 
proposal for a uniform system of accounting to be adopted by manufacturing 
and merchandising concerns . . . . is now reprinted for more general distribu­
tion." 2 However, the text of the bulletin consisted mainly of recommended 
audit procedures. Literally, the publication had nothing to do with uniform 
accounting systems. 
The bulletin concluded with a suggested form of auditor's report, marking 
the first way station in the evolution of auditors' standard reports. 
I have audited the accounts of Blank and Co. for the period from . . . 
to . . . and I certify that the above balance sheet and statement of profit 
and loss have been made in accordance with the plan suggested and 
advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my opinion set forth the 
financial condition of the firm at. . . and the results of its operations for 
the period.3 
The reference to "accounts" in the report and the term "certify" likely 
stemmed from the influence of the English report form. The term "opinion" 
was also used, however, suggesting that certify may not have been intended to 
connote as factual a representation as the literal meaning of the word suggests. 
The reference to the FRB plan communicates adherence to a set of specific 
guidelines and thus adds credibility to the statements. 
This report was by no means in general use. Report wording varied and 
included as alternatives to "in my opinion" such phrases as "correctly set 
forth," "exhibit a true and correct view," "accurately record conditions," 
and "represent the true financial position." 
Although the recommended report was not a "standard" report in the 
sense that it was required by an authoritative pronouncement, it was the first 
report to emerge from the deliberations of the AIA and be recommended in a 
widely circulated publication. Thus it marked the beginning of a series of 
recommended reports that would ultimately lead to a "standard" report. 
Although it must be conceded that the initial effort to recommend a report 
form was partly in response to outside pressure, the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
of 1917 marked the beginning of the profession's exercise of self-discipline 
over the content of the auditor's report. The profession's initiative in response 
to outside pressure resulted in the first landmark in the evolution of the 
auditor's standard report. 
Landmark II—1929 Revision of the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
The march toward a standard report continued with the publication of a 
revised edition of the 1917 Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1929. The revision was 
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initiated by a special committee of the AIA in 1928, prior to the stock market 
crash, in recognition of the commercial growth and prosperity characterized by 
industrial expansion, issuance of new securities, purchases, mergers and the 
accompanying growth in the variety and complexity of financial reporting 
practices. 
The 1929 revision, titled "Verification of Financial Statements,"4 ex­
pressed concern that the 1917 bulletin might have failed to make clear that an 
audit was not a complete examination of the details underlying financial 
statements. Dispelling this notion was important to the profession. The 
increasing size of businesses and the growing volume of their transactions 
virtually demanded testing in an audit. The new bulletin stressed that the 
auditor used tests instead of detailed verification when reliable controls existed 
even though the link between control strengths and audit procedures was not 
well established in practice. The revision suggested a report form, still 
referred to as a certificate, that read as follows: 
I have examined the accounts of . . . company for the period from 
. . . to 
I certify that the accompanying balance sheet and statement of profit 
and loss, in my opinion, set forth the financial condition of the company 
at . . . and the results of operations for the period.5 
Although the 1929 bulletin emphasized testing in an audit, the suggested 
report did not refer to testing or the use of auditor judgment. The major 
difference between the 1929 and 1917 reports was the deletion of the 
references to the "plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board" 
and the "correctness" of the financial statements. In addition, the suggested 
report was divided into two paragraphs that parallel the scope and opinion 
paragraphs of the current standard report. 
Landmark III—The Ultramares Case 
The Ultramares decision erased what accountants had previously consid­
ered to be a clean line between negligence and fraud.6 In substance the 
decision held that accountants could be liable to third parties for gross 
negligence from which an inference of fraud could be drawn. 
The Ultramares case caused the accounting profession to rethink its 
reporting practices. An editorial in the July, 1931 Journal of Accountancy 
offered recommendations for auditors' reports based on the Ultramares 
decision. 
Every accountant's report will be addressed to the client only . . . 
the accountant will divide his report into two sections, one dealing with 
fact (that is, scope of examination) and one with opinion. 
. . . The accountant perhaps should abandon certificates and merely 
make reports . . . The word "certify" which has been used for many 
years is quite inappropriate and should be abandoned . . . It is absurd to 
speak of certifying an opinion.7 
Faced with the potential expansion of liability to third parties, accountants 
began to follow the suggestions in the editorial. The word "certify" began to 
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disappear from reports to make clear that the report was an opinion and not a 
guarantee. The typical report read: 
We have examined the accounts of . . . for the year ended . . . In 
our opinion the accompanying balance sheet and statement of profit and 
loss set forth the financial condition of the company at . . . and the 
results of its operations for the year then ended that date. 
The suggested report revisions illustrate the use of the report as an 
instrument of change. Removal of the term "certify" and emphasis on the 
auditor's conclusion as an opinion preceded widespread acceptance of those 
practices. Thus, the report itself was used to introduce specific changes before 
those changes were readily accepted by practitioners, let alone the public. 
Landmark IV—Correspondence with the Stock Exchange 
The financial reporting abuses that led to the stock market crash in 1929 
had not gone unrecognized by thoughtful members of the accounting profes­
sion. As early as 1927, the Institute attempted to establish cooperative 
relations with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to improve financial 
reporting practices. However, it took the catastrophic market crash in the fall 
of 1929 to excite the exchange's interest in financial reporting reforms and 
cooperation with accountants. 
Late in 1930 a special Institute committee on cooperation with stock 
exchanges was formed. The committee undertook two major tasks: (1) to 
educate the public in regard to the significance of financial statements, their 
value and unavoidable limitations, and (2) to make the financial statements 
published by corporations more informative and authoritative. 
One of the committee's major recommendations aimed at achieving these 
objectives was to require listed companies to adhere to broad, generally 
accepted accounting principles within which they could select detailed methods 
of accounting best suited to their requirements. Companies would be required 
to disclose the methods employed to enable an investor to judge the degree of 
conformity to standard usage. The companies also would be required to 
consistently apply the adopted methods. 
The committee also sought to define the auditor's responsibility for 
financial statements prepared under these new accounting guidelines. It 
recommended that the auditor's report specifically state whether the financial 
statements were prepared on the basis of the accounting methods adopted and 
disclosed by the company. 
The committee's recommendations were approved by the NYSE with one 
critical exception. It was not considered necessary or feasible for companies to 
disclose the detailed accounting methods used so that users could judge the 
conformity of the company's accounting methods with the broad, generally 
accepted accounting principles the committee established. Instead, this re­
sponsibility was shifted from the user to the auditor by requiring the auditor's 
report to state whether the company was following these broad principles. 
In January, 1934, the Institute published a pamphlet titled "Audits of 
Corporate Accounts" that contained the correspondence between the In­
stitute's committee and the Committee on Stock List of the Exchange. This 
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pamphlet resulted in an evolutionary leap in audit report structure that distilled 
and introduced major reporting responsibilities that would not be formally 
recognized in auditing standards for another 15 years. 
These responsibilities are highlighted in the recommended report form. 
We have made an examination of the balance sheet of the XYZ 
Company as at December 31, 1933, and of the statement of income and 
surplus for the year 1933. In connection therewith, we examined or 
tested accounting records of the Company and other supporting 
evidence and obtained information and explanations from officers and 
employees of the Company; we also made a general review of the 
accounting methods and of the operating and income accounts for the 
year, but we did not make a detailed audit of the transactions. 
In our opinion, based upon such examination, the accompanying 
balance sheet and related statements of income and surplus fairly 
present, in accordance with accepted principles of accounting consis­
tently maintained by the company during the year under review, its 
position at December 31, 1933, and the results of its operations for the 
year.8 
This report was in marked contrast to its predecessors. For the first time, 
the report referred to the financial statements as the object of examination 
rather than books or accounts. The concept of testing was explicitly mentioned 
in the report and additional detail concerning the scope of the audit was 
included. 
The opinion paragraph continued to emphasize that an opinion rather than a 
guarantee was being given. This paragraph also introduced the concept of 
accepted accounting principles as a standard against which fair presentation 
could be measured. In fact, the report would seem to resolve the rather recent 
debate over the meaning of the phrase "present fairly in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles." In the above report it is clear that 
the phrase "in accordance with accepted principles of accounting'' modifies the 
term "fairly present," indicating that the committee was unwilling to use the 
phrase "fairly present" alone. This lends historical legitimacy to the conten­
tion that the phrase "present fairly in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles" in the current standard report defines a single standard 
for judging accounting presentations. 
The opinion paragraph also introduced a reference to consistency. Since 
the adopted accounting methods were to be consistently applied under the 
NYSE requirements, the auditor was given responsibility for reporting on 
adherence to this requirement. 
Another significant accomplishment of the Institute's committee was the 
recommendation that the new form of report be adopted as a "standard" 
report. The committee recognized a need for uniformity in the language of the 
auditor's report. This uniformity was intended to accomplish two objectives: 
(1) give a definite form to audit report language among audit firms, making the 
reports comparable and reducing the possibility for misunderstanding arising 
from vagaries in report wording, and (2) make qualifications in audit reports 
more easily recognizable. 
The publication of "Audits of Corporate Accounts" exemplified the 
profession's desire and ability to exercise initiative in improving financial 
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reporting and auditing. Although the pamphlet's requirements could only be 
enforced by the NYSE against listed companies and their auditors, it became 
apparent that the financial statements and auditors' reports of unlisted 
companies might be considered deficient unless the requirements had been 
met. Thus, the audit report continued to be used as a force for change in 
professional practice. The standard wording tended to be used in all audit 
engagements 
Landmark V—The Securities Acts and McKesson & Robbins 
The efforts of the AIA and the NYSE during the 1932-1934 correspondence 
occurred in an environment of severe public criticism of the financial commu­
nity and corporate management. In response to this concern the Congress 
passed a series of securities acts and created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to administer them. The acts placed a new and substantial 
responsibility on the accounting profession from both the standpoint of 
increased legal liability and from the need to improve professional standards for 
both accounting and auditing. 
Although the SEC was vested with the authority to prescribe accounting 
principles and the form and content of the auditor's report, it decided, partly 
due to the persuasiveness of Institute representatives, to leave the initiative to 
the profession. The SEC declined to prescribe the exact form of the auditor's 
report: "Instead we ask for a certificate that shall be illuminating both as to the 
scope of the audit and the quality of the accounting principles employed by the 
registrant."9 
As part of its efforts to take the initiative in developing accounting and 
auditing standards, the Institute revised the Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1936. 
Although the bulletin expanded the discussion of internal control and its relation 
to audit tests, no revision in the suggested form of report was made. 
Practicing accountants had just begun to implement the guidance in the 
revised bulletin when the McKesson & Robbins fraud surfaced. The SEC held 
hearings to (1) determine the detail and scope of the audit conducted, (2) the 
extent to which the prevailing standards of audit procedure had been followed, 
and (3) the adequacy of accepted auditing procedures. One outcome of this 
inquiry was an AIA requirement for confirmation of receivables and observation 
of physical inventory taking. 
The SEC's report was not released until 1940 and by that time the AIA had 
adopted modifications of several positions taken in the 1936 bulletin. The 
modifications were published in a pamphlet titled "Extensions of Auditing 
Procedure" which was reissued as the first of a series of Statements on 
Auditing Procedure (SAP No. 1) to be issued by the Institute. 
The new statement, recognizing the results of the SEC's investigation, 
modified the auditor's standard report as follows: 
We have examined the balance sheet of the ABC Company as of 
December 31, 1939, and the statements of income and surplus for the 
fiscal year then ended; have reviewed the system of internal control and 
the accounting procedures of the company, and, without making a 
detailed audit of the transactions, have examined or tested accounting 
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records of the company and other supporting evidence by methods and 
to the extent we deemed appropriate. 
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and related state­
ments of income and surplus present fairly the position of ABC 
Company at December 31, 1939, and the results of its operations for 
the fiscal year, in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding 
year.10 
The substantive changes in the new report were in the scope paragraph. 
However, what was intended as an editorial improvement in the opinion 
paragraph would later prove to be a major subject of debate within the 
profession. 
The scope paragraph revision emphasized review of internal control as an 
essential element in the audit and implicitly justified the auditor's reliance on 
the system in lieu of detailed testing. This reference to internal control 
preceded any widespread use of control strengths to reduce the extent of 
testing. The new report wording acted as a catalyst to modify practice just as 
much as it informed readers about an audit characteristic. In addition, the 
concept of professional judgment was made explicit in the scope paragraph by 
reference to the gathering of evidence by the auditing "methods" and extent 
of testing deemed appropriate. 
The opinion paragraph revision transposed the words "fairly" and "pres­
ent" and separated "in conformity with GAAP" from "present fairly." The 
reason for repositioning the reference to GAAP was to clarify the meaning of 
the consistency reference. Some accountants apparently believed that "con­
sistently maintained during the year," in the previous report, did not relate the 
principles for the current year to those for the prior year. The changed wording 
removed that confusion, but clouded the relationship between fair presentation 
and GAAP. 
The issuance of SAP 1 also introduced a new report category: the withheld 
opinion. Prior to SAP 1 it was a common reporting practice to specify the 
accounting deficiencies, omission of audit procedures or other similar limita­
tions in the auditor's report and then introduce the final expression of opinion 
with wording such as "subject to the foregoing." The report thus left to third 
parties the decision as to what extent they could rely on the financial 
statements as a whole. 
With the issuance of SAP 1, accountants were prohibited from rendering an 
opinion on financial statements, taken as a whole, when the deficiencies in the 
statements or the limitations on the scope of their engagement would not 
warrant such an opinion. SAP 1 purged from practice the type of report in 
which the auditor expressed an opinion on the financial statements after stating 
all the exceptions and limitations under which the opinion was expressed by 
requiring the following: 
The independent certified public accountant should not express the 
opinion that financial statements present fairly the position of the 
company and the results of its operations, in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles, when his exceptions are such as to 
negative the opinion, or when his examination has been less in scope 
than he considered necessary.11 
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SAP 1 did not, however, preclude the type of report in which the CPA 
indicated the extent of work performed and the findings as a result of that 
work. In fact, the statement explicitly recognized this type of report by stating 
that under the circumstances of a limited scope engagement: 
. . . the independent certified public accountant should limit his 
report to a statement of his findings and, if appropriate, his reasons for 
omitting an expression of opinion.12 
The phrase "if appropriate" permitted the auditor to issue a report that 
neither expressed an opinion nor disclaimed one. 
Landmark VI—The Introduction of GAAS 
The McKesson case had focused the attention of the SEC on auditing more 
sharply than before. In a 1939 speech before the Institute's annual meeting, 
William Werntz, the chief accountant, noted: 
In contrast to the time we have spent on accounting principles, 
there have been few cases before us involving the question of whether a 
reasonable audit was made. 
He then went on to discuss the underlying concepts of independent auditing, 
including the qualifications of the auditor, such as independence, the relative 
responsibility of management and the auditor for financial statements, and 
reliance on internal control. 
The Committee on Auditing Procedure consulted with the SEC and agreed 
that a distinction should be made between auditing standards and the pro­
cedures necessary to meet those standards. It was believed that SAPs 
contained both standards and procedures but that the distinction had not been 
clearly drawn. 
The committee immediately began work on a statement of formal auditing 
standards. However, the committee's work was interrupted by the demands 
made on the profession by World War II and the effort to establish standards 
was not renewed until 1947. 
Meanwhile, in 1941, the SEC amended Regulation S-X by requiring 
changes in the auditor's report, one of which was a statement as to whether 
"the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
applicable in the circumstances." Consequently the Institute recommended 
adding the following words to the scope paragraph in the auditor's report: 
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards applicable in the circumstances and included all 
procedures we considered necessary. 
Thus, the reference to generally accepted auditing standards appeared in the 
auditor's report eight years before the Institute formally adopted them. Since 
the reference to GAAS preceded any extensive development of the written 
expression of these standards, the report wording served to spur that 
development. 
Shortly after the addition was made to the report, it was recognized that, 
since auditing standards were of general application, the phrase "applicable in 
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the circumstances" was inappropriate in this context. Accordingly, this 
sentence was changed to read: 
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards and included all procedures which we considered 
necessary in the circumstances. 
In 1948, after years of experience and after the Institute membership had 
formally adopted auditing standards, a further revision of the report was 
approved as follows: 
We have examined the balance sheet of ABC Company as of 
December 31, 1949, and the related statements of income and surplus 
for the year then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such 
tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as 
we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statements of 
income and surplus present fairly the financial position of ABC Company 
at December 31, 1949, and the results of its operations for the year 
then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.1 3 
The major distinction between this report and its predecessor was the 
omission of the reference to reliance on internal control and testing and 
sampling. Since these aspects of an audit were believed to be widely accepted, 
it was no longer considered necessary to explicitly refer to them in the report. 
The change in practice intended by the original wording had occurred. 
During the ten years from 1939 to 1949, the profession's attention also 
focused on modifications of the "standard" report. Although SAP 1 made clear 
that the CPA should withhold an opinion in certain circumstances, a disclaimer 
of opinion was not explicitly required. Many CPAs issued reports that recited 
their procedures in considerable detail but did not say whether the audit 
described was sufficient to express an opinion. The mere absence of remarks 
concerning the statements presumably indicated that the auditor took no 
responsibility for them. 
In recognition of the need to clarify reporting responsibilities, SAP 23 was 
adopted by the Institute in 1947. The statement modified SAP No. 1 as follows: 
The independent certified public accountant should not express the 
opinion that financial statements present fairly the position of the 
company and the results of its operations, in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles, when his exceptions are such as to 
negative the opinion, or when the examination has been less in scope 
than he considers necessary to express an opinion on the statements 
taken as a whole. In such circumstances, the independent certified 
public accountant should state that he is not in a position to express an 
opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole and should indicate 
clearly his reasons therefor.14 
SAP 23 also specified the choices of report types available to the auditor: 
(1) an unqualified opinion, (2) a qualified opinion, of (3) a disclaimer of opinion. 
The statement indicated that the significance of the exceptions should be the 
criteria used to select the appropriate report type. 
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Although the primary focus of SAP 23 was the requirement that a 
disclaimer be expressly stated when no opinion could be rendered, the 
pronouncement also contained the first authoritative recognition of unaudited 
financial statements. The recognition was in the form of a dispensation to the 
CPA regarding the requirement that a written disclaimer accompany financial 
statements on which no opinion could be expressed. In setting forth the 
disclaimer requirement, the Committee on Auditing Procedure stated: 
However, when financial statements prepared without audit are 
presented on the accountant's stationery without comment by the 
accountant, a warning; such as "Prepared from the Books Without 
Audit,'' appearing prominently on each page of the financial statements 
is considered sufficient.15 
This exemption was not contained in the exposure draft of SAP 23, but was 
added to the final statement based on practitioners' comments on the exposure 
draft. This exception pertained to unaudited financial statements only when 
they were presented on the accountant's stationery without his comments. 
Thus, the use of plain paper was tacitly permitted and a written disclaimer was 
required only if the CPA commented on the financial statements prepared 
without audit. 
The evolution of a standard report had set the stage for the development of 
other report forms that could be considered as having special significance. In 
1954, in the Institute pronouncement Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 
the position set forth in SAP 23 was officially recognized as the fourth standard 
of reporting. 
Landmark VII—The Adverse Opinion 
In 1961, formal recognition was given to a distinct new modification of the 
standard report. SAP 31, "Consistency," created a new report category 
under the caption "change to a principle or practice which lacks general 
acceptance": 
Where the effect of a change to a principle or practice which is not 
generally accepted is material, the independent auditor should so state 
in his report. Such statement requires either a qualification of the 
independent auditor's opinion as to fair presentation in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles or, if the change is sufficiently 
material, an adverse opinion on the financial statements taken as a 
whole.16 
A year later, 1962, SAP 32 was issued which contained the following 
definition of an adverse opinion and the criteria for when one should be issued: 
An adverse opinion is required in any report where the exceptions 
as to fairness of presentation are so material that in the independent 
auditor's judgment a qualified opinion is not justified. In such circum­
stances a disclaimer of opinion is not considered appropriate since the 
independent auditor has sufficient information to form an opinion that 
the financial statements are not fairly presented.17 
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This modification of reporting standards was aimed at prohibiting the auditor 
from disclaiming an opinion to avoid the more definitive and perhaps, from the 
client's viewpoint, more distasteful adverse opinion. 
SAP 32 was not restricted to adverse opinions. It was a comprehensive 
statement that sharpened the auditor's reporting responsibilities under the 
fourth standard of reporting. In addition to defining the four types of audit 
reports the statement discussed unaudited statements, piecemeal opinions, 
negative assurance, reliance on other auditors and the distinction between the 
"except for" and the "subject to" forms of qualification. 
The distinction between "except for" and "subject to" qualifications had 
particular significance. Prior to SAP 32, both types of reports were used 
interchangeably for all types of exceptions. The difficulty this practice posed 
for assessing the significance of qualifying phrases in the opinion paragraph was 
undoubtedly a critical consideration in the SEC's conclusions in ASR 90: 
A "subject to" or "except for" opinion paragraph in which these 
phrases refer to the scope of the audit, indicating that the accountant 
has not been able to satisfy himself on some significant element in the 
financial statements is not acceptable in certificates filed with the Com-
mission in connection with the public offering of securities. The 
"subject to" qualification is appropriate when the reference is to a 
middle paragraph or to footnotes explaining the status of matters which 
cannot be resolved at statement date. 
When the Committee on Auditing Procedure issued SAP No. 32, they 
adopted a similar position. However, the committee was not merely endorsing 
the SEC's view. Some time prior to the issuance of ASR No. 90, the 
committee had submitted a draft of SAP 32 to the SEC that contained this 
reporting guideline. Thus, the profession took the initiative in creating this 
reporting distinction. 
SAP 32 also was the first official pronouncement to contain a section 
specifically devoted to unaudited statements. Although discussion of unaudited 
statements was brief, several new guidelines and requirements were ad­
vanced. 
SAP 32 contained the first authoritative definition of unaudited financial 
statements. In addition, the pronouncement required that such financial 
statements with which the auditor is in any way associated be marked on each 
page as unaudited whether accompanied by the auditor's comments or not. 
The committee also expressed its preference that a disclaimer accompany all 
unaudited statements and required a disclaimer when such statements were 
accompanied by the CPA's comments. 
These reporting requirements were virtually the same as those set forth in 
SAP 23. The term "in any way associated," however, appeared for the first 
time in SAP 32. Since association was not defined, many CPAs continued to 
follow plain paper reporting practices under the view that, since the accoun­
tant's name did not appear in connection with the statements, there was no 
association with them. 
Two years after the release of SAP 32, the subject of unaudited statements 
was again on the agenda of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. Concern 
arose because SAP 32 left unresolved certain questions concerning the 
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term "association," the definition of unaudited statements, the propriety of 
plain paper, and the CPA's association with false or misleading statements. 
These concerns ultimately led to the publication of SAP 38 in 1967, the first 
statement devoted entirely to unaudited financial statements. 
SAP 32 was the culmination of a trend in the increasing explicitness of 
reporting guidelines for audit reports that began with SAP 1. Specifying that an 
opinion should be withheld in certain circumstances was not enough (SAP 1). 
The need to disclaim also had to be specified (SAP 23). Requiring the auditor to 
disclose the reasons for a disclaimer was insufficient. An adverse category of 
reports had to be established to avoid concealment of important information 
(SAP 32). A distinction in the types of qualifications was articulated to clarify 
the category of exception being reported (SAP 32). This trend has continued to 
develop in the reporting guidelines for limited assurance engagements.18 
Landmark VIII—The Seven-Year Scratch 
Although the 1949 version of the standard report underwent minor 
modifications, such as substituting the term "retained earnings" for the word 
"surplus" and adding the statement of changes in financial position as a basic 
financial statement, no major efforts to revise the report occurred until 1965. 
In that year an itch developed to revise the report that was scratched for seven 
years. 
The impetus for revision came from increased criticism of the accounting 
profession due to widely publicized audit failures and growing litigation against 
audit firms. Many accountants believed the criticism and litigation were based 
on misunderstanding of the auditor's function and the meaning of the auditor's 
report. In 1964, the AICPA's public relations counsel stated: 
Too many stockholders haven't the foggiest idea what your certifi­
cate means, and, if I may say so, I think the time is ripe for its revision 
in layman's language and in the light of changed circumstances in the 
past 30 years—particularly that of wide stock ownership.* 
The Committee on Auditing Procedure focused on four major areas for 
potential revision: 
• The inherent limitations of financial statements and the nature of 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
• The description of audit scope. 
• The distinction between the responsibilities of management and the 
auditor. 
• The meaning of "present fairly . . . in conformity with GAAP." 
Financial Statement Limitations and the Nature of GAAP. The committee 
was concerned that the auditor's report did not adequately describe the 
judgments required by GAAP and the resulting limitations on financial state­
ments. Through a series of successive proposed SAPs, the committee 
attempted to create standard report wording to capture these concepts. 
* Note that over thirty years after "certificate" was taken out of the report, the AICPA public 
relations staff still used the term. 
13 
Ultimately, the committee abandoned the effort to describe GAAP and the 
limitations of financial statements in the auditor's report. This decision was 
rationalized on the basis of APB Statement No. 4 and APB Opinion No. 22. 
Statement No. 4 presented the basic concepts and accounting principles 
underlying financial statements. Opinion No. 22 required disclosure of signifi­
cant accounting policies. The committee believed that these pronouncements 
might be relied on to communicate the nature of GAAP and financial statement 
limitations. However, this judgment was undoubtedly colored by the difficulty 
experienced by the committee in trying to agree on a concise description of 
these matters in the auditor's report. 
Description of Audit Scope. The committee was concerned with whether the 
nature and limitations of an audit were adequately described in the auditor's 
report. It proposed revisions in the scope paragraph in three major areas: 
1. The phrase "We have examined" was believed to lack precision. 
The committee recommended the phrase "We have audited." 
2. The term "generally accepted auditing standards" did not, in the 
committee's judgment, specify the particular standards being re­
ferred to or their source. The committee suggested that the phrase 
"of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants" be 
added immediately following the term "generally accepted auditing 
standards." 
3. The committee believed that the phrase " . . . and accordingly, 
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances" was 
too ambiguous. It felt the concepts of testing, evidence and auditor 
judgment needed greater emphasis in the report. The committee 
proposed the alternative phrase "Accordingly, we applied auditing 
procedures to the financial statements and to the underlying data and 
transactions selected by us from the company's records; we con­
sider the auditing procedures to be of the nature and to the extent 
sufficient to provide a basis for our opinion expressed below." 
Distinction Between Management and Auditor Responsibilities. In the 
committee's judgment, the scope paragraph did not adequately convey the 
distinction between management's responsibility for the financial statements 
and the auditor's responsibility for the conduct of the audit and expression of an 
opinion. To overcome this defect, the committee recommended that the 
phrase "these statements are based on the Company's records and other 
representations of the Company's management" be inserted in the scope 
paragraph. 
"Present Fairly . . . In Conformity with GAAP." The repositioning of the 
terms "present fairly" and "in conformity with GAAP," created an unfortu­
nate legacy for the accounting profession. The committee believed that the 
term "present fairly" was open to too many interpretations as reflected in 
legal decisions and critical articles. The committee recommended the phrase 
be deleted and replaced with "present in all material respects." 
The culmination of the seven-year deliberation over the standard report 
resulted in the following recommended report: 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of XYZ Company 
as of December 31, 1972, and the related statements of income, 
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shareholders' equity, and changes in financial position for the years then 
ended. These statements are based on the Company's records and 
other representations of the Company's management. Our audit was 
made in accordance with the generally accepted auditing standards of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Accordingly, we 
applied auditing procedures to the financial statements and to the 
underlying data and transactions selected by us from the Company's 
records; we consider the auditing procedures to be of the nature and to 
the extent sufficient to provide a basis for our opinion expressed below. 
In our opinion, the financial statements mentioned above present in 
all material respects the financial position of XYZ Company at Decem­
ber 31, 1972, and the results of its operations and the changes in its 
financial position for the years then ended in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.19 
Although a substantial consensus existed within the committee that a 
revised report would better communicate the auditor's responsibilities, the 
efforts to arrive at a solution failed. Many committee members, based on the 
advice of the AICPA's public relations division, believed that: 
• Proposed revisions, while technically correct, had unacceptable public 
relations implications for the public and regulatory agencies. 
• Legal interpretations of the auditor's function, role and respon­
sibilities would probably not be altered by a more precise description 
of those attributes in the auditor's report. 
• The increasing effect of "consumerism" presented an unacceptable 
environment in which to attempt to describe limitations of the 
auditor's responsibilities in a revised report. 
The belief that the report needed revision to improve its communicative 
abilities was overshadowed by concern that various segments of the public 
might view the revision as an attempt by the profession to dilute its 
responsibilities. The increased visibility of the auditor's report raised a new 
obstacle to its revision. Proposed changes in the report, unlike those of 
previous revisions, were beginning to fall under the scrutiny of financial 
statement preparers and users. The profession now had to consider how these 
parties might perceive not only the new wording but also the motives 
underlying the proposed changes. 
Landmark IX—SAS 5 
In 1975, the auditing standard setting body took a somewhat different 
approach to clarifying the auditor's standard report. Instead of changing the 
wording in the report, an SAS was issued to deal with the persistent problem of 
what was meant by "present fairly . . . in conformity with GAAP." Since 
previous attempts to find substitute wording for this phrase were unsuccessful, 
the issuance of an SAS in effect interpreted the meaning of the phrase while 
leaving it intact in the report. 
SAS 5 was intended to accomplish several objectives. First, it gave 
guidance to the auditor in fulfilling the responsibility for forming an opinion as to 
whether financial statements present fairly in conformity with GAAP. Second, 
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a formal statement on auditing standards elaborating on this concept made 
explicit what the accounting profession believed the auditor's responsibility 
was. Finally, publication of a standard dealing with the concept provided a 
limited means of informing other third parties, such as report users, what the 
auditor intended in this part of the report. 
Although SAS 5 defined generally accepted accounting principles, the 
substantive guidance concerned how the auditor was to judge the "fairness" of 
the overall financial statements. The SAS specified that fairness should be 
judged within the framework of GAAP and that this judgment involved 
determining that: 
• The accounting principles used have general acceptance. 
• The accounting principles applied are appropriate in the circum­
stances. 
• The financial statements contain the appropriate disclosure. 
• The financial statements present the substance of the events and 
transactions within an acceptable range of approximation. 
Although SAS 5 likely accomplished the objectives of providing guidance to 
auditors about the meaning of "present fairly in conformity with GAAP" and 
establishing the profession's interpretation of the phrase, it is doubtful if the 
SAS contributed much toward educating report readers. The technical orienta­
tion of an SAS and its limited distribution make it an ineffective tool for 
communicating with report users. 
Landmark X—Reports on Comparative Statements 
SAS 15, issued in 1977, redefined the meaning of the reference in the 
fourth standard of reporting to financial statements "taken as a whole." The 
SAS concluded that the phrase should be considered to apply not only to the 
current period financial statements but also to the statements of one or more 
prior periods presented on a comparative basis with those of the current 
period. 
This clarification introduced the concepts of "continuing auditor" and 
"updating a report." The significance of this SAS was to require an auditor 
who had examined the financial statements of the current period and one or 
more consecutive periods immediately prior to the current period to re-
express a previous opinion or, if circumstances warranted, to express a 
different opinion from that previously expressed on the prior year statements. 
In effect, the auditor was explicitly required to consider information obtained 
during the examination of the current-period statements as that information 
might relate to prior-period comparative statements. 
The resulting standard report was: 
We have examined the balance sheets of ABC Company as of 
December 31, 19X2 and 19X1, and the related statements of income, 
retained earnings, and changes in financial position for the years then 
ended. Our examinations were made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the 
accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we consid­
ered necessary in the circumstances. 
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In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present 
fairly the financial position of ABC Company as of December 31, 19X2 
and 19X1, and the results of its operations and the changes in its 
financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.20 
The report change reflected the auditor's new reporting responsibilities for 
comparative statements. However, the major revision in report wording was 
to put appropriate phrases in the plural form. The basic wording of the report 
remained unchanged. 
Landmark XI—Another Seven-Year Itch 
Seven years after the 1972 proposed revision, the Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) again began considering a revised standard report. The impetus 
for this consideration stemmed from the recommendations of the Cohen 
Commission. The commission, relying partly on research and partly on 
congressional and regulatory studies, stated: 
Evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and 
users of his work—especially the auditor's standard report—is un­
satisfactory . . . Recent research suggests that many users misunder­
stand the auditor's role and responsibility, and the present standard 
report only adds to the confusion. 
Thus, it was largely the same reasons that caused the 1972 revision to be 
considered that gave rise to the ASB's new deliberations. 
After extensive research, public hearings and deliberation, the ASB issued 
an exposure draft of a revised report. The recommended report was: 
Independent Auditor's Report 
The accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December 31, 
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and 
changes in financial position for the year then ended are management's 
representations. An audit is intended to provide reasonable, but not 
absolute, assurance as to whether financial statements taken as a whole 
are free of material misstatements. We have audited the financial 
statements referred to above in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. Application of those standards requires judgment in 
determining the nature, timing and extent of tests and other procedures 
and in evaluating the results of those procedures. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present 
the financial position of X Company as of December 31, 19XX, and the 
results of its operations and the changes in its financial position for the 
year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles.21 
The major changes from the existing form of report were: 
• Add a title containing the word independent. 
• Add an assertion that the financial stateents are the representations 
of management. 
• Add a statement that "an audit is intended to provide reasonable but 
not absolute, assurance as to whether the financial statements taken 
as a whole are free of material misstatements." 
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• Replace the word "examined" with the word "audited." 
• Include in the scope paragraph a statement that "Application of 
[generally accepted auditing standards] requires judgment in deter­
mining the nature, timing and extent of tests and other procedures 
and in evaluating the results of those procedures." 
• Delete the word "fairly" from the opinion paragraph. 
• Delete the reference to the consistency of application of accounting 
principles. 
Since several of these proposed revisions were the same ones considered 
in 1972, there seems to be agreement that these aspects of the report should 
be changed. The disagreement concerns how the changes should be made. 
The ASB was no more successful than the Committee on Auditing Procedure 
in reaching a consensus on the form of revision. 
The board received an unprecedented number of comment letters on the 
exposure draft. Although each of the proposed changes had merit for some 
people, the total effect of the changes was apparently not seen as an 
improvement. While the exposure draft stressed that the proposed report 
would not change the auditor's responsibilities in conducting an audit nor alter 
the basis for forming an opinion, many commentators and, ultimately, board 
members decided that the proposed report would be seen as an effort to 
reduce the auditor's responsibility. The overall reaction to the report was that 
it was too negative. 
Although many of the suggested changes faced opposition, the controversy 
boiled down to deletion of the word "fairly" in the opinion paragraph. One of 
the most frequent comments given in support of retaining "fairly'' was that it 
provided a good way to convey the notions of GAAP's inexactitude and the 
auditor's judgment. Others opposed deletion because they believed it would 
make the auditor's report seem less like an endorsement of the financial 
statements. Still others believed that "fairly" was meaningful both to the 
public and to the courts and that its deletion would result in confusion rather 
than clarification. 
Those who favored deleting "fairly" believed it was the primary source of 
confusion in the report. They felt the term implied that the auditor was taking 
more responsibility than intended. That is, that the term suggested the auditor 
was, in effect, forming two opinions: one as to fairness and another as to 
conformity with GAAP. Others who favored deletion felt the term was either 
redundant or so nebulous as to be meaningless. 
The pivotal factor in the proposed revision was whether the lack of 
precision in the term "fairly" was a fatal fault or an irreplaceable virtue. 
Ultimately, a majority of the board preferred to retain "fairly." In view of that 
preference, the board decided that it would not be worthwhile to consider 
revising the scope paragraph if the opinion paragraph would retain "fairly." 
The board believed that it was unlikely that further deliberations would result in 
significant enough improvement of the report to warrant the cost of change. 
Landmark ?? 
The auditor's standard report has remained essentially unchanged for the 
last 33 years. The status quo has persisted in spite of what appears to be 
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widespread agreement that the standard report is not understood by users and 
could be improved to better communicate the role and responsibilities of the 
auditor. Why? 
One reason is the vehement disagreement over how the report should be 
worded to achieve better understanding and communication. This is apparent 
from the last two major efforts to revise the report. 
Another perhaps less apparent reason might be that there is disagreement 
over whether the major objective of the report is to communicate to users the 
role and responsibilities of the auditor. Auditors may be more concerned with 
the protective qualities of the report than with its communicative qualities. The 
language in the current report has been interpreted in court decisions and has a 
known effect. Readers, although they may not fully understand the significance 
of the report, are at least accustomed to the wording. There may be little 
direct value to auditors from better comunication, but a great deal of exposure 
to unknown consequences if the report is changed. 
There are no major calls for report revision from parties outside the 
profession. The dormant nature of the report over the past three decades has 
caused readers to view it as a symbol. Proposals to alter that symbol receive a 
careful scrutiny from parties outside the profession who are concerned that 
auditors may be redefining their responsibilities and shifting some of them to 
others. The report is much more visible than it was in the early days of the 
profession. Changes in the report no longer lie solely within the profession's 
domain. 
The next landmark in audit reporting probably will not focus on revising the 
auditor's report on financial statements. Instead, it is likely that the report will 
be expanded to cover financial information not currently included. Areas such 
as supplementary information and current value financial presentations repre­
sent possibilities. The only safe bet is that the evolution will continue. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Evolution of Audit Reporting 
J. Alex Milburn 
Clarkson Gordon, Toronto 
I read this paper, and then sat back and thought about how to go about 
commenting on it. I had to recognize that I faced some formidable disadvan­
tages. First, the subject of the paper is the evolution of audit reporting in the 
United States—and I am an accountant from a remote foreign land. Second, the 
authors could not be more knowledgeable on the subject. Doug Carmichael, in 
particular, has been part of this evolution for quite some time. Who could know 
better than the authors how the audit report has evolved? I can hardly 
challenge their facts and they are clearly in a much better position than I to 
interpret these facts. 
Buoyed up by these thoughts, I began by asking myself some basic first 
principle kinds of questions—like what am I doing here? I thought about 
questioning the purposes of tracing this evolution in the first place. What is the 
interest in it? What good can come of it? Perhaps I can set up some ideal 
purposes that the paper cannot meet. Certainly, I need some basis for judging 
whether this is a good evolution evaluation or not. Otherwise it is like trying to 
judge "presents fairly" without " G A A P . " 
Naturally, I turned to the FASB conceptual framework. (This is the beauty 
of this developing framework—everything can be explained by it.) I think there 
is some application of the FASB framework to this paper. In particular, I 
presume that the paper attempts to present historical information in a way that 
will help us evaluate the profession's past performance and future prospects. 
Perhaps the paper's usefulness should be judged in terms of whether it helps 
us to see what audit reporting may be evolving towards, and in terms of 
whether it improves our basis for making decisions as to desirable future 
efforts towards improving reporting standards. So we might ask whether this 
paper is useful in this sense. 
As I thought more about this, another basic question occurred to me—what 
are the authors really trying to demonstrate here? Is there a hidden agenda? I 
get the impression of a feeling of a little frustration, and perhaps a touch of 
bewilderment, on the part of the authors. A basic message in the paper is that 
there have been no significant improvement changes in the audit report in 33 
years and that to them "a crucial question is why" (p. 1). They cite significant 
evidence of misunderstanding of the audit report going back to the mid 
1960's—and they describe two major attempts at revision since then that have 
failed. Thus, they raise some serious concerns. 
Focus of the Paper 
I think it very important to identify the focus of this paper because I am 
going to argue that it is too narrow. The authors have concentrated on the 
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annual financial statement audit report. Their primary measure of progress 
seems to be improvement changes in the wording of this audit report. They 
trace the evolution from the undefined, diverse practices of the early 1900's 
through various stages, which might be summed up as follows: 
• Progress in defining and developing audit standards for an engage­
ment—which came to be symbolized by the phrase "generally 
accepted auditing standards" (GAAS). 
• Steps towards trying to clarify the accounting basis for the financial 
statements within the evolving concept of "generally accepted 
accounting principles" (GAAP). 
• Gradual specification of distinguishable reporting sub-types to cover 
all possible signals that the auditor should give with respect to an 
engagement—the unqualified opinion, types of qualified opinions, the 
disclaimer of opinion and the adverse opinion. 
In other words, the authors trace a process of definition, improvement of 
concepts, standardization, solidification. 
To me it is not too surprising to find that changes in the audit report took 
place more quickly in earlier years, as the engagement itself was in the process 
of being developed, and that increasing resistance to change arose as auditing 
matured—became set in terms of legal requirements, precedents and profes­
sional rules. 
Within the framework chosen (the annual financial statement audit engage­
ment) I find the paper well done and interesting. I think it instructive and most 
useful to have the knowledgeable and experienced perspective on events that 
Doug Carmichael and Alan Winters bring to it. 
A Broader Perspective 
However, I suggest that the authors take too narrow a perspective of 
"audit reporting." I will try to demonstrate that, had they taken a broader 
view of audit reporting and its evolution, they would have ended up with a very 
different and, I think, a more useful perspective on past events and future 
prospects and opportunities. 
When I saw the title "The Evolution of Audit Reporting,'' I expected the 
paper would deal with all forms of attest reporting, rather than only the financial 
statement audit. I presume, though, that the authors' orientation was valid in 
the beginning—that the audit of annual financial statements was, in the early 
stages of this evolution, the basic, if not sole, mission of the auditor. But audit 
reporting began to evolve beyond this one engagement some time ago. 
In fact, the paper does mention some evidence of this broadening. In my 
view a key point in their analysis is Landmark VII. Its primary focus is the 
1961-2 defining of the adverse opinion in SAP 32. The authors note in passing, 
though, that the SAP also discussed unaudited statements, piecemeal opinions 
and negative assurance. They end up their discussion of this Landmark by 
pointing out that a "trend has continued to develop in the reporting guidelines 
for limited assurance engagements." But they relegated this to a passing 
reference and did not follow it up. 
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I suggest that in passing by this area they have ignored evidence of the 
formal beginnings of a major development in audit reporting. Some important 
things began to come together in the early to mid 1960's. Perhaps the impetus 
was the growing consumerism which was becoming evident then—and that this 
resulted in pressures for increased accountability by corporate entities to a 
wider public. In any event, there began to be pressures for public companies to 
provide information beyond annual financial statements for various user 
purposes. With this came commensurate pressures upon the public accounting 
profession to provide some degree of independent assurance on certain of this 
information. As pointed out by the Cohen Commission Report, the profession 
first reacted cautiously and negatively to any expansion of the auditor's role-
viewing any association with other than a GAAS financial statement audit as 
fraught with dangers for user misunderstanding and legal liability. (This 
negativism is in contrast with the authors' general finding that the profession's 
financial statement audit reporting tended to lead practice developments.) The 
profession had good reason for concern in the US, as these were litigious 
times. But despite this negative professional reaction, important changes 
began to take place. At first these took ad hoc, diverse and somewhat 
inconsistent forms, just as with the early editions of the financial statement 
audit report. But this evolution has recently been taking a more comprehensive 
general shape. 
Some Evolutionary Developments 
Let me cite some evidence of this wider evolution by reference to the then 
emerging reporting approach referred to as "negative assurance." As far as I 
can see, the concept of "negative assurance" reporting was first given official 
recognition in the early to mid 1960's in the narrowly defined context of the 
"comfort letter" for underwriters on unaudited financial information and 
statistical data in prospectuses. This, and similar reporting forms, soon began 
to spread to other areas. Three examples: 
• Published interim financial information. (The evolution of professional 
reporting in this area is a particularly interesting one. It first emerged 
as a public issue in 1974 when Coopers & Lybrand stepped forward 
and proposed that auditors should be willing, subject to certain 
conditions, to provide limited assurance to shareholders on published 
interim statements. The reactions throughout the rest of the profes­
sion were so adverse that Coopers & Lybrand had to withdraw their 
proposal, but look where we have evolved to since then!*) 
• So-called "special reports" providing limited assurance on specified 
items of financial information, and on compliance with contractual, 
statutory or regulatory requirements (given recognition by SAS 14). 
• Most recently, the development of a "review" engagement to 
provide limited assurance on the financial statements of nonpublic 
entities (in Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review 
Services No. 1, December 1978). 
* I traced the evolution of this, and other limited assurance reporting practices, to 1980 in Canada 
and the US in Limited Audit Engagements and the Expression of Negative Assurance (Toronto: The 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants), Chapters 2-7. 
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What were expressions of negative assurance trying to accomplish? I 
suggest that they were the results of a groping by public accountants in 
practice for a reporting response to situations where there seemed to be a 
legitimate need for some useful degree of assurance, but where a full GAAS 
audit was just not possible or was not practicable from a reasonable cost/ 
benefit viewpoint. 
There are many examples of continuing pressures to broaden the audit 
function beyond GAAP financial statements and a full GAAS audit—including 
reports on internal control systems, assurance on the whole published annual 
report, on forecasts, on supplementary oil reserve information, current cost 
data, etc., etc. 
I suggest that this broader perspective has some potentially interesting 
implications for the evolution of audit reporting: 
• I suggest that these developments expose a broader attest function 
than the traditional financial statement GAAS perspective has allowed 
us to see. Attest assurance may be defined in terms of adding a 
degree of confidence that there are no material errors in a specified 
representation (whether it be financial statements, or whatever). 
This suggests that, conceptually, there is a continuum of possible 
degrees of audit confidence ranging between one extreme of no 
confidence whatsoever, to the other theoretical extreme of 100% 
confidence that the particular representation is what it purports to be. 
The traditional GAAS financial statement audit is a section of this 
continuum, somewhere towards the upper end of the scale. In one 
sense what has been evolving is the whole area below this GAAS 
audit—the reporting of limited attest assurance. Underlying concepts 
and standards in evolution deal with (1) appropriate minimum attest 
effort for different types of situations, (2) user acceptance of the risks 
of undetected errors in those efforts, and (3) effective communication 
of the assurance which results. 
• From this perspective, I think it becomes apparent that "generally 
accepted auditing standards"—which had been developed as the basic 
general attest standards—are incomplete and inadequate.* 
In short, I suggest that this broader perspective strongly points to the need to 
broaden our attest standards—that the so-called "generally accepted auditing 
standards" are really a subset representing only one, albeit important, type of 
attest engagement. 
I introduce all this to try to support a basic point—that when the authors 
implicitly assume audit reporting to be the GAAS audits of annual financial 
statements, they lose, in my opinion, a significant aspect of the recent 
evolution of audit reporting. They end up seeing a world in which there is little 
apparent change, because they are focusing on one fairly mature engagement. 
Words and Communication 
But suppose we accept the approach of this paper—and it is certainly 
legitimate, and potentially very useful, to trace the evolution of the audit report 
* For one suggestion as to the direction in which attest standards should be evolving, see the 
aforementioned CICA Research Study Limited Audit Assurance and the Expression of Negative 
Assurance. 
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on the GAAS audit of annual financial statements. I still have some concern with 
the narrowness of their perspective within this approach. There would seem to be 
some belief, not only by the authors but by the auditing profession in general, that 
the auditor's report is the sole medium of communication with financial statement 
users. If one believes this, it would seem to follow that it is essential to try to 
perfect the words in that report, and that progress in audit reporting lies in 
improving that wording. On the other hand, if one accepts that the report is 
basically a symbol (a symbol of a GAAS level of auditor involvement to arrive at 
a "positive opinion" level of assurance that the information accords with 
GAAP), then one might be less concerned with the exact wording of the 
report. Certainly it would be nice to get rid of words that may have different 
layman's usage than the meaning intended by the profession—for example, the 
word "fairly." Also, it would be nice if we could make more explicit the 
independence of the auditor, the pervasiveness of judgment, and the respon­
sibilities of management for the reported information. However, it may be 
argued that the words themselves become less important if 
1. The reporting symbol is recognizable as representing a particular 
(GAAS) level of audit effort and auditor standards, and a particular 
financial statement representation based on GAAP; and 
2. The underlying standards are defensible and defined in a form that 
reasonable users have access to and can be expected to be able to 
understand. 
(Perhaps some might even argue that these objectives could be met with the 
reporting symbol being a number or a colour, i.e., without any words.) If one 
accepts this reasoning, then the prime responsibilities of the auditing profes­
sion become more oriented towards ensuring that: 
• Attest standards are defensible and adequately defined, and 
• Reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that adequate informa­
tion is available to users on these standards and underlying concepts. 
What I am suggesting then is that perhaps the authors are too preoccupied 
with the wording changes in the report. I say "perhaps," because, in fact, the 
paper is not solely preoccupied with report wording. It notes, for example, as 
Landmark IX, that in 1975 standard setters took the step of clarifying 
"presents fairly in accordance with GAAP" in SAS No. 5 instead of trying to 
change the words in the report. 
The authors note the resistance to changing the standard form of wording 
of the auditor's report, and speculate as to what the reasons may be for this 
resistance. I suspect that they are right in suggesting that once the reporting 
form became reasonably set (i.e. became a symbol), attempts to change it have 
tended to be viewed as attempts to change the meaning of the symbol (what it 
is signalling), even if this was not intended. 
We cannot ignore some very important concerns that the authors raise 
about the understandability of the standard financial statement audit report. 
They point to the Cohen Commission and other sources of evidence that the 
standard financial statement audit report is misunderstood. But I think there 
are at least three possible reasons for this misunderstanding that report 
wording is not going to help. 
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1. Users may not have done their homework. 
2. The standards underlying the engagement may be uncertain, illogical 
or contradictory. 
3. The profession may not have taken adequate steps to educate its 
public. 
To the extent that the latter is the case, I suggest that it is unrealistic for the 
profession to try to educate the public basically by making changes in the short 
form report. In my view, there is just no way that a two-paragraph report can 
serve as the sole means of communication with users—that it can adequately 
portray such subtleties as judgment in the auditing process, the concept of 
"fairness" within GAAP, or the responsibility of management for financial 
information. One must look to the underlying body of standards and practices 
underlying an engagement to understand these things. 
In short, I suggest that we need to have a wider view of audit reporting 
communication. Further, I suggest that the paper evidences some significant 
developments within the past 33 years, basically in the area of improving and 
codifying auditing standards and generally accepted accounting principles. But I 
also suggest that a broader analysis that gets away from preoccupation with the 
wording exposes deficiencies on the part of the profession in communicating its 
standards to its user public, and in educating the public to understand its 
reporting symbols. 
Summary 
In summary, the paper seems to this Canadian to do a good job of tracing 
the evolution of the annual financial statement audit report within the param­
eters that the authors have assumed. But I think that this is too narrow a focus 
within which to view the evolution of audit reporting generally—that we need to 
stand back and look at audit reporting within a larger system that includes other 
degrees of assurance and other representations, or we miss much of what has 
been happening, and the broader implications of this for the future. 
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2 
How Not to Communicate Material and Imma-
terial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls* 
Wanda A. Wallace 
The University of Rochester 
In the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) "Statement on With­
drawal of Proposal to Require Reports on Internal Accounting Controls" (June 
6, 1980) the SEC stated its desire that 
. . . the action announced today will encourage further voluntary 
initiatives and permit public companies a maximum of flexibility in 
experimenting with various approaches to public reporting on internal 
accounting control (and) . . . auditor association with such statements, 
(p. H-1) 
The Commission pointed out that the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) on "Reporting on Internal Accounting Control" (issued 
December 31, 1979 and adopted as SAS 30 in 1980) provides a framework for 
such public reporting. However, while SAS 30 does outline the possible report 
forms related to internal accounting control which can be prepared by the CPA, 
including the necessity of disclosing material weaknesses and permission to 
disclose immaterial weaknesses, if desired, it does not provide any directions 
or illustrations of how these disclosures can be communicated in a meaningful 
form—particularly to the general public. While experimentation may be 
desirable as a means of improving disclosure practices, problems can be 
created for companies and auditors alike if the results of these experiments are 
misinterpreted. 
This paper presents survey evidence which supports the likely diversity in 
financial statement users' interpretation of the effect of internal control points 
(possible disclosures of material or immaterial weaknesses) on report users' 
assessment of management. This evidence, as well as the ranking of the 
various possible report forms on internal accounting control which have been 
discussed in the literature, provide some direction as to the preferred form and 
content of future control disclosures. An analysis is given of the extent to which 
prior beliefs may have influenced survey responses with respect to 
(1) Auditors' present responsibilities. 
(2) The limitations of internal control and audit procedures. 
* This paper is based on a research project which was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell Foundation through its Research Opportunities in Auditing Program. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell Foundation. 
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(3) The state of the art in the evaluation of internal accounting control. 
(4) The expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls. 
In addition, the content of disclosure in management reports regarding internal 
control and related auditors' responsibilities is analyzed. The results are then 
assimilated to draw policy implications for the profession. 
Survey Methodology 
Before the SEC withdrew its proposal to require reports on internal 
accounting control, a survey was conducted of the primary "stakeholder 
groups" with regard to internal control disclosure policies. Table 1 summarizes 
the basis of selection, demographic characteristics of the groups sampled, and 
the response rates. The selected sample is drawn from a number of different 
stakeholder groups and different criteria of selection are applied within each 
sample group to avoid the selection bias which is possible when only one group 
is tested or when asset size of the respondent is the sole criterion of selection. 
The demographics of the samples selected were investigated and found to be 
similar to publicly reported data available through Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 
(1974 to 1980), other survey data, and casual empiricism regarding the 
characteristics of the more general populations from which each sample was 
drawn.1 
Table 2 reports significant differences of opinion across groups regarding 
how internal control points which commonly appear in management letters 
affect the evaluation of management. 
Interpretation of Internal Control Points 
Specifically, it is of interest that CPAs do not perceive the lack of internal 
auditors to be as negative an influence on their assessment of management as 
the other respondents. Similarly, CPAs' interpretation of how important the 
presence of an audit committee is in evaluating management differs substan­
tially from the other respondents. Government respondents are, in combina­
tion with the pilot sample respondents, the most willing to accept a periodic 
inventory system without penalizing management. Government is harsher in 
its evaluation of the significance of all of the internal control points being cited 
than all other groups. The repetition of the points between years is considered 
a rather severe flaw by mutual fund, government, and management re­
spondents. In assessing the effect the size of a company has in evaluating 
management, in view of the listed internal control points, the common stock 
insurance investment officers, CFAs, and private placement groups give least 
attention to the size factor in evaluating a firm's control adequacy. In general, 
the "yes" respondents' comments indicated that expectations for smaller 
companies' controls are lower than for larger companies, e.g., 
Small companies, particularly privately-held firms may frequently be 
managed effectively without many of the formal procedures and 
practices described above. (private placement) 
However, incomplete consensus on the rationale underlying the response is 
indicated by the following marginal comment: 
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TABLE 2 
EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT (A PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES) 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following is a l i s t of internal control points that might appear in a 
management letter issued by an external auditor to a medium-sized client (i.e., 
total sales of the client are approximately $50 million). Please indicate 
whether any of these points would affect your view of the quality of management-
i.e., the degree to which management is f u l f i l l i n g its responsibilities to 
stockholders and creditors. 
INTERNAL CONTROL POINTS 
Consider each statement independently; circle your response. 
Don't know 
None 
Slightly negative 
Negative 
Extremely negative 
If i t is not implemented, 
management should be subject 
to discipline (e.g., fined 
under the foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act) 
(?) 
(N) 
(S-) 
(-) 
(E-) 
(D) 
Key 
Board of Directors & Audit Committee Members (BD) 
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance) (CS) 
Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) 
Mutual Fund Analysts (MUT) 
Government Employees (GOV) 
Pilot Sample (PI) 
Commercial Lending Officers 
Certified Public Accountants 
Controllers for DJIA Companies 
Private Placement Investment Officers 
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail) 
(CL) 
(CPAs) 
(MGMT) 
(PP) 
(T) 
Average 
Standard Deviation (μ) 
(δ) 
96.5 6 0 • .002* 
The client does not have an 
audit committee. EFFECT ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT: 
?** N s- - E- D μ 6 No Response 
BD 8.3 8.3 25 8.3 33.3 16.7 4.0 1.6 
CS 3.4 6.9 20.7 41.4 24.1 3.4 3.9 1.1 -
CFA - - 44.4 33.3 - 11.1 3.8 1.0 11.1 MUT - - - 50 25 25 4.8 .96 -GOV - - 50 25 25 - 3.8 .96 -
PI - 44.4 33.3 - 11.1 3.8 1.0 11.1 
CL _ 53.8 23.1 3.3 .48 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 35.7 28.6 21.4 - - 2.6 1.0 -MGMT - - 25 50 16.7 - 3.9 .7 8.3 
PP 2.9 5.7 22.9 40 25.7 2.9 3.9 1.1 -
T 3.8 7.6 28 34.1 18.2 4.5 3.7 1.13 3.8 
*χ 2 (chi-square) with its significance level is interpreted as the probability of observing the 
sample responses from the nine groups surveyed by mail given they a l l come from a population 
with homogeneous attitudes about internal control information. This χ2 statistic was computed 
based on frequency statistics, although percentages are presented here for ease-of interpretation. 
The degrees of freedom reflect the fact that BD had two subgroups: those directors who were 
audit committee members and those who were not. 
**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100. 
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2 
X -
Although a l l officers and 
employees take vacations, 
control duties and functions 
are not performed by other 
persons during their absence, 
i.e., work is delayed for the 
week. S-
Employees are not adequately 
bonded. 
76.2,60 @ .08 
BD 33.3 41.7 25 4.9 .79 
CS 6.9 13.8 20.7 44.8 13.8 - 3.5 1.12 -CFA - 11.1 22.2 33.3 22.2 - 3.8 1.04 11.1 MUT - - 25 25 50 - 4.3 .96 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 46.2 23.1 23.1 - 3.6 .96 -
CL _ _ 7.7 53.8 7.7 4.0 .50 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 28.6 35.7 14.3 7.1 3.8 1.24 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 25.0 41.7 16.7 - 3.7 .91 8.3 PP 2.9 11.4 22.9 42.9 20.0 - 3.7 1.03 -T 3.0 7.6 18.9 41.7 20.5 3.0 3.8 1.06 5.3 
There is no internal auditor 
or audit staff. 
2 
χ = 133.260 @ .000 
? N S- - E- D μ δ No Response 
BD _ 8.3 8.3 16.7 41.7 25 4.7 1.2 -
CS - 3.4 6.9 44.8 41.4 3.4 4.4 .8 -CFA 11.1 - 33.3 44.4 - 4.3 1.0 11.1 MUT - 25 - 75 - - 3.5 1.0 -GOV - - 25 75 - 4.8 .5 -
PI 7.7 7.7 38.5 30.8 7.7 - 3.3 1.1 7.7 
CL _ _ 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 4.1 1.1 30.8 
CPAs 28.6 14.3 21.4 21.4 7.1 - 2.6 1.4 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 16.7 25.0 41.7 - 4.1 1.0 8.3 PP _ 2.9 14.3 34.3 45.7 2.9 4.3 .87 -T 3.0 6.1 12.1 32.6 36.4 4.5 4.1 1.1 5.3 
No authorization pro-
cedures exist for the 
purchase or sale of 
investments. 
X2 = 82.760 @ .03 
BD 8.3 8.3 25 41.7 16.7 4.5 1.17 
CS 3.4 3.4 6.9 37.9 48.3 - 4.2 .99 -CFA 11.1 - 11.1 11.1 44.4 11.1 4.3 1.6 11.1 MUT - - - 75 - 25 4.5 1.0 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 7.7 38.5 46.2 - 4.2 .93 -
CL _ 15.4 38.5 15.4 4.0 .71 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 21.4 21.4 35.7 7.1 4.1 1.3 7.1 MGMT - - - 33.3 58.3 - 4.6 .51 8.3 PP 2.9 2.9 11.4 31.4 51.4 - 4.3 .98 -T 3.0 2.3 9.8 32.6 43.2 3.8 4.3 1.0 5.3 
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BD 8.3 8.3 25 33.3 25 4.6 1.24 
CS 3.4 13.8 27.6 27.6 27.6 - 3.6 1.15 -CFA - 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 - 3.5 1.2 11.1 MUT - - 25 25 50 - 4.3 .96 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 53.8 30.8 7.7 - 3.4 .77 -
CL 7.7 46.2 15.4 . 3.1 .60 30.8 
CPAs 14.3 - 35.7 42.9 7.1 - 3.3 1.14 -MGMT 41.7 25.0 25.0 - 3.8 .87 8.3 PP 2.9 14.3 25.7 28.6 25.7 - 3.6 1.13 2.9 T 3.0 9.8 28.0 28.0 23.5 2.3 3.7 1.12 5.3 
2 
χ = 113.760 @ .0000 
N E- D μ δ No Response 
2 
X = 
The firm has no manual 
of operating procedures. 
2 X = 100 6 0 @ .0009 
? N s- E- D μ δ No Response 
BD 8.3 8.3 8.3 16.7 41.7 16.7 4.3 1.6 
CS 3.4 - 24.1 44.8 27.6 - 3.9 .9 -CFA 11.1 11.1 - 33.3 33.3 - 3.8 1.5 11.1 MUT - 25 25 25 25 - 3.5 1.3 -GOV - - - 75 25 - 4.3 .5 -
PI 7.7 46.2 15.4 30.8 - 3.7 1.0 -
CL _ 30.8 30.8 7.7 3.7 .7 30.8 
CPAs 21.4 - 28.6 35.7 14.3 - 3.2 1.4 -MGMT - - 25 33.3 33.3 - 4.1 .8 8.3 PP 2.9 - 22.9 40.0 34.3 - 4.0 .9 -T 5.3 2.3 21.2 37.1 28.0 1.5 3.9 1.1 4.5 
Access to computer 
facilities is not 
limited. 
χ2 - 72.9360 @ .12 
BD 16.7 8.3 58.3 16.7 4.4 1.68 
CS 3.4 3.4 17.2 48.3 27.6 - 3.9 .96 -CFA - 11.1 11.1 11.1 55.6 - 4.3 1.2 11.1 MUT - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -GOV - - - - 100 - 5.0 0.0 -
PI 7.7 - 46.2 38.5 7.7 - 3.4 .96 -
CL 15.4 23.1 30.8 4.2 .83 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 7.1 28.6 42.9 7.1 4.3 1.25 7.1 MGMT - - 16.7 33.3 41.7 - 4.3 .79 8.3 PP 2.9 2.9 14.3 48.6 31.4 - 4.0 .92 -T 3.8 2.3 12.1 34.8 39.4 2.3 4.2 1.04 5.3 
A perpetual inventory system 
that continually records 
purchases and costs of sales 
throughout the year is not 
used; instead, the company 
uses a periodic system, up-
dating its inventory records 
once a year. 
dating its inventory records 
once a year. ? 
N S- - E- D u 6 No Response 
BO 8.3 25 25 33.3 8.3 3.2 1.3 
CS 3.4 10.3 27.6 34.5 24.1 - 3.7 1.1 -CFA 11.1 22.2 11.1 11.1 33.3 - 3.4 1.6 11.1 MUT 25 - - 50 25 - 3.5 1.7 -GOV - 50 25 25 - - 2.8 .96 -
PI 15.4 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 - 2.7 1.3 15.4 
CL 46.2 15.4 7.7 7.7 3.7 1.1 23.1 
CPAs 21.4 14.3 7.1 42.9 7.1 - 3.0 1.4 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 58.3 16.7 8.3 - 3.3 .79 8.3 PP 2.9 - 34.3 31.4 31.4 - 3.9 .96 -T 6.1 9.8 29.5 29.5 18.9 1.5 3.5 1.16 4.5 
χ2 = 95.560 @ .002 
All records maintained in 
the branches are under the 
supervision of the branch 
managers. 
2 
X = 81.760 @ .033 
BD 16.7 8.3 25.0 33.3 8.3 8.3 3.3 1.5 CS 13.8 27.6 24.1 13.8 17.2 - 2.9 1.3 3.4 CFA - 22.2 22.2 11.1 22.2 3.4 1.3 22.2 MUT - 25 - 75 - - 3.5 1.0 _ GOV 25 ..25 -50___ 3.0 1.4 
PI 38.5 38.5 15.4 7.7 - 2.9 .95 -
CL 7.7 23.1 30.8 _ 15.4 2.9 1.3 23.1 CPAs 21.4 14.3 7.1 50.0 7.1 - 3.1 1.4 _ MGMT - 25 33.3 25 8.3 - 3.2 .98 8.3 PP 5.7 11.4 31.4 20.0 28.6 - 3.6 1.21 2.9 T 9.8 18.2 25 23.5 16.7 .8 3.2 1.3 6.1 
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? I N I S- I - I E- I D I μ I δ No Response 
How would a management 
letter issued by an 
external auditor con-
taining a l l of the above 
internal control points χ
2 = 81.460 @ .03 
of management? *** ? N s- - E- D μ δ No Response 
BD 16.7 8.3 16.7 33.3 8.3 4.1 1.37 16.7 
CS 6.9 3.4 6.9 31.0 41.4 6.9 4.2 1.26 3.4 
CFA 11.1 22.2 - 22.2 22.2 11.1 3.6 1.8 11.1 MUT - - - 50 25 25 4.8 .96 -GOV - - - 25 50 25 5.0 .82 -
PI 23.1 23.1 30.8 15.4 - 3.4 1.08 7.7 
CL _ 23.1 23.1 30.8 - 4.1 .88 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 - 14.3 21.4 42.9 - 3.85 1.46 7.1 MGMT - - 16.7 25 50 8.3 4.5 .26 -PP 5.7 - 2.9 28.6 57.1 2.9 4.4 1.05 2.9 T 5.3 3.8 8.3 26.5 43.2 6.1 4.3 1.2 6.8 
How would a management 
letter containing a l l of 
the above internal control 
points affect your assess-
ment of management, i f you 
knew that each of the points 
were also noted in the manage-
ment letter issued last year? 
X 2 = 52.660 @ .74 
BD 8.3 16.7 8.3 33.3 16.7 4.4 1.4 16.7 
CS 3.4 6.9 6.9 17.2 48.3 17.2 4.5 1.3 -CFA 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 11.1 3.9 1.7 11.1 MUT - - - - 75 25 5.3 .5 -GOV 50 . 5 0 _ 
PI 23.1 7.7 15.4 53.8 4.0 1.29 -
CL _ 7.7 15.4 7.7 38.5 7.7 4.3 1.3 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 - 7.1 7.1 57.1 7.1 4.2 1.6 7.1 MGMT - - 8.3 8.3 58.3 25 5.0 .85 -PP 2.9 2.9 5.7 14.3 60.0 14.3 4.7 1.08 -T 3.8 4.5 8.3 11.4 50.8 15.9 4.6 1.24 S.3 
Would any of your responses 
change i f the company in-
volved was small (as opposed 
to a medium-sized or large 
company)? Yes No μ δ No Response 
BD 58.3 25 .70 .48 16.7 
CS 44.8 41.7 .46 .51 3.4 
CFA 11.1 55.6 .17 .41 33.3 
MUT 75 25 .75 .50 -GOV 100 - 1.0 0.0 -
PI 84.6 15.4 .85 .38 -
CL 53.8 30.8 .64 .51 15.4 
CPAs 71.4 14.3 .83 .39 14.3 
MGMT 58.3 33.3 .64 .51 8.3 
PP 42.9 48.6 .47 .51 8.6 
T 50.8 38.6 .57 .50 10.6 
2 
X = 20.312 @ .06 
***The respondents were not cons i s tent i n t h e i r responses i n the sense that some i n d i v i d u a l 
comments were deemed to have more of a negative e f f e c t on how management's evaluated than 
a l l of the comments combined. 
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It could even be worse for a smaller company that is not as financially 
sound and a mere marginal participant in an industry. (private place­
ment) 
The observed diversity in the interpretation of internal control points 
suggests that the report form of a management letter or a listing of material 
weaknesses alone is inadequate to provide a basis for evaluation of a company's 
management. In fact, several of the CPA respondents noted that it was 
impossible to evaluate the points without knowing more about the company and 
the context of the control suggestion, e.g., 
It is really impossible to answer these questions without some specific 
context. (CPAs) 
This requirement of more information is not as broadly recognized by other 
respondent groups. However, the evidence is clear that uniform interpretation 
of an internal control point will not occur. While uniform interpretation may not 
be desirable, if the basis of any interpretation is less than full understanding or 
knowledge, problems with such disclosures arise. 
The accounting literature states 
Informative disclosure to prudent investors presumes statement con­
tent which is explicit, complete, and unequivocal. (Griffin and Williams, 
1960, p. 46) 
The SEC advises 
A disclosure which makes the facts available in such form that their 
significance is apparent only upon searching analysis by experts does 
not meet the standards imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 as we 
understand that Act. (SEC, 1948, p. 133) 
The survey evidence on interpretations of internal control points suggests that 
neither of these standards for disclosure would be met by such a listing of 
material or immaterial weaknesses. The points listed in Table 2 demonstrate 
how not to communicate weaknesses in accounting controls. 
A Closer Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers' 
Responses 
If the CS, CFA, MUT, GOV, CL, and PP subgroups from Table 2 are 
combined as users of control disclosures and BD, CPAs, and Mgmt. are 
combined as producers of such disclosures, a test of the significance of the 
differences in responses between these two principal groups can be per­
formed. Such a comparison indicates that at a .05 level of significance: 
• the producer group considers the absence of adequate bonding to be 
much more negative than the user group (4.1 versus 3.7, where 1 = 
? and 6 = D from Table 2), 
• the user group considers the lack of an internal audit staff to be much 
more negative than the producer group (4.3 versus 3.8), 
• the user group considers the periodic inventory system to be less 
desirable (3.7 versus 3.1), and 
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• the producer group considers responses to be more dependent on the 
size of the company than the user group (.73 versus .51, where 1 = 
yes). 
For all other items in Table 2, the differences of opinion across the user and 
producer groups as to the effect of the control points on the evaluation of 
management are observed to be insignificant. 
Within the producer group, it is desirable to separately consider the BD 
group, since the audit committee members act not only as reviewers of 
external reporting issues on behalf of the company, but also act as users of 
internal control disclosures by CPAs. A review of Table 2 suggests that, in 
general, the BD group is harsher on management when reviewing the 
individual control points, other than the two points concerning periodic 
inventory and the maintenance of branch records. However, the combination of 
the control points or the repetition of control points across years is not 
evaluated as severely by the BD group as by other respondent groups. Some 
additional insight regarding these differences in opinion is gained by reviewing 
written comments received on the questionnaire instrument from BD re­
spondents. 
•RE: Periodic Inventory 
Depends on monetary size and quantity of inventory 
•RE: Branch's Records 
Not if properly audited 
•RE: Combined Points 
I don't see external auditors as experts in control. 
Depends on what the letter said. 
As we have those controls as a matter of course, the lack of them 
would have to cause a negative assessment of management—but 
it could be misleading. Management may be maximizing return to 
investors in terms of company growth and making efficient and 
profitable use of resources. 
•RE: Repetitive Points 
This case would still have to be judged on its merits. The 
company view is more meaningful than that of the auditor. 
Would have negative assessment if management was aware of 
these weaknesses but no attempt was made to correct them. 
Overall, it appears that the BD group, many of whom are audit committee 
members, are reasonably astute as to materiality considerations, substantive 
testing alternatives, the absence of cost/benefit analyses by CPAs, the 
importance of the context of internal control points, the central role of cost/ 
benefit evaluations, and the critical aspect of whether attempts have been 
made or plans formulated to respond to past years' control suggestions. How 
might control disclosures be structured to provide similar insight to other 
respondent groups? 
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Preference for Report Forms 
Some direction on how disclosures concerning accounting controls should 
be made can be provided from survey evidence that asks the stakeholder 
groups to rank possible report forms. However, when focusing on the 
preferences summarized in Table 3, it is necessary to qualify the results. 
Several respondents indicated in marginal comments a preference for no 
ranking, and in fact, no report on controls. It should also be noted that despite 
directions to use each rank number 1 through 8 once only, some respondents 
listed repeats, e.g., all 8's. The reason for emphasizing such comments and 
responses is to remind the reader that a preference of 1 does not constitute 
demand for internal control reporting; it simply represents that if reports are 
going to be made available, this is the preferred form. 
An evaluation of the underlying group responses indicates that commercial 
lending officers prefer an audit opinion with materiality limits more than other 
respondent groups; similarly, CPAs are most opposed to the auditor's report 
without materiality limitations. Mutual fund and commercial lending officers are 
proponents of the management letter provision while the Board of Director 
members, CPAs, and controllers are opposed to this form of report (again, 
relative to other respondents). Management is clearly a strong proponent of 
providing its opinion on controls to the public. If the groups were combined 
despite their significant differences, a general preference would be observed 
for a summary opinion on control systems by the auditor relative to a detailed 
listing of either controls or internal control points (the relative average rankings 
are 3.1, 5.2, and 4.3 respectively). This preference for fewer "details," as 
well as some question as to whether any such report should be made available, 
were further emphasized in written comments on this section of the question­
naire, as exemplified by the following quotes: 
None of these reports would be particularly useful to the public. In fact, 
they could be misleading in that the public might view them as an 
auditor's assurance that fraud cannot take place within the firm. 
Too much information is worse than not enough. (private placement) 
I cannot rate these. And do not wish to. Most stockholders and 
probably most investors would not read a report including so much 
additional and technical comment and could easily misinterpret them. 
(common stock investment officer) 
The whole concept of 'a report' is foolish and the concept of trying to 
synthesize the conditions prevailing in our 1,500 legal entities produces 
an exercise in madness. 
Please, SIRS, SUMMARIZE THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 
IN ONE SENTENCE. (Board of Directors and Audit Committee 
Member) 
These comments combined with those reported at the end of Table 3 suggest a 
general attitude that reports concerning internal controls should not be made 
available. The responses to the questions regarding the potential harm and 
perceived value of control reports reinforce this interpretation. 
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TABLE 3 
PREFERENCE FOR REPORT FORMS (A FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES) 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Listed below are eight possible report forms related to internal control which have been proposed for public dissemination. 
Please rank these in order of preference (1 = most preferred, 8 = least preferred); costs related to each report should 
be considered in your ranking. Use each of the rank numbers 1, 2, 8 one time only per column. The reporting alterna-
tives are listed in alphabetical order. 
Key 
Board of Directors 5 Audit Committee Members (BD) 
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance) (CS) 
Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) 
Mutual Fund Analysts (MUT) 
Government Employees (GOV) 
A. Auditor's opinion that a company's internal 
accounting control system adequately provides 
reasonable assurance that there is control 
over errors or irregularities that could be 
material to the financial statements. 
* χ2 (chi-square) with its significance level is interpreted as the probability of observing the sample responses from 
the nine groups surveyed by mail given they all come from a population with homogeneous attitudes about internal 
control information. Note that the underlying assumption of χ2 is independence and that these responses are expected 
to be intercorrelated due to the fact that they represent ranking statistics. Therefore, the mean values for the 8 
responses (A through H) for the 9 groups surveyed by mail were analyzed by calculating the Kendall Coefficient of 
Concordance. The results are reported below: 
W value .379 
χ2df value 23.8567 
Probability of exceeding this 
X2 value i f the null hypo-
thesis of independence is 
correct .001 
Kendall S--sums of squares 
of deviations from expected 
sums of ranks 1,278 
The conclusion is that significant differences do exist among the groups' rankings. As noted in Table 2, the 
reported χ2 statistics were generated from frequency data, although percentages are reported herein for ease 
of interpretation. The board of directors were again subdivided into two groups for the computation. 
**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100. 
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BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
1** 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 μ δ No Response 
16.7 41 7 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 3.0 2.0 
37.9 10 3 6.9 17.2 10.3 6 9 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.4 
33.3 22 2 - - - - 11.1 2.5 2.7 33.3 
25 25 25 3.7 3.8 25 
- - 25 25 - 25 - - 4.3 1.1 25 
30.8 15.4 15.4 7.7 15.4 7 7 - - 2.8 1.8 7.7 
38.5 15 4 15.4 7.7 7.7 - - - 2.2 1.4 15.4 
- 14 3 21.4 21.4 7.1 7 1 14.3 4.3 2.1 14.3 
8.3 - 33.3 8.3 25.0 - - - 3.6 1.3 25.0 
40 14 3 5.7 11.4 11.4 2 9 5.7 - 2.7 2.0 8.6 
28.0 15 2 11.4 12.9 9.8 3 8 2.3 4.5 3.1 2.0 12.1 
X 2 = 92.28 4 @ .26* 
Pilot'Sample (PI) 
Commercial Lending Officers (CL) 
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) 
Controllers for DJIA Companies (MGMT) 
Private Placement Investment Officers (PP) 
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail) (T) 
Average (μ) 
Standard Deviation (δ) 
BD 25 8. 3 25 8.3 16.7 16.7 3.7 2.5 
CS 6.9 20.7 17.2 27.6 6.9 10. 3 3.4 3.6 1.7 6.9 
CFA 22.2 22.2 11.1 - - - - 11.1 2.8 2.6 33. 3 
MUT 25 - - 25 25 - 4.3 2.1 25 
GOV 25 25 - - - 25 4.7 6.2 25 
PI 15.4 - 15.4 23.1 7.7 7.7 7.7 4.8 1.9 23.1 
CL 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 15.4 4.8 1.8 15.4 
CPAS - 14.3 14. 3 14.3 7.1 35.7 6.4 1.6 14.3 
MGMT - 16.7 33.3 8.3 16.7 5.6 1.5 25 
PP 2.9 17.1 25.7 17.1 8.6 14.3 - 2.9 3.8 1.6 11.4 
T 6.1 12.9 15.9 17.4 12.1 9.8 .8 11.4 4.2 2.0 13.6 
C. Description of the existing internal 
accounting controls by management 
(assume the length is constrained to 
five pages of an annual report). 
D. External Auditor's Letter of Recommendations 
(i.e., Management Letter). 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 No Response 
BD _ 8 3 8.3 8 3 25 8. 3 33 3 6.3 1.7 8.3 
CS 20. 7 10 3 20 7 6.9 6 9 10.3 10.3 6 9 3.8 2.4 6.9 
CFA 11.1 22 2 22.2 - - - 11 1 3.8 2.3 33.3 
MUT 25 25 - 25 - - - - 2.3 1.5 25 
GOV 25 - - 50 - - 5.0 1.9 25 
PI 23.1 15 4 15 4 15.4 15.4 - - 15 4 3.6 2.4 -
CL 15.4 23 1 30 8 - - - 7.7 7 7 3.2 2.3 15.4 
CPAs - 21 4 - - 42.9 - 21 4 5.8 1.9 14.3 
MGMT 8 3 - 25.0 - 25.0 - 16 7 5.3 2.0 25.0 
PP 20 14 3 14 3 11.4 8 6 5.7 11.4 5 7 3.7 2.3 8.6 
T 12.9 9 8 16 7 9.8 4 5 14.4 6.8 11 4 4.3 2.3 13.6 
E. Listing of primary strengths and weaknesses 
of the internal accounting control system 
by the auditor (assume the length is con-
strained to five pages of an annual report). 
BD 16.7 16.7 33.3 33.3 6.8 1.1 _ 
CS 3.4 20.7 10.3 3.4 10.3 24.1 13.8 6.9 4.7 2.2 6.9 
CFA 11.1 - 11.1 11.1 22.2 - - 11.1 4.3 2.3 33. 3 
MUT - 25 25 - - - - 25 4.3 3.2 25 GOV - - - 25 - - 25 25 6.3 3.3 25 
PI - 7.7 7.7 7.7j 23.1 30.8 7.7 6.0 1.5 15.4 
CL 7.7 7.7 15.4 7.7 15.4 15.4 15.4 - 4.5 2.0 15.4 CPAs - - - 14.3 28.6 7.1 14.3 21.4 6.0 .4 14.3 
MGMT - - 8.3 - 8.3 16.7 16.7 25.0 6.4 1.7 25.0 PP 2.9 25.7 11.4 5.7 8.6 17.1 14.3 5.7 4.4 2.2 8.6 
T 3.0 12.9 9.1 6.1 12.9 15.2 15.2 12.9 5.1 2.1 12.9 
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B. Auditor's opinion that a company's internal 
accounting control system adequately provides 
reasonable assurances of achievement of each 
of the objectives of internal accounting control 
(i.e., cost-benefit considerations are not  
limited to amounts material to the financial  
statements). 
χ2 = 73.68 4 @ .79 
X2 = 85.98 4 @ .43 
X 2 = 78.684 @ .65 
X 2 - 98.7 8 4 @ .13 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I s 6 7 8 μ δ No Response 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
6.9 
22.2 
7.1 
8.3 
8.6 
6.8 
13.8 
25 
14.3 
8.3 
8.6 
8.3 
8.3 
6.9 
25 
7.1 
11.4 
6.8 
8.3 
13.8 
11.1 
7.7 
7.7 
14. 3 
8.3 
5.7 
9.1 
20.7 
11.1 
23.1 
7.1 
28.6 
15.9 
16.7 
25 
23.1 
15.4 
8.3 
5.7 
6.1 
25 
10.3 
11.1 
25 
25 
15.4 
7.7 
21.4 
33. 3 
8.6 
15.2 
41.7 
24.1 
11.1 
25 
38.5 
30.8 
14.3 
8. 3 
14.3 
19.7 
6.7 
5.0 
4.3 
5.3 
5.7 
6.9 
6.4 
4.8 
5.4 
4.8 
5.2 
1.7 
2.4 
2.9 
2.1 
6.9 
1.3 
1.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.2 
2.3 
3.4 
33.3 
25 
25 
15.4 
15.4 
14.3 
25.0 
8.6 
12.1 
χ2 = 143.884 @ .0000 
F. Management's opinion on the adequacy of the 
internal accounting control system. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 No Response 
BP 25 16.7 8.3 _ 25.0 8.3 16.7 3.9 2.6 . 
CS 6.9 - 3.4 3.4 13.8 3.4 10.3 51.7 6.5 2.2 6.9 
CFA 11.1 - - 22.2 33.3 6.2 2.7 33.3 
MUT 25 - - 50 6.7 2.3 25 
GOV 25 - - 50 - - - 3.7 4.1 25 
PI 23.1 7.7 7.7 15.4 - - 23.1 7.7 4.1 2.7 15.4 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
7.7 
50 
50 
15.9 
7.1 
33.3 
5.3 
14. 3 
8.3 
2.9 
4.5 
15.4 
11.4 
6.1 
7.7 
7.1 
11.4 
11.4 
15.4 
5.7 
6.1 
15.4 
8.6 
6.1 
23.1 
7.1 
51.4 
33.3 
5.8 
2.3 
1.6 
6.8 
5.3 
2.2 
2.2 
.7 
1.7 
2. 7 
15.4 
14.3 
8.3 
8.6 
11.4 
G. Management's opinion, attested to by an 
independent auditor, that a company's 
internal accounting control system 
adequately provides reasonable assurance 
that there is control over errors or 
irregularities that could be material to 
the financial statements. 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
χ2 = 77.3 8 4 @ .69 
BD 16.7 25 25 8.3 8.3 16.7 4.3 2.4 
CS 17.2 - 6.9 13.8 6.9 13.8 31 3.4 4.9 2.3 6.9 
CFA 11.1 11.1 - - - 22.2 - 22.2 5.2 3.0 33. 3 
MUT 25 - - - 25 25 - - 4.0 2.6 25 
GOV 25 25 - - - 25 - 3.3 6.9 25 
PI 7.7 7.7 23.1 15.4 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 4.2 2.1 15.4 
CL 7. 7 - 7.7 7.7 7.7 15.4 30.8 7.7 5.5 2.1 15.4 
CPAs 7.1 7.1 14.3 7.1 7. 1 - 35.7 7.1 5.1 2.4 14.3 
MGMT 8.3 - 8.3 8.3 8.3 16.7 8.3 16.7 5.3 2.3 25.0 
PP 11.4 2.9 8.6 17.1 2.9 14.3 28.6 8.6 5.1 2.3 5.7 
T 12.9 3.0 9.1 12.1 5.3 12.9 23.5 9.1 5.0 2.3 12.1 
21. If you could select some 
combination of the above 
report forms, you would 
prefer*** 
χ2 = 4 7 6 - 2 480 @ .54 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAS 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
25 
51.7 
44.4 
25 
25 
38.5 
30.8 
14.3 
16.7 
54.3 
38.6 
***Percentages indicate how many respondents mentioned a given report within the combination listed on the 
questionnaire; since a number of combinations were indicated, the sum of the percentages is not equal 
to 100%. 
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H. Management's opinion, attested to by an 
independent auditor, that a company's 
internal accounting control system 
adequately provides reasonable assurances 
of achievement of each of the objectives 
of internal accounting control (i.e., 
cost-benefit considerations are not  
limited to amounts material to the  
financial statements). 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 u 6 No Response 
χ2 = 68.6 7 2 @ .60 
16.7 
3.4 
22.2 
25 
25 
23.1 
15.4 
21.4 
16.7 
5.7 
12.1 
33.3 
13.8 
30.8 
30.8 
35.7 
25.0 
14.3 
18.9 
8.3 
17.2 
25 
23.1 
7.7 
7.1 
16.7 
20.0 
13.6 
8.3 
10.3 
7.7 
7.7 
7.1 
8.3 
11.4 
8.3 
16.7 
13.8 
11.1 
25 
25 
7.7 
15.4 
7.1 
8.6 
11.4 
8.3 
24.1 
7.7 
14.3 
22.9 
14.4 
8.3 
10.3 
33.3 
25 
8.3 
11.4 
9.8 
3.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.3 
3.0 
2.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.8 
4.2 
3.8 
2.0 
1.8 
2.9 
3.1 
2.7 
1.2 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
1.9 
2.0 
6.9 
33.3 
25 
25 
7.7 
15.4 
7.1 
25 
5.7 
11.4 
25 
34.5 
33.3 
25 
30.8 
15.4 
7.1 
8. 3 
31.4 
24.2 
8.3 
37.9 
22.2 
25 
30.8 
7.1 
8. 3 
48.6 
28.8 
44.8 
22.2 
25 
3875 
7.1 
40.0 
27.3 
8.3 
24.1 
22.2 
50 
7.7 
7.1 
28.6 
18.2 
16. 7 
6.9 
25 
38.5 
15.4 
21.4 
25 
5.7 
11.4 
25 
6.9 
22.2 
25 
23.1 
23.1 
7.1 
8.3 
8.6 
12.1 
25 
6.9 
11.1 
25 
5.7 
6.8 
A B C D E F G H 
22. Would you consider public 
dissemination of any of the x 2 = 4 6 7 . 7 3 6 0 @ . 0 0 0 1 
above report forms to be: 
Of l i t t l e or no value? 
A B C D E F G H 
BD 8. 3 8.3 66.7 33.3 41.7 33.3 16.7 25 
CS 10.3 10.3 31.0 17.2 24.1 37.9 17.2 31 
CFA 22.2 22.2 33.3 33.3 11.1 33.3 22.2 22.2 
MUT 25 25 25 - 25 25 25 -
GOV - 25 25 - 25 - - -
PI 23.1 
38.5 
61.5 38.5 76.9 46.2 46.2 38.5 
CL 23.1 30.8 46.2 46.2 38.5 53.8 30.8 38.5 
CPAS 35.7 35.7 71.4 57.1 64. 3 28.6 35.7 50 
MGMT 41.7 58.3 83.3 50.0 83.3 33.3 41.7 58.3 
PP 11.4 11.4 37.1 17.1 20 45.7 25.7 34. 3 
T 18.2 21.2 46.2 28.8 34.8 37.9 25 34.1 
Harmful ? χ2 = 329.8 2 4 0 @ .0001 
BD 8.3 8.3 41.7 33. 3 8. 3 
CS 6.9 3.4 3.4 27.6 24.1 3.4 6.9 6.9 
CFA 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 33.3 22.2 22.2 
MUT - - 25 25 25 - - -
GOV - - 25 25 - - - -
PI 30.8 38.5 23.1 46.2 30.8 23.1 23.1 30.8 
CL 15.4 15.4 7.7 23.1 38.5 15.4 23.1 23.1 
CPAS 28.6 42.9 35.7 50 57.1 28.6 28.6 42.9 
MGMT - - 8. 3 8.3 16.7 - - -
PP 8.6 5.7 8.6 31.4 28.6 8.6 11.4 11.4 
T 9.8 10.6 12.1 29.5 29.5 9.8 11.4 13.6 
Is there some other report form not l isted that 
you would prefer to the above alternative? 
Board of Directors 
& 
The SEC's insistence on more reports w i l l tend to dilute more 
important information in annual reports. 
Audit Committee Members The auditor's certificate is a l l the reassurance needed. 
Common Stock Investment 
Officers (Insurance) 
A management statement l i s t ing uncorrected management letter 
comments. 
Pilot Sample N/A: Question was not included on pilot survey instrument. 
Commercial Lending Officers No report should be offered. 
Certified Public Accountants SEC proposal for Phase I only. 
Controllers for DJIA Companies Compliance is a matter of law under FCPA. 
In our view no additional reports should be required. 
Private Placement Investment Officers Some standard established by accounting profession. 
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With respect to potential harm, several respondents stated that such 
disclosures would be 
Dangerous to make . . . public due to (their) proprietary nature. 
(private placement) 
Hence, some general consensus that internal control reports are not desired is 
reflected by marginal comments, and if such reports are made available, the 
respondents clearly do not prefer the most extensive or most expensive report 
forms. In general, for the total sample, the auditor's report on internal 
controls, perhaps accompanied by management's opinion, limited to materiality 
considerations, is the preferred report form if control reporting is required. 
A Second Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers' 
Responses 
When the same user/producer dichotomy described for Table 2 is applied to 
Table 3, the following significant differences (at a .05 level) are observed: 
• the user group prefers reports 
A (2.8 versus 3.6), 
B (3.8 versus 5.1), 
C (3.7 versus 5.8), and 
D (4.6 versus 6.4) 
relative to the producer group and 
• the producer group prefers reports 
F (2.6 versus 6.4) and 
G (3.0 versus 4.1) 
relative to the user group. 
Obviously these difference statistics are not strictly appropriate for the data, 
given they are intercorrelated rankings, but they do provide insight as to which 
reports influence the overall significance of the Kendall Coefficient of Concor­
dance, reported in Table 3. 
Of particular interest, as suggested earlier, are the responses of the BD 
group, a continuing user of internal control disclosures by CPAs. As reported 
in Table 3, the BD group ranks public disclosure of either the external auditor's 
letter of recommendations (report D) or a listing of strengths and weaknesses 
in the internal accounting control system by the auditor (report E) extremely 
low relative to the other respondents (6.3 and 6.8 respectively, versus an 
overall mean for the total sample, including BD, of 4.3 and 5.1). It would 
appear that as frequent users of management letters, the BD members would 
oppose making such reports public. As reflected in the comments already 
cited, the BD group, as well as the other respondents, generally opposed the 
concept of such potentially long and complicated disclosures. A comment by 
one BD respondent reflects the overall message: 
The auditor's certificate is all the reassurance needed. 
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The Effect of Prior Beliefs on Observed Attitudes Related to Inter-
nal Accounting Control 
The survey instrument was constructed to provide a means of gaining some 
understanding of the extent to which the survey responses are affected by the 
• misunderstanding of current audit responsibilities, 
• lack of awareness that internal control adequacy does not preclude 
fraud, and 
• tendency of respondents not to consider cost factors in such policy 
issues. 
This study utilizes an "attitude-behavioral intention" framework (see Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975 for a detailed theoretical discussion). Prior beliefs about 
internal accounting control systems or extended reporting responsibilities and 
their related costs are assessed as a basis for explaining the attitudes of 
respondents regarding 
• the desirability of extending internal accounting control reporting 
responsibilities, 
• internal accounting control report preference rankings, and 
• the effect of internal accounting control points, reported in an 
auditor's management letter, on the evaluation of the degree to which 
management is fulfilling its responsibilities to stockholders and credi­
tors. 
The results are reported in Exhibit A of the Appendix. 
Exhibit A first outlines the operational questions used to assess beliefs 
regarding auditors' present responsibilities with respect to internal control, 
limitations of internal control and audit procedures, the state of the art with 
respect to evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls, 
and the expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls. The belief 
codes are then related to respondents' attitudes regarding the desirability of 
auditors' involvement, preference for internal control report forms, and the 
evaluation of internal control points in management letters. 
The key findings, as reported in Exhibit A include the following: 
• respondents' beliefs regarding auditors' present responsibilities ex­
plain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinions 
concerning 
—whether management's opinion on the adequacy of the internal 
accounting control system is preferred (72%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that employees 
are not adequately bonded would have an effect on how manage­
ment is assessed (56%), and 
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control 
points on the assessment of management would change if the 
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large 
company) (64%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the limitations of internal control and 
audit procedures explain a substantial amount of the observed 
variation in opinions concerning 
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—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (54%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that all of the 
current year's comments were also noted in the management letter 
issued last year (60%), and 
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control 
points on the assessment of management would change if the 
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large 
company) (61%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the state of the art with respect to 
evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls 
explain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinion 
concerning 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (40%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that although all 
officers and employees take vacations, control duties and functions 
are not performed by other persons during their absence, i.e., 
work is delayed for the week, would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (44%), and 
—whether a management letter containing all of the management 
letter points cited would affect the assessment of management 
(39%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the expected costs of expanded study 
and evaluation of controls explain a substantial amount of the 
observed variation in opinion concerning 
—the desirability of auditors' involvement in the evaluation of internal 
controls (32% due to expected costs; 17% due to the expectation 
that fraud would be deterred; 31% due to the expectation that the 
public will be misled) and 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (16% due to expected costs; and 20% due 
to the expectation that the public will be misled). 
The implication which can be drawn from interpreting the main effects in the 
analysis of variance models that are reported in Exhibit A is that the profession 
can influence the various respondent groups' attitudes on control-related 
reporting issues by providing public information that will have an effect on 
these individuals' beliefs regarding the auditor's current activities, inherent 
limitations in control systems, available technology, and the costs of expanding 
both auditors' responsibilities and disclosure requirements. The information 
responsibilities of the profession are substantial, and "miscommunication," 
particularly as to auditors' current activities, can be expected to influence 
attitudes on disclosure issues. 
"Misinformation" About Internal Control in Management Reports 
One potential source of "misinformation" on auditors' responsibilities is 
the management report. The profession should, in light of the evidence 
presented in Exhibit A, exercise considerable care in reviewing management's 
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disclosures to ensure that auditors' activities, as well as the limitations of 
control systems and the cost considerations in establishing such systems, are 
accurately represented. 
Management reports were suggested by The Committee on Auditors' 
Responsibilities (1978, p. 76), and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants' Special Advisory Committee issued "Tentative Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Reports by Management," providing examples of 
wording.2 However, no standard language is presented; per discussion with an 
AICPA representative, the Committee wanted to avoid a letter format that 
would result in "boilerplate" application. However, as demonstrated in the 
following content analysis of management reports that are being issued, there 
are hazards of not prescribing a standard report. 
A Growing Concern 
Increased concern over the problems of imprecise language in manage­
ment's reports is warranted in light of the growing number of companies 
including such representations in their financial statements; Business Week 
reported in its April 16, 1978 issue that 
a surprising 38% of the (annual) reports (reviewed) carried such a note 
(companies acknowledging management's responsibility for developing 
the financial figures) compared with only four companies a year ago. 
This number has grown in apparent response to the Financial Executives 
Institute's (1978) endorsement that a management report be furnished in 
annual reports to shareholders. Beresford et al (1980) report from a sample of 
305 companies drawn from the Fortune top 1000 companies, 40% issued 
management reports in 1979 relative to 23% in 1978. Similarly, Price 
Waterhouse & Co. reports that 56% of a sample of large electric, gas, and 
water companies issued 1980 management reports, compared to 39% in 1979 
(Smartt, 1981). 
If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal to require a 
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control (1979), postponed 
by the SEC in its June 6, 1980 withdrawal, were to be implemented, the scope 
of the problem with "misinformation" about internal controls would increase. 
Loose language concerning auditors' responsibilities could not only persist in 
management reports, but could be carried over to statements by management 
on internal accounting control. 
Such imprecision could have liability implications for both companies and 
auditors (particularly with respect to "perceived" attestations of compliance 
with the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(b)(2)]. In past litigation, auditors' internal 
control work has been liberally interpreted in its scope. 
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law and 
statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First Securities' internal 
control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to 
prepare for filing with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
condition required under Section _ 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 17a-5, 
17 CFR _ 240.17a-5. 
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While responsibilities for Securities brokers or dealers include a review of 
internal controls according to audit procedures prescribed by the jurisdictional 
agency, such statements of expanded scope are not recommended to be 
included in reports to the public (Committee on Auditing Procedure, "Audits of 
Brokers or Dealers in Securities"). The above quote from Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder extends the review responsibility to include the auditor/customer 
relationship, in spite of potential problems with the customer's knowledge of 
the nature of the review conducted, or understanding of its limitations. 
In the Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. case (1976, 195, 683), Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. faced the claim3 (among others) that the proxy 
statements were deficient for 
failure to disclose that Chadbourn (a company with whom Standard 
merged) had continuing serious deficiencies in its data processing 
systems that jeopardized its business future and cast substantial doubt 
upon internally generated business statistics. 
It is clear that the courts are contesting the limited evaluation and reporting 
responsibilities of auditors regarding internal controls. The common issuance 
of management reports that claim an extended audit function is likely to provide 
added impetus to litigation disputes. 
An additional ramification of "misinformation" is its potential effect on 
individuals' decision-making. If creditors and investors believe the attest 
function extends to internal controls, they may not assess the risk profile of 
individual companies properly. This implies misallocations of resources and 
wealth transfers which would not occur in the absence of such erroneous 
beliefs. 
Methodology 
From the population of annual reports on file at the Graduate School of 
Management Library, at the University of Rochester, the latest available 
report for 88 of the 1980 top Fortune 100 companies was examined and a 
sample of 49 management reports was identified. Exhibit B of the Appendix 
summarizes the results of the content analysis which was performed for six of 
the companies providing management reports. Similar information for the other 
43 companies can be obtained by contacting the author, who is now at Southern 
Methodist University. Exhibit C of the Appendix lists those "latest" annual 
reports reviewed for the sample that contained no management report, as well 
as those 12 companies of the Fortune 100 for which no annual report was 
available. 
Results 
Although Exhibit B indicates that many of the management reports contain 
similar content and tend to concern the topics generally described in the 
literature, "misinformation" is present in many of the reports regarding 
• the requirements of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), 
and 
• the nature of internal control. 
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Under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) an auditor is 
permitted to make an economic choice between reliance on internal controls or 
non-reliance. If the auditor believes a more effective and efficient audit can be 
performed without testing the control system, or if the system has such 
significant weaknesses that reliance is unwarranted, the auditor may only 
perform substantive tests. 
In addition, GAAS apply to internal accounting controls as distinct from 
internal controls. Operating controls like quality of production checks are not 
subject to the auditor's review. In addition, only administrative controls that 
directly affect the accounts are required to be considered in the normal course 
of an audit. This emphasis on internal accounting controls is a very small subset 
of a firm's internal controls, i.e., the nervous system that activates overall 
operating policies and keeps a business within practical performance ranges. 
Furthermore, any reference to an auditor's review of such elements as 
"timeliness of disclosure" suggests an efficiency orientation to an audit which 
misrepresents the general nature of the audit function. Other than meeting 
regulators' time limits, there will be no specific attention paid to whether 
production reports or other disclosures are prepared in a timely manner. 
Not only do Generally Accepted Auditing Standards not require a compre­
hensive review of an entire system of internal accounting controls, they do not 
provide a basis for reporting on the adequacy of internal accounting controls 
(let alone internal controls). Communication of material weaknesses in internal 
accounting control that come to an auditor's attention during an examination of 
financial statements is required. 
However there is no requirement under generally accepted auditing 
standards to evaluate each control or to identify every material 
weakness. (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20, ¶3). 
In addition, the criterion applied by an auditor to identify a material weakness is 
whether reasonable assurance is provided that "errors or irregularities in 
amounts that would be material in the financial statements being audited would 
be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the normal 
course of performing their assigned activities." (Statement on Auditing 
Standard No. 1). These criteria may be broader than those that may be 
appropriate for evaluating weaknesses in accounting control for management or 
other purposes. 
Auditors differ as to their policies regarding the recommendation of internal 
control modifications and improvements. There is no requirement that they 
make such recommendations, and when the suggestions are verbalized, they 
are not analyzed on a cost/benefit basis to determine the propriety of the 
changes. The frequent absence of comprehensive internal control review and 
written control suggestions by auditors and the responsibility of management 
to select a control system based on cost/benefit estimates suggest that regular 
duties of auditors are being exaggerated and the management decision process 
for selection of controls is not being appropriately communicated in representa­
tions by managers. 
"The work of internal auditors cannot be substituted for the work of the 
independent auditor" (Statement on Auditing Standard No. 9). While internal 
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auditors' procedures affect the nature, timing, and extent of the independent 
auditor's work, such internal audit functions are a supplement to, not a 
substitute for, the work of the independent auditor. The independent auditor 
will duplicate the efforts of internal auditors in the sense that tests of some of 
the work of internal auditors will be performed. Obviously, if significant 
defalcations by management occurred, there could be an incentive for internal 
auditors to concentrate their "work" in that area in an attempt to deter the 
external auditor from testing that area of control and/or set of transactions. 
While an independent auditor does not expect or search for fraud, the 
independence issue precludes clear substitution of internal audit work in an 
examination by an external auditor. 
Exhibit B illustrates phraseology that could be misleading to report users in 
understanding GAAS. Confusion already exists with respect to auditor respon­
sibility for the detection of fraud, as reported in survey results by Professor 
Richard E. Ziegler. Ziegler reports that bankers, financial analysts, and 
individual shareholders agree 
That an examination made in accordance with GAAS means that the 
auditor conforms to GAAS; evaluates the adequacy of the accounting 
system; (and) uses procedures specifically intended to detect fraud or 
other irregularities (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 
1977, pp. 174-175). 
Furthermore, the nature of internal control, particularly its limitations, is not 
adequately discussed in most management reports. An analysis by a re­
searcher at the AICPA concerns problems with discussions of internal 
controls, other than the auditor's role, in fifty-eight management reports (56 
from 1977 annual reports and 2 from 1978 reports). Zuber (1978) found only 
five of the fifty-eight reports referred to "internal accounting control" as 
opposed to internal control or financial control. Only nine of the fifty-eight 
reports discussed cost/benefit considerations and even fewer (five) referred to 
"inherent limitations" of internal accounting control. Other evidence accumu­
lated by Zuber on the elements contained in the internal control references 
found in annual reports clearly demonstrates "misinformation" on current 
design and implementation practices and the general nature of internal control 
systems. While the results of my own study demonstrate some improvement 
relative to Zuber's findings, "misinformation" is still apparent. A key problem 
is that discussions of the adequacy of internal accounting controls are 
frequently loosely coupled with descriptions of independent auditors' activities. 
While much literature has discussed the frequency of management reports and 
their general content (see, for example, Brown and Kintzele, 1980 and 
Financial Analysts Journal, 1980), to my knowledge, other than the Zuber 
(1978) research cited above, little attention has been given to the detailed 
disclosures that can "miscommunicate." 
Implications for Disclosure 
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 and Exhibits A and B has several 
implications for the auditor: 
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• Although SAS No. 30 permits disclosure of both material and 
immaterial weaknesses in public reports that express the auditor's 
opinion of internal accounting control as of a specified time period, the 
auditor should refrain from short listings of internal control points 
such as those summarized in Table 2 
—to avoid misinterpretation, 
—to avoid disclosing proprietary information, and 
—besides, users appear to prefer an opinion, in contrast to detailed 
information. 
• While SAS No. 30 specifies that reports on an entity's system based 
solely on a study and evaluation of internal accounting control made as 
part of an audit is intended for "restricted use," such use includes 
"other specified third parties"; since it is probable such parties will 
include some of the stakeholder groups sampled in this study, a mere 
listing of control points could cause problems similar to those typically 
anticipated for reports on which no restrictions are placed on use. 
• If a description of a control weakness is required, such description 
must explicitly describe the risk exposure from such a weakness; 
otherwise users will draw their own inferences concerning risk, some 
of which are likely to overstate or understate the actual risk faced by 
the entity. 
• When conferring with a client who is preparing a management report 
on controls, the auditor should make management aware of the 
observed diversity of interpretation of such disclosures and the 
possibility of disclosing proprietary information, as well as the 
importance of accurately describing the auditors' limited involvement 
with internal accounting controls and the inherent limitations and cost/ 
benefit dimensions of a control system. 
• When requested to provide services related to the evaluation of 
controls, the CPA can discuss the reported preferences for control 
disclosures, and thereby assist the client in selecting the preferred 
type of engagement. 
• When asked to advise a client as to whether resources should be 
allocated to a report on internal accounting controls, the general lack 
of interest in such reports indicated in this study can be discussed, as 
can the regulatory threat by the SEC of requiring such reports in the 
absence of voluntary disclosure; presumably, a cost/benefit analysis 
could then be performed by the entity as to its preferred disclosure 
strategy. 
To meet desired standards of disclosure, Table 2 with the reported 
diversity of interpretation demonstrates how not to disclose weaknesses; 
additional direction to the profession beyond SAS 30 as to the form of 
disclosure which would at least narrow the range of the perceived effects of a 
particular weakness would be useful in avoiding possible ill effects of experi­
menting with control disclosures. Furthermore, Exhibit B suggests some 
potentially misleading disclosures in management reports which warrant 
attention by the profession. 
My analysis presented in Exhibit A of the Appendix suggests one approach 
to improving the consistency with which existing disclosures and future 
proposals for additional disclosures, particularly those related to internal 
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accounting controls, are evaluated by market participants. By informing the 
public as to the state of the art of audit technology, the requirements of GAAS, 
the current responsibilities of CPAs, and the verifiable costs of proposed 
requirements, market participants' beliefs on such matters will be more 
consistent with observed auditing practices, and, in turn, their attitudes 
involving disclosure policies can be expected to be less diverse than would be 
the case if erroneous beliefs as to auditing practices were permitted to persist. 
Footnotes 
1. A wave analysis comparing early and late respondents, as well as a paired-sample t-test of 
original responses with those received from a post-questionnaire study were performed as tests 
for nonresponse bias. No significant differences were observed. 
2. Beresford et al (1980) provide a useful comparison of the subjects which have been proposed 
for inclusion in management reports by the Financial Executives Institute, the Cohen Commission, 
and the AICPA. 
3. While this case was appealed and decided in favor of the accountant, as was the Hochfelder 
case, the mere claim in past litigation that auditors be held responsible for assessing the adequacy 
of internal controls suggests that litigious concerns are warranted. 
References 
AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20, "Required Communication of Material 
Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control" (Professional Standards, Vol. 1 AU Section 323, 
01, August, 1977). 
AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30, "Reporting on Internal Accounting Control" 
(AICPA, 1980). 
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. (1976-77 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L . Rep. (CCH) 195, 
683 (E.D. Term., 1976). 
Beresford, Dennis R., James J. Doyle, and Gary A. Zell, "On Trial-Voluntary Internal Control 
Reports," Financial Executive (September, 1980), pp. 14-19. 
Brown, Frank A. and Philip L. Kintzele, "Management Reports—Only a Few Are Appearing in 
Annual Reports," The Woman CPA (April, 1980), pp. 14-16. 
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1978). 
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report of Tentative Conclusions (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1977). 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (U.S. Supreme Court, 1976). 
Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 1980), pp. 79-80. 
Financial Executives Institute, letters to members, June 6, 1978. 
Fishbein, Martin and I. Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory 
and Research (Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 1-52. 
The 1981 Fortune Double 500 Directory (New York: Time, Inc., 1981), pp. 4-7. 
Griffin, Charles H. and Thomas H. Williams, "Measuring Adequate Disclosure," The Journal of 
Accountancy (April, 1960), pp. 43-48. 
Heidrick and Struggles, Inc., "The Changing Board" (1977); "The Changing Board Update" 
(1978); "Director Data" (June 1978) and (April 1979); and "Profile of a Bank and Bank Holding 
Company Chief Executive Officer" (1974 and 1980). 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b) (2) (B). 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting Series Releases (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 133. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, "Statement of Management on Internal Accounting 
Control," 17CFR Parts 221, 229, 240, 249; Release No. 34-15772 File No. S7-779 (April, 
1979). 
Securities and Exchange Commission, "Statement on Withdrawal of Proposal to Require Reports 
on Internal Accounting Controls," Accounting Series Release No. 278, 17CFR Parts 211, 229, 
240, 249; Release No. 34-16877, File No. S7-839 (June 6, 1980). 
50 
Smartt, L . "The Management Report in Financial Statements—Coming or Going" Public Utilities 
Fortnightly (November 19, 1981), pp. 6, 7. 
Special Advisory Committee, "Tentative Conclusions and Recommendations of the Reports by 
Management," File Ref. No. 4267 (AICPA, December 8, 1978). 
Zuber, George, "Analysis Submitted to the Task Force on Reporting on Internal Control," File 
Ref. No. 4285 (AICPA, November 3, 1978). 
APPENDIX 
• Exhibit A 
ANOVA Results Concerning the Relationship of Beliefs and 
Attitudes Related to Internal Accounting Control 
• Exhibit B 
A Content Analysis of Management Reports 
• Exhibit C 
No Management Report Included in Annual Report Reviewed 
51 
EXHIBIT A 
ANOVA Results Concerning the Relationship of Beliefs and Attitudes Related to Internal Accounting Control 
•Auditors' Present Responsibilities 
This series of statements is 
designed to determine your views 
about the nature of internal 
accounting control and its 
current relationship to the 
external audit function. For 
each item, please answer by 
circling one of the following 
categories: 
Definitely True (DT) 
More True than False (MTF) 
Uncertain (?) 
More False than True (MFT) 
Definitely False (DF) 
BELIEFS 
Operational Questions 
Al l internal accounting controls that have a significant bearing on the prevention and 
detection of material fraud are tested by the external auditor annually. 
The auditor's unqualified audit report implicitly indicates that no material weakness 
exists in the internal accounting controls of the client. 
The determination of whether or not recommended internal accounting controls are 
justified on a cost/benefit basis is the responsibility of the auditor. 
Special examinations specifically designed to detect defalcations will uncover a l l 
current defalcations. 
If a financial statement item can be substantiated with less effort by not relying on 
internal accounting control, the auditor may omit testing of the related control 
B 
C 
D 
E 
•Limitations of Internal Control 
and Audit Procedures 
[Same Directions As Above] 
If a current internal accounting control system is deemed adequate, it is reasonable 
to project the future adequacy of such controls. 
Most embezzlement losses are due to lack of compliance with prescribed procedures or 
circumvention of the internal accounting control system, rather then the ineffective-
ness of the system design. 
Internal accounting control systems border on impotence when standing guard against 
collusion of management. 
A fraud such as occurred at Equity Funding is possible without the auditor being at 
fault. 
[Also applicable.] 
BB 
CC 
DD 
EE 
•State of the Art 
[Same Directions As Above] 
The evaluation of internal accounting controls is a highly subjective process in which 
knowledgeable individuals can arrive at different conclusions concerning adequacy. 
Weaknesses in internal accounting control will cause unaudited financial statements to 
be misleading. 
Management should accept and implement recommendations by the auditor for improvements 
in the internal accounting control system. 
AAA 
BBB 
CCC 
•Expected Costs of Expanded Study 
and Evaluation of Controls 
Below is a l ist of possible 
effects of extending auditors' 
internal control responsibili-
ties. Please indicate whether 
effect of extended responsibi-
l i t ies . (Yes or No) 
-Cost Effects 
-Financial Statement Effect 
-Fraud Deterrent Expected 
-Less Information 
-Misled Public 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF EXTENDING AUDITORS' INTERNAL CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Audit costs will increase by 30%. 
Companies on average will increase the investment in their internal accounting control 
systems in excess of the level of investment that can be justified on a cost/benefit 
The increased controls will be cumbersome, resulting in lower efficiency of operations. 
The internal accounting controls are extended beyond the firm's cost/benefit point in 
order to cover the l iabi l i ty risk to directors and external auditors. 
Public disclosure of internal accounting control information (e.g., material weaknesses) 
will create a competitive disadvantage to the reporting companies. 
The risk of error in year-end financial statement balances will increase. 
Substantially greater protection against material fraud is not provided. 
Information items currently in annual reports, e.g., accident records, hiring and manage-
ment training programs, will be deleted, i . e . , replaced by a "boiler-plate" report. 
Managers will be unwilling to respond to analysts' direct questions concerning internal 
control; the analysts wil l simply be referred to the public "boiler-plate" reports. 
The extension and related disclosures will mislead the public. 
Users of internal accounting control reports will project over the long-term future that 
such controls will be adequate. 
Users of internal accounting control reports believe fraud is thereby precluded. 
A2 
A3 
A5 
A6 
A8 
A9 
A11 
A12 
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EXHIBIT C 
No Management Report Included in Annual Report Reviewed 
Company Year Auditor 
All ied Chemical 
American Can Co. 
American Home Products Corp. 
Atlantic Richfield 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1976 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Boeing 
Borden, Inc. 
1973 
1979 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Caterpillar 
Champion International Corporation 
The Charter Co. 
Chrysler Corp. 
The Coastal Corporation 
Consolidated Foods Corp. 
CPC International 
1978 
1977 
1980 
1978 
1980 
1975 
1977 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Main Lafrentz & Co. 
Deere & Co. 
Dow Chemical Co. 
1979 
1973 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Esmark 
Exxon 
1981 
1979 
Arthur Young & Co. 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Farmland Industries 1981 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
General Dynamics 
The Greyhound Corp. 
Gulf 4 Western Industries, Inc. 
1977 
1976 
1974 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Ernst & Ernst 
International Paper Co. 
ITT 
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 
1977 
1976 
1978 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Johnson & Johnson 1978 Coopers & Lybrand 
The LTV Corp. 
Litton Industries, Inc. 
1975 
1976 
Ernst & Ernst 
Touche Ross & Co. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
1977 
1977 
Ernst & Ernst 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
Owens-Illinois 
1976 
1977 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Arthur Young & Co. 
Republic Steel 1980 Ernst & Whinney 
The Signal Companies 
Standard Oi l Company (Indiana) 
1976 
1977 
Haskins & Sells 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Tenneco 1979 Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Union Oi l Co. 
Union Pacific Corp. 
1979 
1975 
Coopers& Lybrand 
Deloitte Haskins 4 Sells 
Weyerhaeuser 1977 Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Xerox Corporation 1977 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
No Annual Report Available to Researcher Amerada Hess Standard Oi l (Ohio) 
CBS Texaco 
Gulf Oi l Texas Instruments 
International Business Machines TRW 
Marathon Oi l United Brands 
Phillips Petroleum US Steel 
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Discussant's Response to 
How Not to Communicate Material and 
Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls 
Alan N. Certain 
Price Waterhouse 
Born, I believe, in response to the SEC's post-FCPA proposal to require 
management and auditor reporting on internal accounting controls, principally 
to provide the Commission an objective summary of the likely results of any 
rule it might adopt, Dr. Wallace's survey lives on to explain the difficulties 
management and auditors face when trying to describe internal accounting 
controls to the "stakeholders" of a business enterprise. 
To cynically summarize the survey (in words somewhat different from 
those of Dr. Wallace), I read it to give evidence supporting four points: 
Point one—When given facts about control conditions within an enter­
prise, people—even such sophisticated users of financial and accounting 
data as the nine groups surveyed—place greatly varying interpretations 
on the facts. 
Point Two—Point One doesn't matter, because people—even such 
sophisticated users of financial and accounting data as the nine groups 
surveyed—don't want the facts. They want a summary overview or 
opinion from someone else. 
Point Three—-When "someone else"—and so far this has been manage­
ment, through the new breed of responsibility reports that proliferated 
after the recommendations of the Cohen Commission and the FEI— 
does summarize an enterprise's control responsibilities, it is likely to be 
in language that is sometimes technically incorrect and always subject to 
the same varying interpretations as are the underlying facts. 
Point Four— Point Three is not surprising, since the survey evidence 
supporting Point One demonstrates a great diversity of opinion about 
the facts of the effectiveness of internal controls and about the effects of 
various so-called control weaknesses, even among the preparers 
themselves, the preparers of the responsibility reports cited in Point 
Three. 
Overall, Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis bear out the title of her paper. 
None of the methods implemented so far to disclose information about an 
enterprise's internal accounting control—whether a recitation of control 
weaknesses, a report by management of strengths and weaknesses, or an 
opinion by management—is likely to be successful in communicating a uniform 
message. One suggested communications device—an auditor's opinion—has 
yet to be tested in practice, but I'll have more to say about that device. 
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Future Prospects 
However, this entire issue of the best methodology to report on internal 
accounting controls may be moot today. I say that because of current SEC 
inactivity in the area, and because of my belief in two points of human nature. 
The points are, first, people tend to devote a majority of their attention to 
those matters they believe are most important to their well-being, with balance 
between long-term and short-term effects. My belief in this point leads me to 
the conclusion that, by and large, in the period immediately before the SEC's 
post-FCPA proposal, managements were satisfied that there was a proper 
cost/benefit relationship for control documentation and disclosure. 
The second point of human nature I believe in is that, in the short term at 
least, criticism from others, particularly critics who have the power to enforce 
their views on the individual, diverts the individual's attention to quelling those 
criticisms. My belief in this point is consistent with observed activity during the 
years since enactment of the FCPA of 1977. The SEC's proposal to require a 
management report on internal accounting controls, together with an audit 
opinion on such report, stimulated activity in the early part of this period. 
However, with the release of ASR 278 in June 1980,1 believe we began to see 
a diminution of management's concern with this subject and of management's 
devotion of resources to strengthening internal accounting control. ASR 305, 
issued in January 1982, states, in essence, that the SEC is satisfied that the 
private sector has responded appropriately and that no regulatory disclosures 
are required. In my view, we have already seen the majority of developments 
in public disclosures of internal accounting control. I doubt that we'll see much 
auditor attestation in public reports. 
And in my view, the current status of public disclosure of internal 
accounting control is not deficient. Dr. Wallace's survey tells me that people-
even sophisticated users—aren't really interested in knowing a lot about 
internal accounting controls in business enterprises. And if I'm wrong—if 
knowledgeable users of internal accounting control data really want it, and 
really want auditor involvement—I believe the forces of the market will bring 
forth the level of disclosure wanted by the users. 
Half of the top 100 companies and a significant percentage of other large 
companies do have management responsibility reports addressing internal 
accounting control. The SEC, in ASR 305, expresses satisfaction, not dismay, 
with the diversity of language found in these reports. A few of these companies 
have already included auditor opinions. If such information is truly useful, this 
fact should become apparent to other providers and they should raise their 
standards. In other words, I don't believe Gresham's Law applies to public 
financial reporting. But the cost/benefit ratio must be positive. 
Let's assume, for purposes of further discussion, that users do want more 
reporting on internal accounting controls. What form should the reporting take? 
Report Preferences 
Dr. Wallace's survey presented eight possible forms. The preferences of 
preparers and users, I think, are interesting. Dr. Wallace presented the 
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alternatives alphabetically. I've rearranged them in ascending order from least 
expensive to most expensive and compared the preference rankings. (See 
Exhibit.) You might take some minor exception to the precise order of least 
expensive to most expensive, but I expect that in most cases you wouldn't 
want to alter an item by more than one place in the table. 
Exhibit 
A Cost/Benefit Comparison of 
Internal Accounting Control Reports 
Reporting Basis Preference Rank 
Preparers Users 
Least Expensive 
F. Management's opinion without auditor in­
volvement 1 4 
C. Management's description of controls, without 
auditor involvement 6 2 
D. Auditor's Letter of Recommendations (weak­
nesses) 7 6 
E. Auditor's listing of both strengths and weak­
nesses 8 7 
G. Management's opinion, with materiality limits, 
attested to by auditor 2 5 
A. Auditor's opinion with materiality limits 3 1 
H. Management's opinion without materiality 
limits, attested to by auditor 4 8 
B. Auditor's opinion without materiality limits 5 3 
Most Expensive 
In my view, the preferences of the preparer group are the most telling 
ones. I say that, of course, because I'm a member of the preparer group. My 
interpretation of the preference ranking for preparers is that preparers believe, 
first of all—and this is supported by Dr. Wallace's analysis, also—that an 
overall summary or opinion, rather than details, is preferred. But, second, my 
analysis says preparers believe that the benefits are of such doubtful quantifica­
tion, that the less costly the approach, the more desirable the results. I agree. 
In other words, the rankings one to five of the preparer group are all summary 
disclosures, leading from least expensive to most expensive. And their last 
choices are the ones which involve a lot of details. 
The user group is less clear in its message. But, except for the anomaly of a 
preference ranking of 2 for report Form C, the users also demonstrate a 
preference for summaries or opinions, rather than for details. 
At the present time, the form and extent of internal accounting control 
disclosure is controlled by the preparer groups, and the present predominant 
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disclosure of internal accounting control is Form F. If we're going to have more 
disclosure, in the present voluntary climate, it will be the preparers—the board 
of directors, management and auditors—who determine the form of such 
expansion. 
Looking again to the preference ranking, it seems most likely that the next 
step might be auditor attestation of a management opinion with materiality 
limits (Rank 2) and this, I believe, was Dr. Wallace's conclusion as well, from 
much more rigorous analysis. 
Possibilities if Auditors Involved 
If we are going to have more involvement of auditors, what form should it 
take? In my view, auditor involvement has four aspects which I call "Documen­
tation," "Evaluation," "Verification," and "Attestation." 
Statements on Auditing Standards, particularly SAS No. 30, provide a good 
starting point for auditor involvement. However, I note that little published 
reporting has appeared so far. I've seen no comprehensive surveys, but 
anecdotal evidence suggests that existing reports have been issued in conjunc­
tion with audits that already were compliance-test oriented and where the 
incremental cost was in the range of 5-10%. In other cases, where greater 
expansion of effort would be required (say in the 25% and more of audit fees 
range) auditors have not been retained to report on controls. 
I do believe, though, that while it's a good foundation, SAS 30 rests in part 
on the pragmatic fact that control systems, by and large, are inadequately 
documented. This comes out in the provision of SAS 30 that mandates a 
method of documentation as a basis for common understanding between 
management and the auditor, while acknowledging this documentation might be 
prepared by the auditor himself. While this approach works for reporting on the 
past, it offers no comfort as to expectations for the future. 
Internal control reporting is clearly future oriented. While it has been 
correctly said that the projection of evaluation into the future is subject to the 
risks that conditions will change and that the degree of compliance will 
deteriorate, and while these are valid risks, they simply point up the 
importance of proper documentation. Without proper documentation, the 
internal accounting control system is, as I call it, "personage dependent." 
Documentation makes the system "personage independent." Without docu­
mentation of the system, the loss of a key employee—that is, the only one with 
knowledge of the workings of systems or subsystems within that person's 
sphere of responsibility—creates a void in the control system that must first be 
recognized by others before it can be corrected. Since, in most organizations, 
people tend to not fully understand what other people do outside their 
immediate proximity, the absence of a procedure completed by a departed 
person may, in fact, not even be noticed until the condition has become 
irretrievably lost. With proper documentation, the system is personage 
independent and can recover, though its proper functioning may suffer for a 
time. 
Importance of Documentation 
For these reasons, I believe documentation of control systems is by far the 
number one requirement for the reliability of control systems with a future 
orientation. 
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Documentation should have four dimensions: 
First, there should be documentation of each type of transaction, showing 
each procedure and control step to be performed all the way from inception to 
ultimate recording in the enterprise records. The typical flow chart is 
representative of this kind of documentation. 
Second, a proper evaluation depends on consideration of all the accounting 
and control functions performed by an individual. This documentation is often 
called a job description. We might consider these to be individual inclusionary 
controls. 
Third, and of equal importance, are exclusionary controls. To illustrate: 
Jones may reconcile the bank account and have no other assigned cash 
responsibilities. This would seem to be a good segregation of duties and a 
strong control. However, if Jones could obtain blank check stock without 
detection, the control is abrogated. The fact that the organization chart and job 
description indicate that Jones is independent loses its significance. This is why 
exclusionary controls, such as locked cabinets, restricted access areas and 
computer terminal ID's and passwords are so important. And without complete 
documentation of the system, these flaws can be overlooked for years. 
Work Plans are the fourth dimension of the control documentation process. 
Work Plans outline procedures to be carried out or reports to be prepared on 
each day of the accounting period. A quarterly closing schedule, which is used 
to assure management that all the analyses and judgments required for 
preparation of financial statements have been completed, is a prime example of 
such a Work Plan. 
Internal Control Evaluation and Verification 
The evaluation stage of the process is adequately described in Statements 
on Auditing Standards, also. It consists of a searching contemplation of existing 
conditions looking for weaknesses. A common approach to the search is for the 
auditor to ask, "If I wanted to circumvent the system without detection, how 
could I do it?" The underlying rationale of this approach is that, by identifying 
all avenues to deliberately defeat the system, the auditor will also have covered 
accidental exposures. I observe without further comment that the enunciation 
of this "how can I beat it" view is probably a major contributor to the 
continuing view of many users that the detection of fraud is a primary purpose 
of an audit—a view that is apparent in responses to Dr. Wallace's survey. 
Evaluation can be made of a system that is poorly documented. But that 
evaluation is much more biased toward the past than an evaluation of a well-
documented system of internal accounting control Further, evaluation of a 
poorly-documented or undocumented system is a process that must be 
repeated from the ground up each time a conclusion is needed. The evaluation 
of a well-documented system, on the other hand, increases in reliability each 
time it is done because the auditor is able to build upon prior knowledge, 
perhaps exploring relationships between duties that were previously over­
looked. 
The verification phase, likewise, is adequately covered in Statements on 
Auditing Standards. While extensive compliance testing is certainly not 
employed in all audits, the procedures are familiar and the implications of the 
test results are understood. 
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Reporting on Internal Control 
The attestation or reporting phase is the final one, and is one where, in my 
view, more information than provided by SAS 30 should be conveyed. The user 
should have access to more information than simply the final statement that the 
auditor is satisfied there are no material weaknesses in the internal accounting 
control system. By this, I don't mean we should remove materiality considera­
tions, but rather, I mean the user should be told a little more about the basis of 
the opinion. 
Again, in my view, the most significant factor is the extent of documenta­
tion, and the report should include information about it. One approach might be 
to define a term "gross transaction volume" as the sum of all debit and credit 
changes in all accounts during the period under examination and then to 
address an opinion to the adequate documentation of systems controlling X 
percentage of gross transaction volume. 
In conclusion, I believe Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis clearly summa­
rize the diversity of viewpoints between users and preparers and within groups 
on the subject of internal accounting control reporting. I agree that the 
approaches studied in the paper show clearly "How Not to Communicate 
Material and Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls." If further 
expansion of disclosure does develop, auditors stand ready to participate, but 
there is a great need for better systems documentation to provide a basis for 
future-oriented evaluation. 
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Human Information Processing Research in 
Auditing: A Review and Synthesis 
Robert H. Ashton 
New York University 
The importance of individual decision making to the audit process is 
increasingly being recognized. Decisions involving the collection, interpretation 
and integration of audit evidence are receiving attention from auditing firms 
concerned with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of audits. Concur­
rent with the profession's interest in audit decision making, a growing body of 
knowledge about decision making by practicing auditors is being generated by 
academic researchers. This body of knowledge, based on human information 
processing research, focuses on the understanding, evaluation and improve­
ment of audit decision making. It offers great potential for identifying shortcom­
ings of audit decision making, and for reducing or eliminating those 
shortcomings. 
This paper reviews and synthesizes human information processing re­
search in auditing. Its purpose is to introduce this body of knowledge to 
readers who are relatively unfamiliar with it. Coverage of the topic is fairly 
broad, emphasizing the questions of why this research is conducted and what 
its implications are, and de-emphasizing methodological issues of experimental 
design and analysis.1 The discussion proceeds in four parts: (1) some 
background information on human information processing research in auditing, 
(2) an explanation of the reasons for conducting this type of research, (3) an 
overview of the research evidence, and (4) a consideration of some of its 
practical implications. 
Introduction and Background 
Human information processing research in auditing focuses on several 
decision-related activities of practicing auditors. Although a large audit may 
entail hundreds of judgments and decisions, it is useful for research purposes to 
abstract audit decision making to four basic types of decision-related activities: 
(1) evaluations or judgments of current information, (2) predictions of future 
outcomes, (3) assessments of the probability that particular outcomes will 
occur (and revisions of such probabilities), and (4) choices among alternative 
courses of action. 
For example, auditors collect, interpret and combine various types of 
evidence in order to evaluate internal control system design, the materiality of 
an item, and the implications of sample outcomes. Auditors may predict error-
rate levels in audit populations, or the future going-concern status of a client, or 
71 
they may assess probability distributions over error-rate levels or going-
concern status. Auditors make choices among alternatives when selecting 
sample sizes, the type of opinion to issue, and disclosure alternatives. 
Obviously, these are only a few of the areas in which auditors make 
evaluations, predictions, probability assessments and choices. Moreover, 
these four types of decision-related activities are not necessarily practiced as 
distinct phases of audit decision making. For example, an auditor might use the 
results of internal control evaluation and preliminary testing to predict the 
specific error-rate level in a population or to assess a probability distribution 
over several possible error rates, and then combine these evaluations, 
predictions and assessments with additional information in order to choose 
among alternatives types or amounts of subsequent testing. For research 
purposes, however, it is convenient to regard these four decision-related 
activities as relatively distinct, because rigorous research methods exist for 
studying each of the four. 
These decision-related activities are studied by human information process­
ing research in controlled experimental settings designed to mirror the real-
world decision contexts of interest. This type of research does not rely on 
auditors' self-reports of their decisions (e.g., through surveys or interviews), 
and does not rest on anecdotal evidence about decision making. Instead, it 
takes advantage of the primary strength of the experimental method—the 
control over confounding variables, which, in other types of research methods, 
make it difficult to draw reliable scientific inferences. 
Human information processing research is guided by decision-making 
paradigms (or models, or theories, or "world views") which provide opera­
tional frameworks for choosing variables to be examined, for forming expecta­
tions about relationships between independent and dependent variables, for 
designing particular studies, and for interpreting and integrating research 
results. In addition to providing comprehensive perspectives from which to 
conduct and interpret research, the paradigms also entail criteria for evaluating 
and improving human performance in information processing, judgment and 
decision making. These paradigms were developed primarily in the discipline of 
cognitive psychology, but they also were developed in economics and statis­
tics.2 
From a methodological standpoint, human information processing research 
in auditing can be traced directly to earlier developments in cognitive 
psychology. For all practical purposes, the interest in human information 
processing research began less than 30 years ago with the appearance of Ward 
Edwards' classic article on decision making.3 To appreciate the enormity of the 
literature that has appeared since then, consider that in the past 20 years the 
Annual Review of Psychology has published five reviews of this research,4 with 
each review covering the empirical studies published since the previous 
review. The number of studies cited has ranged from about 140 to about 320 
for these five reviews. A complementary line of research that comes from 
psychology (as well as from business and economics) has been pursued since 
the mid-1950s by Herbert Simon and his colleagues.5 
More to the point, however, is the sizable amount of human information 
processing research conducted in accounting and auditing contexts. This work 
has been done by researchers with training in accounting and auditing, 
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psychology, and statistics, and has been published in the accounting and 
auditing literature (and, increasingly, in the psychology literature). The 
research in accounting and auditing began approximately 10 years ago, and 
both its quantity and quality have grown significantly since then. By 1976/77, 
there were enough studies in accounting and auditing to warrant a literature 
review,6 and enough interest in the future development of the area that an 
American Accounting Association committee was formed to evaluate its 
potential contributions. After the appearance of the committee's report7 and 
the literature review, the number of human information processing studies in 
accounting and auditing increased dramatically. My own recent review identi­
fied some 100 published articles or unpublished working papers in this area.8 
The human information processing studies in our literature relate to a wide 
variety of issues in financial accounting, managerial accounting, and auditing. 
However, the studies devoted to auditing are the most extensive and realistic 
of all. I am aware of approximately 50 articles or working papers which report 
empirical results on audit decision making. It is important to recognize that the 
people whose decision making was examined in these studies were practicing 
auditors, not college students or other surrogates for auditors. More than 
2,500 auditors from national, regional and local firms have participated in these 
studies, and they represent all levels in these firms. Further, in many cases the 
researchers had the advice of practicing auditors in designing their research 
studies. While some of the studies might be considered "basic" research, 
since they relied on abstract and simplified representations of the audit 
process, most have had an applied orientation.9 Taken as a whole, the set of 
human information processing studies in auditing is an invaluable source for 
understanding audit decision making, and for drawing practical implications. 
Reasons for Studying Audit Decision Making 
Before reviewing the research results and their potential implications, it 
may be useful to consider explicitly the reasons for doing human information 
processing research in auditing. The ultimate goal of this research is to 
improve audit decision making. Before decision making can be improved, 
however, it is useful to evaluate the current quality of decision making, and 
before decision quality can be evaluated, decision making must be understood. 
Thus, three reasons for studying audit decision making are to understand, 
evaluate and improve audit decisions. 
Understanding Audit Decision Making. Before audit decision making can be 
evaluated or improved, it must be understood. The research in this area 
focuses on such general questions as: How do auditors make evaluations, 
predictions, probability assessments and choices? What items of information, 
or "cues," influence their decisions? Can their decision making be systemat­
ically explained by some information-processing biases or by some aspects of 
the decision setting? 
Efforts to understand audit decision making involve attempts to describe 
audit decision making. Most such attempts rely on representational models of 
decision making; that is, models that represent the relationships among the 
multiple cues that serve as inputs for information processing and decision 
making, and the decisions that result. This type of "input-output" modeling is 
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frequently operationalized by constructing a linear multiple regression model 
that represents the auditors' processing of information. This is done by 
providing the auditor with several (experimentally controlled) combinations of 
values on each of certain cues that are used for making decisions, and recording 
the auditor's decision for each combination of cue values. The decisions 
(evaluations, predictions, etc.) are then regressed on the cue values. Other 
possibilities are to attempt to represent the auditor's intuitive probability 
revisions via Bayes Rule for probability revision, or to attempt to represent 
choices among alternatives via an expected utility model. Bayesian, regres­
sion, and utility models can then be used as starting points for describing, and 
understanding, audit decision making. 
Evaluating Audit Decision Making. A second reason for doing human 
information processing research in auditing is to evaluate audit decision 
making, and, accordingly, much of the research goes beyond simply trying to 
understand audit decision making as it exists. Decision making in auditing has 
been evaluated against six criteria: (1) accuracy, (2) normativeness, (3) 
stability, (4) consensus, (5) insight, and (6) consistency with professional 
auditing standards. 
The accuracy criterion implies that an auditor wants his or her decisions to 
be correct. This criterion can be used for evaluations or predictions if an 
external reference point is available, or will become available in the future. For 
example, an accuracy criterion can be used in going-concern evaluations by 
seeing whether firms predicted to go bankrupt actually do go bankrupt. An 
accuracy criterion can be used for evaluating subjective probability assess­
ments if relative frequency information is available. However, the number of 
audit decision contexts in which an accuracy criterion can be used appears to be 
extremely small. 
The criterion of normativeness can be (and has been) used more extensively 
in the research on audit decision making. Use of this criterion implies that an 
auditor wants his or her decisions to correspond with those prescribed by 
normative or statistical standards of decision making. For example, choices 
among alternatives might be evaluated in some contexts against the normative 
standard of expected utility maximization. Probability revisions can be evalu­
ated against the statistical standard of Bayes Rule, a logical consequence of 
conditional probabilities that prescribes the optimal revision of prior proba­
bilities upon the receipt of new data. Subjective probability assessments can be 
evaluated against several types of normative standards, including the proba­
bility axioms that relate to the combinatorial properties of probabilities. As a 
final example, an auditor's interpretations of sample outcomes can be evaluated 
by the extent to which these interpretations reveal an appreciation for (1) the 
inverse relationship between sample size and sampling variability, or (2) the 
impact of data reliability. 
Three other criteria for evaluating audit decision making which are 
frequently employed in the research literature are stability, consensus and 
insight. Stability refers to the question of whether one auditor, given the same 
data at different points in time, will make the same decision. Consensus 
addresses the question of whether different auditors, given the same data at 
one point in time, will make the same decision. Insight refers to the degree of 
understanding that an auditor has into his or her own decision process as 
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represented by a model of that process. These three criteria can be employed 
in addition to accuracy and normativeness, but they are most often used when 
accuracy and normativeness cannot be employed. One rationale for stability is 
that perfectly stable decisions have no random component, which has a 
detrimental effect on decision accuracy. A rationale for both stability and 
consensus is that the cost and/or quality of an audit may fluctuate needlessly if 
decision making is inconsistent over time or across auditors. The rationale for 
insight involves the importance of an auditor's understanding his or her own 
decision making if he or she attempts to train other auditors in decision making. 
A sixth criterion for evaluating audit decisions, which is rarely mentioned in 
the research literature but would appear to be extremely important, is the 
extent to which decisions are consistent with professional auditing standards. In 
some cases, auditing standards may be sufficiently precise that they can serve 
as criteria for decision evaluation. Examples include the SAS 39 statement that 
the extent of substantive testing required to obtain sufficient evidence should 
vary inversely with the auditor's reliance on internal control, and the SAS 31 
statements that evidence based on the auditor's direct personal knowledge or 
obtained from independent sources outside the client entity should ordinarily 
be considered more reliable than evidence obtained indirectly or secured solely 
within the entity.10 
Improving Audit Decision Making. When research finds shortcomings in 
audit decision making vis-a-vis any of these six criteria, attention naturally 
turns to finding ways of improving audit decision making. Five possibilities have 
been considered: (1) increasing the auditor's awareness of his or her 
information-processing shortcomings, (2) feedback, (3) changing the data set, 
(4) education/training, and (5) the use of decision models. Obviously, these 
possibilities are not mutually exclusive. 
The first alternative, increasing awareness, may be a prerequisite for the 
application of the other four. It may also be a useful alternative in its own right. 
If auditors are aware of the possibility that their decision making may 
sometimes involve shortcomings, and if the nature of these shortcomings is 
made explicit, then they may be willing to monitor their decision making. 
Monitoring could involve the provision of feedback information about the 
outcomes of past decisions so that a "track record" could be established. It 
could also involve the provision of information about the auditor's own decision 
process or about data relationships in the environment. Such monitoring could 
also lead to changing the data set on which audit decision are based. This could 
involve a search for additional data to include in the decision process, as well as 
the elimination of data that already are included. 
A fourth possibility for improving audit decision making is education and 
training. This could be undertaken in both university courses and in-house 
training modules in auditing firms, and could include training in statistical and 
probabilistic concepts as well as exposure to the results of human information 
processing research studies. Finally, decision models could be used to supple­
ment or replace intuitive decision making in repetitive audit decision contexts. 
This alternative could entail the use of optimal models such as Bayes Rule, 
statistical models based on environmental data relationships, and models of the 
auditor's own decision process. One feature that these five decision-improve 
ment alternatives share, to a greater or lesser extent, is that of providing 
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structure for intuitive decision making. Establishing some type of structure may 
be necessary if audit decision making is to be improved. 
Justifying or Defending Audit Decision Making. Although it is not explicitly 
addressed in the research literature, a fourth reason for doing human 
information processing research in auditing is to provide a sound basis for 
explaining, justifying or defending audit decision making to parties who might 
question the auditor's application of "professional judgment." These parties 
could include an auditor's superiors, peers or subordinates, as well as 
regulatory agencies and the courts. While the literature's overriding concern 
with improving audit decision making implies that it needs improving (and the 
research results generally support this contention), many studies have found 
auditors to be rather good decision makers vis-a-vis the six decision-evaluation 
criteria mentioned earlier. In addition, decision making by auditors has been 
found to be relatively good compared to that of other groups of experts such as 
physicians and clinical psychologists. Thus, auditors may wish to use the 
results of human information processing research as a basis for defending, as 
well as improving, audit decision making. 
The Research Results 
Most of the research has focused on understanding and evaluating audit 
decision making. A sufficient number of studies has appeared in four areas to 
permit some generalizations: (1) materiality/disclosure judgments, (2) internal 
control evaluation, (3) probability assessment, and (4) evaluation of sample 
outcomes and other types of audit evidence. A few studies have been reported 
in other areas. 
Materiality/Disclosure Judgments. Some studies have addressed mate­
riality/disclosure issues directly,11 while others have addressed such issues 
indirectly as part of a study devoted primarily to some other topic.12 Many of 
these studies have focused on the type of disclosure recommended for specific 
items (e.g., an inventory write-down) of varying sizes, while others have dealt 
with the specification of overall pre-audit materiality levels for planning 
purposes. Still others have examined the interaction between materiality and 
uncertainty. 
One consistent finding is that simple linear models based on a small number 
of cues explain a large proportion of the variance in materiality/disclosure 
judgments of individual auditors. For virtually all auditors studied, impact on 
net income has been the most important factor in such judgments, but there 
has been little agreement on the importance of other factors, resulting in only 
moderate levels of consensus among different auditors. Differences in mate­
riality and disclosure judgments have been found between auditors and other 
professional groups (e.g., investment analysts and lending officers) and among 
auditors from different firms and different levels of experience. The amount of 
uncertainty about the proper valuation of an item has been found to influence 
materiality/disclosure judgments, and, conversely, an item's materiality has 
been found to affect judgments about acceptable levels of uncertainty. 
Internal Control Evaluation. More studies have been devoted to internal 
control evaluation than to any other topic.13 Most of these studies have simply 
asked auditors to rate the strength of an internal control system (in a particular 
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area such as payroll or the sales/collections cycle) as certain internal control 
indicators changed. Others have studied the effects of changes in internal 
control strength on the allocation of audit work to different types of testing, or 
the effects of such changes on the judgmental selection of sample sizes for 
substantive testing. 
As with materiality/disclosure judgments, the research has found that the 
internal control evaluations of individual auditors can be represented well by 
simple linear models based on a small number of cues. Consensus across 
auditors has been found to be relatively high for ratings of internal control 
strength, but moderate to low for the allocation of audit effort and the selection 
of sample sizes in response to internal control changes. Stability and self-
insight have been found to be high. 
Internal control cues related to separation of duties have been found to 
dominate internal control evaluations. Moreover, the number of hours planned 
for audit testing in specific areas has been found to vary inversely with the 
rated strength of internal control, and sample-size specifications have been 
found to change in the appropriate direction in response to changes in the 
strength of internal control. Finally, the evidence on firm and experience-level 
effects has been mixed: Some studies have noted small effects on consensus, 
insight and the importance of separation-of-duties cues, while other studies 
have found no effects. 
Probability Assessment. Studies of probability assessment and revision have 
been conducted in both attribute14 and variables15 contexts. Most studies have 
provided the participating auditors with some background information and then 
asked for subjective probability assessments over error-rate levels or popula­
tion values of account balances. Some studies, however, have focused on the 
revision of probabilities after new data are received, and others have investi­
gated the impact of subjective probability assessments on sample sizes and on 
the chances of making Type I and Type II errors. 
The studies have shown that auditors can understand and use several 
probability elicitation methods. In attribute contexts, however, low consensus 
in probability assessments has been found across auditors when the same 
elicitation method is used, and low convergence in probability assessments has 
been found when one auditor uses different elicitation methods. Different 
methods have also been found to result in different sample-size specifications. 
In addition, judgmentally-revised distributions have been found to be more 
diffuse and to result in larger sample sizes than distributions revised via Bayes 
Rule. 
In the variables contexts studied, the variability in fractile assessments 
across auditors was greater for the more extreme fractiles assessed, and the 
variability for given fractiles was greater across individual auditors than across 
three-person teams of auditors. Also, the teams assessed higher probabilities 
near the actual population values, and lower probabilities elsewhere, than the 
individuals did. Studies in both attribute and variables contexts have found that 
internal control strength has some effects on probability assessments. For 
example, distributions assessed by individual auditors have been found to be 
tighter, and to be less variable across auditors, for stronger internal control 
systems. 
Evaluation of Sample Outcomes and Other Types of Audit Evidence. Another 
set of studies has focused on some decision "heuristics," or rules-of-thumb, 
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that auditors might use to reduce the complexity of certain types of audit 
decisions.16 Heuristics may be beneficial since they reduce the time and effort 
required for decision making, and in many cases they may result in "good" 
decisions. On the other hand, they may also lead to systematic biases in 
decision making by causing the auditor to ignore relevant information and/or to 
process irrelevant information. The studies in this group have attempted to 
demonstrate the existence of such biases across a variety of audit-related 
decision contexts. 
Some studies suggest that many auditors are insensitive to the importance 
of sample size when evaluating sample outcomes, and do not have sufficient 
appreciation for the inverse relationship between sample size and sampling 
variability. Other studies have suggested that auditors are not sufficiently 
sensitive to the reliability of information or to the importance of prior 
probabilities. Still others have found that auditors' evaluations and probability 
assessments are influenced by irrelevant information. 
Other Studies. Human information processing studies have been conducted 
in several additional auditing areas, but not in sufficient quantity to allow 
generalizations about the results. Topics addressed include: (1) analytic 
review, (2) review of financial forecasts, (3) evaluation of the competence of 
internal audit departments, (4) audit seniors' performance evaluations of their 
subordinates, (5) predictions of going-concern status, (6) perceptions of the 
messages intended by different types of audit reports, (7) perceptions of 
auditors' independence, and (8) the applicability of expected utility theory as a 
framework for audit decision making.17 
Implications for Practice 
Given the goal of improved decision making, the practical implications of 
human information processing research in auditing are suggested by the five 
decision-improvement alternatives discussed earlier: increasing awareness, 
education/training, feedback, changing the data set, and using formal models. 
This final section of the paper elaborates briefly on some of these alterna­
tives.1 8 
It seems reasonable to believe that auditors will be better able to improve 
decision making if they are aware of the information-processing shortcomings 
that affect their decisions. Therefore, efforts to communicate to auditors the 
results of human information processing research are important, and have been 
undertaken in some instances.19 Such efforts could lead to the inclusion of 
training materials on judgment and decision making in formal in-house training 
programs. Auditing researchers are beginning to develop materials which 
might be useful for this purpose.20 Another possibility is to include such 
materials in auditing courses in universities, and some efforts in this direction 
have been made.21 The need for auditors to be trained in decision making, as 
well as in auditing, is one of the principal implications of this research. 
Other important implications relate to structuring the audit decision 
process. This could involve the provision of checklists or other types of explicit 
guidance to assist auditors in both the selection of relevant information and the 
integration of multiple items of information to reach a decision. 
A national auditing firm has recently implemented a structured approach for 
computing sample sizes for substantive testing when statistical sampling is not 
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used.22 Actual sample sizes that depart from the computed sample sizes by 
more than 20 percent must be explicitly justified, the approach relies on a 
combination of equations and decision tables to mechanically process six types 
of information. This information is based on auditors' judgments related to 
expected monetary error in an account and the strength of internal control, in 
addition to information about the size of the account, materiality, the level of 
stratification of the sample, and the existence of overlapping substantive tests. 
In effect, this method specifies the variables to be used, the weighting factors 
for these variables, and the way in which the variables are to be combined to 
arrive at sample sizes. There is some arbitrariness in the weights for the 
variables, but the appropriate variables are included, and the directions of their 
impact on sample size are correctly specified. A large body of analytical and 
empirical research has shown that selecting the appropriate variables and 
weighting them in the appropriate directions is often more important to 
decision quality than is refinement of the weights themselves.23 Moreover, the 
use of such a method should substantially reduce inconsistencies across 
auditors in the selection of sample sizes. 
The structured approach just described relies on a formal model to aid the 
auditor in processing information and making decisions. The research evidence 
suggests that other types of formal models would also improve audit decision 
making. Examples include models for weighing and combining internal control 
indicators in order to quantify the strength of an internal control system, 
models for analytical reviews, and models of bankruptcy prediction to aid in 
going-concern evaluations.24 The evidence strongly supports the use of 
statistical sampling and the statistical evaluation of sample results. 
In conclusion, I believe the results of human information processing 
research have important implications for the practice of auditing. Some of these 
implications are at the level of the individual auditor (e.g., the need for 
awareness and education), but most are at the level of the auditing firm (e.g., 
the need for training programs and formal models). Indeed, some firms have 
already shown significant interest in potentially changing some aspects of their 
practice in response to the research results. At the very least, the evidence 
generated in this area is consistent with, and can be used to support, activities 
such as providing structure for decisions and using formal models, although 
these activities may not have been directly motivated by the research results. 
In addition to having practical implications at the individual and firm levels, 
human information processing research can produce results that are relevant at 
the standard-setting level. For example, the Auditing Standards Board revised 
the exposure draft of SAS 39 to eliminate a suggested probability-assessment 
method which human information processing research had shown to result in 
excessive Type II errors.25 While it would be an overstatement to claim that 
human information processing research is sweeping the auditing profession like 
wildfire, it does seem to be kindling some interest among practitioners and 
policy makers. Hopefully, this interest will increase as more people become 
familiar with its potential benefits. 
Footnotes 
1. Recent books by Ashton (1982) and Libby (1981) analyze human information processing 
research in auditing, and in other areas of accounting, in great detail. This research is also 
reviewed by Libby and Lewis (forthcoming). 
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2. The two major paradigms that have guided human information processing research in 
auditing are the "lens" and "probabilistic judgment" paradigms. The former, which is closely 
linked to the decision-related activities of evaluation and prediction, emphasizes the construction of 
linear models as representations of information processing by individuals. This paradigm further 
emphasizes the relative accuracy of intuitive predictions versus those made by formal information-
processing models, as well as the "weights" that decision makers (implicitly) attach to various 
pieces of information in making evaluations or predictions. The probabilistic judgment paradigm 
(which is also called the subjectively expected utility, or SEU, paradigm) is more closely linked to 
choices among alternative actions and to the assessment, revision and use of probabilities in 
decision making. It emphasizes the relationship between intuitive assessments, revisions and 
choices and those prescribed by formal models. These paradigms are discussed at length by 
Ashton (1982) and Libby (1981). 
3. Edwards (1954). 
4. Edwards (1961); Becker and McClintock (1967); Rapoport and Wallsten (1972); Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1977); Einhorn and Hogarth (1981). 
5. This research is summarized in several papers by Simon (1955, 1956, 1959, 1978, 1979a, 
1979b). 
6. Libby and Lewis (1977). 
7. Ashton, Barrett, Elliott, Libby, Vasarhelyi and Wright (1977). 
8. Ashton (1982). 
9. Several aspects of basic and applied research in auditing are discussed by Kaplan (1977) and 
Ashton (1981b). 
10. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1982, Sec. 350.19 and Sec. 326.18). 
11. Boatsman and Robertson (1974), Firth (1979), Messier (1979), Moriarity and Barron 
(1976, 1979). 
12. Lewis (1980), Newton (1977), Schultz and Reckers (1979), Ward (1974, 1976). 
13. Ashton (1974a, 1974b), Ashton and Brown (1980), Biggs and Mock (1980), Gaumnitz, 
Nunamaker, Surdick and Thomas (forthcoming), Hall and Zimmer (1981), Hamilton and Wright 
(1977, 1980, 1981), Joyce (1976), Mock and Turner (1979, 1981), Reckers and Taylor (1979), 
Weber (1978). 
14. Corless (1972), Crosby (1980, 1981), Felix (1976), Kinney and Uecker (1982). 
15. Solomon (forthcoming), Solomon, Krogstad, Romney and Tomassini (forthcoming). 
16. Bamber (1980), Biddle and Joyce (1979, forthcoming), Gibbins (1977), Joyce and Biddle 
(1981a, 1981b), Kinney and Uecker (1982), Uecker and Kinney (1977). 
17. The references for these eight areas follow: 1—Blocher, Esposito and Willingham (1981). 
2-Danos and Imhoff (1982). 3-Gibbs and Schroeder (1979). 4-Wright (1980). 5-Kida (1980). 
6-Libby (1979). 7-Shockley (1981). 8-Ashton (1980, forthcoming), Lewis (1980), and Ward 
(1974, 1976). 
18. Practical implications of this research are also discussed by Holstrum (1980), Joyce and 
Libby (1981), Libby (1981), and Messier and Snowball (1981). 
19. An example is Holstrum (1980). 
20. An example is Waller and Felix (1981). 
21. Ashton (1981a). 
22. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1980). Libby (1981) reports that Deloitte, Haskins & Sells 
and Touche Ross & Co. have developed similar approaches for certain types of decisions. 
23. For elaboration, see Ashton (1979). 
24. Altman (1982) reports that Arthur Andersen & Co. is testing a bankruptcy-prediction 
model for this purpose. 
25. See Kinney and Uecker (1982) for elaboration. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Human Information Processing Research in 
Auditing: A Review and Synthesis 
Gary L. Holstrum 
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells 
My comments on this paper and on the underlying research are in three 
categories: (1) a very favorable overall evaluation of the paper, (2) differences 
in emphasis regarding specific areas of research described in the paper, and (3) 
suggestions of tentative guidelines for using the implications of this research to 
improve auditor judgments. 
Overall Comments 
The paper does an excellent job of accomplishing its stated objective of 
reviewing and synthesizing the research in a manner designed to "introduce 
the body of knowledge to readers who are relatively unfamiliar with it." As 
mentioned in the paper, readers who wish to investigate the area in greater 
depth should refer to the recent monographs by Ashton (1982) and Libby 
(1981). 
In this paper, Ashton provides helpful descriptions of six criteria used by 
researchers to evaluate auditors' judgments: accuracy, normativeness, sta­
bility, consensus, insight, and consistency with professional auditing standards. 
The distinction between accuracy and normativeness is important. Although 
auditor judgments are very rarely susceptible to evaluation by an accuracy 
criterion (because of the unavailability of external, verifiable reference points), 
they can often be evaluated on the basis of their degree of correspondence with 
normative or statistical standards. Furthermore, when neither accuracy nor 
normativeness criteria are feasible in the circumstances, researchers often 
utilize consensus, stability, or insight. Such criteria are helpful because 
evidence of lack of consensus or stability provides an indication of the lack of 
accuracy and normativeness. However, the converse does not logically 
follow—a high degree of consensus or stability does not necessarily indicate a 
high degree of accuracy or conformity with normative standards. 
The issue of whether auditors' judgments are more accurately described as 
rather good or rather poor is not as important as the issue of how such 
judgments can be improved. I agree with Ashton's conclusions that the 
ultimate goal of this research is to improve auditors' judgments and that the 
most salient common feature of efforts to improve such judgments is the 
establishment of suitable structures for the decision making process. 
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Differences in Emphasis Concerning Specific Research Findings 
1. Materiality judgment research has been limited to public industrial 
companies. In discussing the research on auditors' materiality judgments, 
Ashton describes some of the general findings, and notes that "for virtully all 
auditors studied, impact on net income has been the most important factor in 
such judgments." However, the fact that virtually all of this research was 
limited to public industrial companies effectively restricts the ability to 
generalize the research results. I question whether the impact on net income 
would have the same predominance for a nonpublic company (where primary 
users are likely to be creditors with an interest in using various financial 
statement relationships to predict future solvency) as it has for a public 
company (where the primary users are likely to be investors with a primary 
interest in using income and cash flows from continuing operations to predict 
future cash flows). It is also doubtful whether this research (concerning public 
industrial companies) could be validly generalized to financial institutions or 
nonbusiness entities. 
2. Auditor consensus regarding internal control evaluation may not be 
"relatively high." In discussing the results of research (including his own) on 
auditor evaluations of internal control, Ashton concludes, "Consensus across 
auditors has been found to be relatively high for ratings of internal control 
strength." Categorizing auditor consensus in this area as "relatively high," 
however, may not be appropriate. The research that demonstrated a higher 
degree of consensus for such judgments than had been found generally for 
other professions (see Ashton, 1974) reported an average correlation of .7 
between pairs of auditor judgments. Although the average correlation was 
generally higher than for other professions, it still explained only 49% of the 
variability in judgments. Furthermore, the correlations between judgments of 
some pairs of auditors in the Ashton study were as low as .04, and the 
introduction of a more realistic degree of complexity in the internal accounting 
control information presented to auditors resulted in a much lower degree of 
consensus (see Reckers and Taylor, 1979). 
Suggested Guidelines for Improving Auditor Judgments 
The goal of this research is to improve auditor decision making. Based upon 
the research findings, Ashton offers five decision-improvement alternatives 
and discusses some audit-practice examples that introduce a structured 
mechanism to improve auditor judgments. Although the alternatives and 
examples Ashton offers are helpful, the profession also has a need for general 
guidelines for utilizing this research to improve the audit judgment process. 
Accordingly, I believe the audit judgment process can be improved through an 
organized program that meets the following guidelines: 
1. Recognize the capabilities as well as the limitations of individual 
experts in making audit judgments. 
2. Identify potential decision aids. 
3. Identify areas of comparative advantage of both the individual 
experts and the decision aids. 
4. Develop structured frameworks that integrate the best features of 
both individual experts and decision aids. 
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The most difficult step in this process is the identification of the areas of 
comparative advantage of individual experts and decision models. The Ashton 
paper provides a good summary of the limitations of individual experts in 
making audit judgments, and the statistical and operations research literature 
identifies many potential decision aids. However, the research literature does 
not provide as clear or definitive directions regarding areas of comparative 
advantage. Nevertheless, I believe some general tendencies of comparative 
advantage can be identified, at least tentatively, as described below. 
In identifying areas where individual experts do a better job than models 
(and conversely), it is helpful first to distinguish between unstructured and 
structured judgment situations. In unstructured situations, most decision 
models cannot effectively be applied, and individual experts are superior in 
identifying potential patterns and bringing about some type of structure. In 
structured situations, individual experts tend to be better at collecting and 
coding information relevant to the judgment, and decision models tend to be 
superior at combining and integrating the information. 
For example, consider the process of confirming accounts receivable to 
form a judgment about the validity of recorded receivables. This situation is 
susceptible to being structured and successfully modeled in the sense that an 
appropriate sample size can be determined—given certain information such as 
required precision (tolerable error), required reliability, and expected error 
rate. After the sample of confirmations has been taken and the individual 
confirmation responses have been analyzed, the model can also be used to 
make inferences about the population of recorded receivables by computing an 
upper confidence limit. In this situation, the individual experts (auditors) can 
most effectively be used to collect the information (by preparing, reviewing, 
and sending the confirmation requests) and to code the information (by 
determining which sample items represent errors or invalid recorded receiv­
ables). The research has generally shown that the decision model is superior to 
individual experts (auditors) at combining and integrating the information in 
such audit situations. An effective and efficient audit process, therefore, will 
include a structured framework that provides the auditor with the decision 
model as an aid in the judgment process and thereby integrates tasks that are 
performed best by the individual expert with those that are performed best by 
a decision model. 
Some recent trends have occurred in audit practice concerning the 
development of a structured approach for making audit judgments in areas that 
were previously regarded as being unstructured. Such approaches have tended 
to use decision models, statistical formulas, and other structured frameworks 
for combining and integrating information that has been gathered and coded by 
auditors. The above discussion concerning confirmations is an example related 
to tests of details. For analytical reviews, various structures (including the use 
of regression analysis) have been introduced to aid the auditor in integrating 
data. For evaluations of internal accounting control, decision tables and 
network analyses have been developed to evaluate the adequacy of segregation 
of duties. Audit risk models, such as the one described in SAS No. 39, have 
been utilized to aid the auditor in integrating the information from the various 
audit components—internal accounting control, analytical review, and tests of 
details. These examples not only indicate recent trends in practice, but they 
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also provide an indication of the likely directions for future improvements in the 
audit judgment process. 
Conclusions 
In summary, I believe the Ashton paper provides an excellent introduction 
to the research on auditor judgment. This research can also be used as a basis 
for developing tentative guidelines for future improvements in auditor judg­
ments. 
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4 
Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors: 
Implications for the Practitioner1 
Robert E. Hylas 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Financial statement errors are of great concern to the CPA and the financial 
executive alike. The auditor applies procedures attempting to ensure that all 
material errors in a client's financial statements are detected and adjusted. 
Numerous errors detected during an audit can increase auditing fees and be 
embarrassing to the financial management of a company if they result in audit 
adjustments. Practitioners should, whenever possible, assist management in 
preventing these errors which may indicate underlying weaknesses in a client's 
accounting systems and may cast doubt on the reliability of other financial 
reports prepared for internal use. 
In this paper I review selected results of a study, "Audit Detection of 
Financial Statement Errors" 2, that I co-authored with Robert H. Ashton, 
Associate Professor of Accounting at New York University. The study focuses 
on errors that led to a financial statement adjustment. It suggests certain 
implications for the practitioner, both for designing and applying auditing 
procedures, and for ways of preventing accounting errors. 
Due to the study's broad scope, the results are somewhat tentative. 
Future research is necessary to further explore the issues and questions raised 
and to validate any interpretations of these findings. 
Study Method 
The study analyzed errors uncovered during audits by Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co. of different-sized companies in a variety of industries. Audit 
team members reported the dollar amounts and account classifications of up to 
five audit adjustments for each company. They were also asked to describe the 
circumstances that led to the discovery of each error and their perception of 
the underlying causes of the error, including whether they believed it was 
intentional. We reviewed and classified 281 adjustments reported for 152 
companies. Selected results appear throughout this paper. 
Auditing Implications 
The study results illuminate three important issues: How auditors find 
errors, why they occur, and where they occur. The most interesting result is 
the large number of errors found using analytical review and various "infor­
mal" audit procedures compared with the small number found by traditional 
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procedures. This rinding is particularly surprising in light of the emphasis 
placed on these procedures in the audit literature and raises questions about 
the relative cost-effectiveness of audit procedures. 
Not so surprising, but of potential importance to the auditor, is that most 
errors are unintended and due to random human error rather than to systems 
or procedural problems. The participating auditors attributed a great many 
errors to various personnel problems, including employee turnover and 
inexperience, time pressure, carelessness and even incompetence. Other 
related causes they noted included a lack of knowledge in accounting, and 
errors made in judgmental amounts. Relatively few errors were due to poor 
controls, a lack of follow-up or review, and other pervasive problems. Finally, 
errors tend to be concentrated into selected audit areas which vary somewhat 
by industry; more errors seem to occur in small companies; and detected 
errors typically understate income almost as frequently as they overstate it. 
These findings, discussed in more detail below, have important implications for 
the design of audits and for preventing errors. 
How Auditors Find Errors 
During an audit, a variety of different events or circumstances can lead the 
auditor to detect an error, ranging from formal audit procedures such as 
confirmation or inventory counts, to casual remarks by client personnel. We 
summarize these "initial events" and the error percentages detected by each 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
As Table 1 indicates, analytical review and "informal" audit procedures, 
including client discussions and expectations from prior years, uncovered 45.6 
percent of the errors reported in this study, and 54.9 percent of the large 
errors; that is, errors greater than 0.6 percent of a company's assets. 
Table 1 
How Errors Were Detected3 
Initial Events All Errors Small Errorsa Large Errorsb 
Expectations from Prior Years 10.3% 3.7% 15.9% 
Client Discussions 8.2 7.3 8.5 
Analytical Review 27.1 31.7 30.5 
General Procedures 2.1 1.2 4.9 
Tests of Detail 47.3 49.9 35.3 
Estimates of Value 5.0 6.1 4.9 
a Less than or equal to 0.1 percent of total assets. 
b Greater than or equal to 0.6 percent of total assets. 
Tests of detail also detected a large percentage of errors (47.3 percent), 
although these procedures tended to detect small errors more frequently than 
large ones. Of the various types of detailed tests, confirmation and physical 
inspection in combination detected only 2.9 percent of the errors as indicated 
on Table 2. In contrast, detailed tests using client-supplied documentation, 
including both internally- and externally-prepared documents, detected 36.8 
percent of the errors ("Obtaining Supporting Documentation," which led to 
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detection of 19.4 percent of the errors, and "Analysis and Review," which led 
to detection of 17.4 percent). 
Analytical Review and Informal Procedures 
Analytical review is a catch-all term for a group of techniques of growing 
importance in auditing. In our study it included comparisons of current 
unaudited balances with prior years, predictions of current balances based on 
exogenous data, analyses of interrelationships among account balances, rea­
sonableness tests, estimates of account balances and initial review. 
Together with informal procedures such as discussions with client person­
nel and expectations from prior years based on a knowledge of the company, 
analytical review detected almost half of the errors resulting in an adjustment 
(45.6 percent). This figure may be somewhat misleading, though, because 
auditors normally use these methods before beginning detailed testing, 
uncovering errors that later procedures might also have turned up. However, 
this high percentage does underscore that analytical review, combined with 
various informal procedures, is at least as worthwhile as detailed tests, and is 
perhaps more cost effective since it requires less time to perform. 
Although prior year expectations and discussions with clients turned up 
mostly large errors (about 25 percent of them), analytical review by itself 
detected both large and small errors in almost equal proportions. As Table 1 
indicates, auditors using analytical review found 31.7 percent of the small 
errors they reported, and 30.5 percent of the large errors. They found most 
small errors by using analytical review procedures on small subsidiary trial 
balances and other balances supporting aggregate financial statements. Since 
analytical review takes little time while finding a large proportion of both large 
and small errors, practitioners designing and conducting audits should empha­
size these procedures where possible, in lieu of detailed testing, to reduce 
audit costs. 
Analytical review and informal procedures are already required for limited 
reviews of interim and other unaudited financial statements. Professional 
standards require auditors to conduct inquiries, obtain a familiarity with a 
client's accounting practices, and apply analytical review and other general 
audit procedures (SAS No. 10). The study findings seem to validate the 
effectiveness of limited review procedures for unaudited financial statements. 
Confirmation and Physical Inspection 
The study findings show that confirmation and physical inspection pro­
cedures detect few errors. As Table 2 indicates, out of the 281 errors 
reported, these procedures found only 2.9 percent, or 8 errors. Additionally, 
of the seven errors detected through confirmation procedures, three of them 
were identified before the confirmations were actually sent. 
Other research studies4 have also cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
confirmation procedures. In these studies, researchers manipulated the dollar 
amounts they asked recipients to confirm. Although these confirmation 
requests contained incorrect amounts, many recipients nonetheless confirmed 
them. Because confirmation and physical inspection procedures do not appear 
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Table 2 
Errors Detected by Tests of Detail 
Percentage 
Physical Inspection Procedures 
Confirmation Procedures 
Test Footings and Extensions 
0.4% 
2.5 
2.8 
Obtaining Supporting Documentation: 
Externally Prepared 
Internally Prepared 
Legal Documents 
Combinations of Above 
Prior Years' Workpapers 
11.4 
3.2 
2.5 
1.4 
0.7 
Analysis and Reviewa 
Scan 
Other 
19.4 
17.4 
3.2 
1.8 
TOTAL 47.3% 
Number of Errors 133 
a Analysis and review of internal information including account balance details, account balance 
detail activity, client work-ups, account classification and data consistency. 
to detect most errors and are quite time consuming, these procedures may not 
be very cost effective. 
The questions raised about the value of confirmation and physical inspection 
in this and other studies should spur practitioners to re-evaluate the objective 
of using these procedures. For instance, are confirmation and physical 
inspection actually most useful in detecting and preventing fraud? These 
procedures, in fact, first became required in response to the massive 
McKesson & Robbins fraud in the 1930's, which went undetected despite an 
audit. Unfortunately, the results of our study show little about detection of 
frauds, since only 10 of the reported errors were considered intentional, and 
they were not necessarily fraudulent. 
If the primary audit objective in performing confirmation and physical 
inspection is indeed not to detect unintended errors but rather to prevent and 
detect fraud, different standards may be appropriate in selecting sample sizes 
for these procedures. For instance, merely performing limited confirmation 
and physical inspection procedures in and of themselves may be sufficient to 
deter frauds of certain types, regardless of the sample sizes used. Also, 
because fraud is relatively infrequent in comparison to unintended errors, as 
demonstrated by this study, sample sizes might be reduced. 
Other Tests of Detail 
A significant number of errors were detected by tests of detail other than 
confirmation and physical inspection procedures. These test procedures found 
44.4 percent, or almost half of the errors. Almost all of these detailed test 
procedures relied on client-supplied documentation. 
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One interesting result is the large percentage of these errors detected 
through detailed tests that used internally-prepared documentation. This 
category includes at least the 17.4 percent of the errors detected through 
analysis and review, the 3.2 percent resulting from obtaining internally-
prepared supporting documentation and perhaps portions of other categories 
not specifically broken out. In contrast, obtaining externally-prepared docu­
mentation led to detection of only 11.4 percent of the errors. 
For the audit practitioner, these findings indicate that externally-prepared 
documentation is no more likely to be a source for detecting errors than 
internally-prepared documentation. Assuming that most errors are unintended, 
internal documents should be no less reliable than external documents and may 
indeed be a more direct means to uncover errors. This result seems to 
contradict the emphasis in the auditing literature on externally-prepared 
documentation. 
Overall, the findings for detailed tests show that these procedures detect a 
large number of errors and they should continue to be emphasized. Auditors 
should, however, closely consider the appropriate mix of detailed test 
procedures in light of results of this study. These tests also seem to detect 
more small errors than large errors, indicating they may be effective in finding 
errors that informal procedures do not detect. 
Why Errors Occur 
Most errors that auditors discover appear to be unintentional. Auditors 
participating in the study considered fewer than 4 percent, or 10 out of 281, of 
the reported errors to be made purposefully. Another important finding is that 
errors discovered tend to understate as often as they overstate company 
income. Further, most errors did not seem to be the result of major systems or 
procedural problems, but rather resulted from various personnel and related 
problems including inexperience, inadequate knowledge of accounting and 
errors in judgmental amounts. 
Personnel Problems 
Personnel problems, as defined in this study, included turnover and the 
resulting inexperience of new employees, incompetent or poorly-trained 
employees, and excessive time pressures on employees. These problems 
(Table 3) accounted for 26.3 percent of the errors, many of them leading to 
major audit adjustments. Two related causes were lack of knowledge of 
accounting, including basic accounting concepts, new pronouncements, and 
other principles. Auditors cited this problem as a cause of 15.0 percent of the 
errors, and judgment errors as causing 15.3 percent of the errors. (These 
percentages cannot be added because multiple causes were cited for some 
errors). 
Practitioners should be aware that personnel factors can affect the 
reliability of financial statements. Auditors should consider, for instance, 
reviewing the experience of accounting personnel in light of their current 
responsibilities, the rate of turnover among accounting personnel, and the 
provisions for replacing terminated or vacationing employees. They could look 
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Table 3 
Causes of Errors 
Personnel Problems 
Insufficient Accounting Knowledge 
Judgment Errors 
Cut-off or Accrual Errors 
Mechanical Errors 
Inadequate Control, Follow-up or 
Categories 
Percentagesa 
26.3 
15.0 
15.3 
38.1 
12.5 
Average 
Dollar Size 
$180 
$143 
$627 
$236 
$67 
Review 
Miscellaneous 
9.3 
19.2 
$135 
$53 
.72% 
.58% 
a Percentages add to more than 100% due to double counting of some errors attributed to more 
than one cause. 
at personnel factors as part of their regular review of a client's internal 
controls. If they note significant personnel problems, it may indicate a need for 
more testing of the affected audit areas, and procedures directed towards 
specific transactions handled by new or inexperienced personnel. 
Cut-Off and Accrual Errors 
Another important cause of the errors cited was improper cut-off and 
accrual of accounts at year-end. These errors, which comprised 38.1 percent 
of total error, averaged about 1 percent of company assets. The findings 
indicate that the traditional emphasis placed on verifying year-end balances by 
examining transaction cut-offs and accruals is justified. Since most of these 
errors occurred in small companies, auditors may wish to perform a balance 
sheet audit on these companies stressing substantive tests on year-end 
balances rather than reviews of on-going controls. This is, in fact, the approach 
often taken for small companies. 
Mechanical Errors 
This category includes posting, coding, footing and extension errors. 
Although the study found that 12.5 percent of the errors reported were 
mechanical errors, many were small, averaging only 0.35 percent of company 
assets. Audit procedures specifically intended to detect a subset of these 
mechanical errors, footing and extension errors, actually found very few errors 
(2.8 percent of the total errors reported). These findings may suggest that less 
time should be devoted to uncovering these relatively small mechanical errors, 
particularly in large companies where material errors of this type are rare. 
Where Errors Occur 
We have summarized those auditing areas in which errors most frequently 
occur in Table 4. Auditors reported the majority of the errors (56 percent) in 
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five audit areas: (1) sales & receivables, (2) purchases & payables, (3) 
inventory and production, (4) other assets, and (5) fixed assets. These 
concentrations of errors differ somewhat by industry. For industrial com­
panies, for instance, 31.7 percent of the errors involved inventory and 
production, while for wholesale and retail companies, 44.9 percent of the 
errors occurred in the sales and purchases cycle combined. The distribution of 
errors also differs for financial and service industries. 
A concentration of errors into specific audit areas may suggest that auditors 
should devote more time to these areas during an examination than to those 
where few errors are expected. In fact, most auditing firms already identify 
critical areas of particular importance before beginning actual fieldwork, and 
perform additional testing and review in these areas. The results of this study 
confirm the worth of this policy for planning an audit. 
Table 4 
Where Errors Occur6 
All Wholesaleb 
Audit Area Companies Industriala & Retail Financialc Serviced 
Cash 2.1% 1.6% — 4.7% 2.3% 
Securities & 
Investments 3.2 — 2.6% 4.7 2.3 
Sales & Receivables 15.7 11.2 18.4 5.9 38.6 
Notes Receivable 5.7 1.6 2.6 16.4 — 
Inventory & Production 11.3 31.7 7.9 4.7 4.5 
Other Assets 7.5 4.8 5.3 7.1 6.8 
Fixed Assets 10.0 3.2 15.8 8.2 18.2 
Long-Term Debt 3.9 1.6 2.6 5.9 4.5 
Purchases & Payables 11.0 15.8 26.3 5.9 4.5 
Income Taxes 4.2 4.8 5.3 4.7 — 
Other Liabilities 7.8 1.6 2.6 18.4 2.3 
Stockholder's Equity 3.5 6.3 — 1.2 2.3 
Commitments & 
Contingencies 3.9 7.9 — 1.2 6.8 
Labor Costs and 
Benefits 5.0 4.8 5.3 7.1 2.3 
Other Income 3.6 3.2 5.3 2.4 2.3 
Other 2.1 — — 1.2 2.3 
Total Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Number of Errors 281 63 38 85 44 
a SIC Nos. 2 and 3 
b SIC Nos. 5 
c SIC Nos. 6 
d SIC Nos. 7 and 8. 
The study findings also indicate that errors tend to occur more frequently in 
smaller companies. Although companies included in the study were broken into 
three categories of almost equal size, containing approximately 50 companies 
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each, many more errors were reported for companies in the small size 
category than for either the large- or medium-sized category (see Table 5). 
These results may indicate that controls to prevent errors are lacking in small 
companies and that auditors should be more concerned with the possibility of 
unintended errors when examining small companies. 
Table 5 
Company Sizes6 
Largea Mediumb Smallc 
Number of errors 66 92 123 
Number of Companies 49 52 51 
No-Error Companies 23 22 12 
a Assets greater than $50 million. 
b Assets of $10 to 50 million. 
c Assets less than $10 million. 
Preventing Errors 
Beyond the auditing implications of financial statement errors, practitioners 
have an opportunity to assist their clients in preventing errors that might show 
up in financial statements. The study results indicate certain areas where 
improvements in management practices could potentially reduce accounting 
errors. 
Pre-Audit Review 
The apparent effectiveness of analytical review and "informal" auditing 
procedures suggests that clients can benefit from using similar techniques to 
uncover and correct potential accounting errors before a year-end audit begins. 
Comparable internal procedures might include reviews of internal budgeting, 
planning, and other financial data using various analytical techniques such as 
ratio and trend analysis. Comparison of recorded financial data to budgeted 
amounts, for instance, often uncovers errors. Also, companies can use 
statistical techniques similar to audit tests to estimate expected account 
balances. 
Client internal auditors can perform pre-audit reviews through discussions 
with preparers and users of accounting records. Discussions lead to detection 
of a surprising number of errors and identification of likely potential sources of 
errors. Employees who are aware of possible errors often are not given the 
opportunity to report or correct them and may have no specific responsibility to 
do so. Procedures and policies encouraging accounting and operating personnel 
to help correct known or potential errors can be an effective preventive 
measure. 
Personnel Policies 
Clients can take steps to reduce errors caused by personnel problems and 
other related causes. Improvements in personnel policies may reduce turnover 
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in the accounting staff. Hiring and promotion practices, employee pay scales, 
benefits programs, and staffing levels all have an impact on turnover. Also, 
screening of new employees during hiring and promotion should ensure that all 
accounting employees possess a basic understanding of accounting concepts 
and principles. 
Accounting Department Organization 
The proper organization and delegation of accounting department respon­
sibilities may help clients to eliminate potential personnel problems that cause 
errors. Employee errors may be reduced if the department has clearly-defined 
job responsibilities, written job descriptions, and standardized procedures. 
Information about the organization and definition of duties may be particularly 
useful to employees who are unfamiliar with new responsibilities. Adequate 
department staffing is also important. 
Accounting Expertise 
Improvements in accounting expertise among accounting personnel can 
eliminate potential sources of errors. Companies can improve training, intro­
duce self-study courses, and circulate current accounting pronouncements and 
other literature to accounting personnel to increase their knowledge of 
advanced accounting concepts and new pronouncements. 
Conclusions 
The study findings and implications may suggest the following scenario for a 
more effective and efficient audit: 
The audit team members plan the examination to emphasize areas where 
errors are most likely. During a review of internal accounting controls, the 
auditors assess the level of experience and competence of client personnel to 
determine where errors are more likely despite adequate internal accounting 
controls. The client's industry may also indicate likely sources of error. 
In the interim phase, members of the audit team review prior-year 
workpapers and other documentation, conduct analytical reviews, and discuss 
areas of concern with the client. The auditor can feel assured that these 
relatively easy procedures will uncover a major portion of any errors. These 
initial steps will also help further define those areas that warrant additional 
detailed tests. 
During the year-end audit, the time needed and cost for detailed testing 
require the auditor to apply these techniques selectively. Wherever possible, 
analytical review procedures are applied to small accounts and areas where 
errors are not likely, supplemented only by limited detailed testing and 
compliance tests. Tests of detail are applied extensively only where errors are 
considered to be a distinct possibility. These tests include extensive analysis 
and review of client records and comparison of recorded balances and 
transactions to supporting documentation. Extensive tests of detail are also 
applied to year-end transactions to uncover errors in cut-offs and accruals, 
particularly for small companies. Tests of footings and extensions are held to a 
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minimum and are performed only to verify the basic integrity of client supplied 
documentation. As a precaution against fraud, the audit team sends a limited 
number of confirmations and, where appropriate, inspects inventory for a small 
sample of items at each company location. 
Upon completion of the examination, the audit team will know the potential 
sources and causes of accounting errors and can assist the client to prevent the 
recurrence of similar errors. Such assistance might include improving person­
nel policies, accounting department organization, and expertise of accounting 
employees. At the conclusion of the engagement the practitioner will have 
made a significant contribution towards preventing the recurrence of similar 
accounting errors and has also helped to reduce future audit costs as a result. 
This scenario is, of course, speculative. It is intended only to project some 
possible implications of the study and to stimulate further discussion into the 
issues raised. I hope that this research will lead to further study that will be 
beneficial both to practitioners and to client financial executives. 
Footnotes 
1. I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Janet Lewis, of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 
who assisted in preparing this paper. 
2. See R.E. Hylas, and R.H. Ashton, "Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors," The 
Accounting Review (forthcoming). 
3. Categories in Table 1 include the following quoted from the article referenced in (2). 
Our definition of analytical review was broad. It included procedures such as compari-
sons of current unaudited balances with balances of prior years, predictions of current 
balances based on exogenous data, and analyses of interrelationships among account 
balances. It also included what the auditors referred to as "reasonableness tests," 
"estimates" of account balances, and "initial review." The latter term refers to a 
cursory review of financial statements in the early planning stages of an audit. 
The category "Tests of Detail" is further categorized in Table 2: Analysis and review 
involves the examination of transaction or balance components of data produced by or 
contained in the client's accounting system. It involves examination of transaction 
amounts and descriptions, account balance details, "work-ups" to support account 
balances, and data appearing on various types of reconciliations. Supporting Documenta-
tion—Externally Prepared involves comparisons of accounting data with evidence 
obtained outside the client's accounting system. It includes reference to confirmations, 
invoices, cancelled checks, test counts, and checks of mathematical accuracy. Scan 
involves a cursory review of transactions or the details supporting balances, in a search 
for unusual items or obvious errors. This category may be contrasted with analytical 
review, which involves entire account balances or other aspects of overall activity. 
The category "General Procedures" includes reviews of accounting policies and 
procedures, legal letters, and minutes of boards of directors' meetings. "Estimates of 
value" includes both auditors' estimates and their evaluations of clients' estimates 
involving, for example, uncollectible accounts, net realizable value of inventory, losses 
on discontinued operations, and contingent losses. 
4. See Davis et al. [1967], Hubbard and Bullington [1972], Sauls [1970, 1972], Sorkin [1978], 
and Warren [1974, 1975]. 
5. From article referenced in footnote (2). Nine errors excluded where no specific cause was 
identified, and ten additional errors excluded which were considered to be intentional. The 
following comments apply to the categories. 
The first category, Personnel Problems, refers to such things as turnover, new or 
inexperienced client employees, carelessness, incompetence, and time pressures. A 
related category, Insufficient Accounting Knowledge, includes errors caused by insuffi-
cient awareness of general accounting concepts, promulgated accounting principles, and 
specific accounting policies of the client. The category of Judgment Errors refers to 
items that had to be estimated because exact dollar amounts could not be determined, 
e.g., estimates of uncollectible accounts, obsolete inventory, and contingencies. 
Insufficient information at year-end, as well as "poor" or "unreasonable" estimates 
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based on adequate information, were cited by the auditors as the major causes of 
problems in this category. Cut-off or Accrual errors refers to incomplete, poorly-
executed, or omitted cut-off or accrual procedures at year-end. The Mechanical Errors 
category refers to procedural errors—e.g., posting, coding, keypunching, footing and 
calculation—made by employees considered normally to be competent and conscien-
tious. Inadequate Control, Follow-up or Review procedures includes errors caused by 
failure to perform, for example, reviews of old account balances for collectibility, follow-
ups of reconciliation differences, and established internal control procedures. The 
Miscellaneous causes category includes, for example, errors that the auditors ascribed 
to coordination or communication problems, the use of outside service bureaus, the use 
of estimated amounts instead of actual amounts, differences between client accounting 
policies and generally accepted accounting principles, misunderstanding of contract 
terms, and inability to handle unusual items properly. 
Of the above errors, the ten classified as intentional were considered by the auditors 
to have been purposely caused by client management or employees. In some cases the 
auditors were confident of this interpretation; in others, they only suspected that the 
errors were intentional. 
6. From the article referenced in footnote 2. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors 
William F. Messier, Jr. 
University of Florida 
The recent competition among public accounting firms for clients has forced 
them to find more efficient ways to conduct audits. The methods chosen to 
improve efficiency, however, must be as effective as the old methods in 
detecting error or auditors must be willing to accept higher levels of risk on 
their engagements. The results reported in Hylas' paper (and which are based 
on the study by Hylas and Ashton1) provide many insights for practitioners and 
present some interesting areas of research for academicians. In particular, this 
study provides valuable information on how auditors can more efficiently and 
effectively conduct audits. 
In my discussion I will first address some specific areas of the study that are 
particularly interesting and informative. Secondly, I would like to comment on 
Hylas' scenario for an effective and efficient audit. 
Specific Areas of Interest 
In this section I would first like to address two specific results that may 
have a significant impact on the way audits are presently conducted. I will folow 
this with a subsection which contains a number of miscellaneous comments. 
Personnel Related Problems 
The result that surprised me the most was that the auditors who 
participated in the study "attributed a great many errors to various personnel 
problems, including employee turnover and inexperience, time pressure, 
carelessness, and even incompetence." Relatedly, a large number of errors 
resulted from a lack of accounting knowledge by client personnel. There are 
some serious implications for accounting control from such findings. SAS 
Section 320.30-.48 outlines the basic concepts or elements of internal control. 
Of all the concepts listed in those standards, the most critical element to the 
internal control system is competent and trustworthy personnel. This results 
from the fact that even if all of the other concepts of internal control (e.g. 
segregation of duties, execution and recording of transactions, etc.) are 
present, incompetent personnel can destroy their effectiveness. 
Does the fact that a large percentage of errors are caused by personnel 
problems pose difficulties for the auditor? My inclination is that it does. This is 
based on the belief that it is difficult for auditors to assess personnel related 
problems ex ante (i.e. early in the audit). Certainly, employee turnover and 
inexperience should be "red flags" to the auditor, but judging the competence 
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of client personnel may be very difficult. In fact, auditors may only get a "feel'' 
for this after performing tests of transactions. Of course, prior experience with 
the client may help. 
While I have not surveyed any public accounting firms, I suspect that 
auditors currently do not make "formal" assessments of client personnel. 
Given the results of this study, auditors should consider refining their 
approaches to personnel evaluation and/or develop new ways of identifying 
"problem" personnel early in the audit and allocate audit resources in their 
areas of responsibility. 
Analytical Review Procedures 
The result that analytical review procedures (ARPs) identified a high 
percentage of errors should be very encouraging to auditors because it 
provides empirical support for current auditing standards (SAS Section 318). 
These results are also encouraging because these procedures appear to be as 
effective as tests of details in detecting errors and probably can be conducted at 
a lower cost. I assume from reading the paper that the ARPs reported on did 
not include formal quantitative approaches such as regression analysis which 
may be more costly. 
I have two comments about this result that require clarification. First, we 
normally think of ARPs as being useful in detecting unusual fluctuations. The 
implication to me is that this means "large errors." The results of the study 
indicates that ARPs were equally effective at finding "small errors." My 
concern here is why auditors would be investigating fluctuations that result in 
"small errors." The only explanation that appears reasonable was that these 
"small" errors were still material. Further research along these lines (i.e. 
investigation rules) would be helpful.2 
Secondly, the study provides no information on the state of the sample 
companies' internal control systems. Kinney has pointed out that "The 
marginal effectiveness of preliminary analytical review in predicting error 
depends in part upon the effectiveness of internal control subsystems . . . " 3 In 
the current study we have no way of determining whether ARPs were effective 
in and of themselves or because the auditors knew of internal control 
weaknesses from prior experience and therefore knew where to suspect 
errors. Future studies of this type need to examine the evaluation of internal 
control on the effectiveness of ARPs. 
I think the findings that ARPs and other informal procedures were effective 
in detecting errors is important for another reason that was given only casual 
comment in the paper. This relates to the use of ARPs for reviews of financial 
statements for non-public companies. The main procedures required by 
Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Services No. 1 for a 
review engagement are inquiry and ARPs. My discussions with individuals 
from both large and small public accounting firms indicate that there is a great 
deal of diversity in how firms approach review engagements. I have been told 
by a number of CPAs that the type and amount of evidence gathered on review 
engagements often approaches the amount gathered on an audit (e.g. confirma­
tions of accounts receivable, vouching of selected accounts, etc.). These same 
CPAs indicate that one of the reasons this occurs is that they are just not 
satisfied with the effectiveness of inquiry and ARPs. The results reported in 
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this paper should relieve some of their fears in relying on these evidence 
gathering procedures. 
Miscellaneous Comments 
The study contained a number of other findings that are worth mentioning. 
First, is the result that a small percentage (4%) of errors were intentional. This 
is noteworthy but we must be very careful not to place too much reliance on 
such a result. If the client or client personnel have "strategically manipulated" 
accounting information, traditional audit procedures may not be effective in 
finding them.4 
Second, is the result "that externally-prepared documentation is no more 
likely to be a source for detecting errors than internally-prepared documenta­
tion." This result would be more meaningful if we knew what percentage of 
total documentary evidence was in each category. For example, if 80% of the 
documentary evidence that auditors examine on an engagement is internal, 
then we would expect internally-prepared documents to detect a high percent­
age of errors. In other words, I am suggesting we not dispose of the idea that 
external evidence is more reliable until we have more data. 
A Revised Audit Scenario 
Hylas' scenario for an effective and efficient audit is somewhat different 
from what auditors are currently doing, although I think competitive pressures 
are pushing them in that direction. I agree with him that auditors should 
allocate their resources where they expect errors. There are two points in the 
audit process where such an approach will prove most beneficial: (1) where 
auditors use ARPs early in an engagement for planning purposes and (2) in the 
study and evaluation of internal control. In the first instance the auditor will 
have to identify unusual fluctuations and then allocate resources to investigate 
their causes. In the second instance the auditor must "anticipate" what types 
of errors can result from a particular control weakness before allocating audit 
resources. Unfortunately, we have little evidence on how well auditors 
perform these tasks.5 
A second comment on Hylas' scenario concerns the audit work at the test 
of details stage. He suggests that tests of details should be "applied 
extensively only where errors are considered a distinct possibility." If we 
assume that auditors are able to anticipate errors, then the current approach of 
taking large random samples could be modified. If auditors design audit 
procedures to assess the effect of specific types of errors then there is no need 
to take large random samples. At this point auditors would only be interested in 
the presence of "unanticipated" types of errors. In such instances some type 
of discovery sampling might be more appropriate.6 
Conclusion 
I view auditing as an evolutionary process where audit firms must adapt to a 
changing environment. Studies like Hylas and Ashton's provide valuable 
information which can assist audit firms in this adaptation process. I hope that 
the future will see further collaboration between practitioners and academics in 
studies similar to the one discussed today. 
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A Multi-Attribute Model for Audit Evaluation* 
Theodore J. Mock 
University of Southern California 
Michael G. Samet 
Decisionetics, Inc. 
Introduction 
This paper concerns research directed at the development of a general 
procedure for assessing an overall, meaningful measure of the quality of an 
audit engagement from a systematic integration of several evaluative charac­
teristics. Such a measure can serve as a key input for audit planning and cost-
benefit analysis in complex assessment situations. The technical approach is 
based upon the creation and application of a hierarchical multi-attribute 
evaluation (MAE) model that decomposes an audit into manageable parts which 
can be analytically assessed and combined. 
The importance of the need to parameterize and measure the quality of 
various audit procedures and their role in the overall process of evaluating audit 
evidence is widely recognized in the field. Accounting firms and their clients are 
continually striving to develop and refine useful criteria for assessing audit 
effectiveness. For example, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1976, p. 150) 
highlight a research opportunity objective to develop: 
. . . measures of effectiveness for individual and related sets of auditing 
procedures that take into account . . . the anticipated quality of 
evidence derived from their use. 
Such auditing procedures include (p. 9): 
. . . all of the tools, techniques and procedures used to examine 
information . . . The methods for reporting the results of the examina­
tion, because, no matter how thorough and effective the examination, in 
the end a user can only rely on the assurance that is actually 
communicated by the auditor's report. Additionally, audit methods 
encompass all of the supporting functions and procedures used to plan, 
control, and carry out an audit. 
At a more general level, the American Institute of CPAs has shown a 
continuing interest in audit quality and firm quality control practices. For 
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example, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 4, "Quality Control 
Considerations for a Firm of Independent Auditors" established nine elements 
of quality control which were subsequently incorporated into Statement on 
Quality Control Standards (SQCS) No. 1. In addition, most SASs contain 
explicit references to evaluative criteria and attributes which may be expected 
to impact on the quality of individual audit engagements. 
Because of the disparate nature of the many different features of audit 
quality, a need exists for judging and expressing the overall procedural quality 
of an audit in an integrated, meaningful and useful manner. Toward meeting 
this need, a number of attempts have been made to condense and codify the 
vast literature on auditing know-how into a set of specific guidelines or 
evaluative criteria (i.e., the "do's" and "don'ts" of good procedures). These 
efforts have mostly taken the form of itemized considerations and check lists, 
such as are found in firm quality control review manuals and in related 
documents (Milliron and Mock, 1981). The different schemes suggested vary 
considerably in the degree to which they are comprehensive and well 
organized. For the most part, however, these schemes are loosely structured, 
and their originators rarely claim that they have employed a thorough/ 
systematic/expert-consensus-based approach for specifying evaluative dimen­
sions which are mutually exclusive and relatively exhaustive. Furthermore, the 
techniques do not usually provide quantitatively meaningful measures of audit 
quality. What appears to be needed, therefore, is a much more formal approach 
to establishing and configuring evaluative dimensions or attributes into a well-
structured model that can provide traceable and dependable quantitative 
estimates of audit quality. 
However, the evaluation of the quality of an entire audit is a difficult 
intellectual exercise which requires the combination of a number of evaluative 
factors into an overall measure of quality. This analysis is usually done using 
extensive review forms or quality control review manuals, and the complex set 
of qualitative judgments must be informally aggregated into one vaguely-
specified audit evaluation. Although the informal approach may lead to a 
satisfactory evaluation, this method has numerous potential failings. Among 
these are that it may lack: (1) reliability and validity, since evaluators are often 
unable to combine so much information in a consistent, repeatable, accurate 
manner; (2) generality and systematization, since different audits cannot be 
compared and contrasted by the same evaluation model; (3) intelligibility and 
communicability, since the logic by which judgments are made often cannot be 
adequately explained; (4) diagnosticity, since it offers little or no information 
about the relative contributions of the various evaluation factors; and (5) cost-
effectiveness, since most review processes require extensive lists of factors to 
be evaluated (see Milliron and Mock, 1981). Therefore, a more objective and 
standardized evaluation methodology which corrects these deficiencies may be 
desirable. 
A recently popularized methodology known as multi-attribute evaluation 
(MAE) offers such an approach to making quantitative assessments involving 
multiple criteria (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Edwards, 1977). MAE 
methods can decompose a complex overall evaluation problem into more 
manageable sub-problems through scaling, weighting, and combining opera­
tions applied to specific criteria. With respect to audit evaluation, the MAE 
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approach offers to improve upon current, intuitive techniques of audit-practice 
assessment in the following ways: (1) making explicit what are conventionally 
implicit considerations; (2) quantifying what are usually qualitative descriptions; 
(3) simplifying the representation and integration of what are often complex 
configurations and interrelations among relevant information; and (4) providing 
an objective and general method for rating the overall quality of an audit. In 
sum, the MAE method is designed to provide a useful framework for evaluative 
analysis, discussion, and feedback. 
Method and Results 
The identification and definition of appropriate evaluative attributes for 
audit quality and their configuration into attribute clusters or categories (i.e., 
an MAE model) is a challenging task. The problem results from the fact that 
the attributes and their classification are arbitrary; they are subject to 
differences of opinion and there is probably no such thing as a "best" set. The 
approach taken here, therefore, was to use a systematic, iterative procedure 
to distill a "good" set of general evaluative criteria which are broad in scope 
yet are meaningful, practical, and internally consistent. This multi-phase 
approach involved repeated consultation with relevant literature and expert 
opinion, attribute content analysis, and empirical verification studies. In 
general, an attempt was made to satisfy the desirable properties of an attribute 
set as suggested by the framework of MAE theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976); 
namely, that it be complete, so that it covers all aspects of the problem; 
operational, so that it can be meaningfully used in analysis; decomposable, so 
that the evaluation process is simplified by breaking it down into parts; 
nonredundant, so that double counting of attribute impact is avoided, and 
minimal, so that evaluation dimensions are kept to a minimum. These 
guidelines were followed in the development of a cohesive set of attributes for 
evaluating the quality of an audit. 
As a first stage of the attribute-definition process, the basic professional 
and authoritative sources (e.g., SASs, SQCSs, the AICPA Peer Review 
Manual (1978), PMM's Quality Controls (1980), AY's "Perspectives on 
Quality" (1980), etc.) were reviewed. In addition, suggestions for evaluative 
considerations were obtained from many auditing references such as Roberts' 
(1978) treatment of statistical auditing, and research studies such as Mock and 
Turner (1981) which focus on the evaluation of internal accounting controls. 
This process generated 110 initial considerations or factors. Working with an 
experienced auditor, these considerations were organized into a loosely 
structured list which was then presented to several practicing audit experts. 
These experts were interviewed, on a one-to-one basis, and they provided 
valuable comments for each consideration concerning its meaning (i.e., is it 
really different from some other consideration?), relevance (i.e., does it reflect 
significantly upon audit quality?), and scope (i.e., should it be combined with 
another audit consideration or perhaps decomposed into two or more separate 
considerations?). 
Based on the first phase of attribute definition, 32 evaluative considerations 
were specified. Each consideration was phrased in the form of a specific 
question; for example, "Were appropriate critical audit areas identified?" A 
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tentative organizational or classification scheme for these considerations was 
then developed as a conceptual hierarchy in terms of attributes and attribute 
categories. Each attribute was defined by a set of a few related evaluative 
questions; and the attributes were grouped according to five major categories 
relating to audit performance (PLAN, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURES, 
EVALUATION, CONDUCT). Attributes within the PLAN category, for 
example, are "Objectives," "Research," and "Strategy." 
As the second phase of attribute-set development, a set of simple paper-
and-pencil sorting tasks was constructed that required the classification of 
question elements into attribute categories. These tasks were then presented, 
in the form of a pilot study, to ten faculty members and doctoral students in the 
School of Accounting at the University of Southern California. On one task, for 
example, participants were asked to sort questions (presented in random order 
without labels) into major categories (e.g., PLAN, ADMINISTRATION, etc.). 
In another task, the questions had to be sorted according to only attribute 
labels (e.g., "Objectives," "Research," . . .) without reference to the name 
of the major category to which each attribute belonged. In a third task, both 
attribute category names and attribute labels were presented in a hierarchically 
structured manner (i.e., PLAN—"Objectives," "Research," "Strategy;" 
ADMINISTRATION—"Personnel,'' "Budgeting," "Management;" etc.). 
For each sorting task, each question had to be placed into only one category or 
attribute as appropriate. Participants were instructed that the purpose of the 
exercise was to assess levels of agreement/disagreement—among people 
knowledgeable about auditing—concerning where specific issues related to 
audit quality fit into an overall schema. They were asked to respond in 
accordance with their individual subjective opinions since there were really no 
"right" answers. 
The conduct and results of the pilot study demonstrated the success of the 
sorting-task technique for providing data that could be gainfully used toward 
the refinement of both specific attribute definitions (i.e., evaluative questions) 
and the organizational structure into which they are placed. A "confusion 
matrix,'' showing the frequency with which each question was assigned to each 
attribute category, was generated to represent the results for each sorting 
task; these matrices highlighted apparent difficulties that participants had in 
interpreting and appropriately classifying specific questions. Based on a 
systematic analysis of these data, modifications were made in the way certain 
questions were phrased or worded; and some changes were also effected in 
the labeling and organization of the attribute categories. In addition, it was 
determined from the data that the most diagnostic task (in terms of suggesting 
potential problems with the attribute scheme) was the one requiring partici­
pants to classify questions into attributes when both the names of the attributes 
and corresponding attribute categories were indicated. As a result of this latter 
finding, which is supported by other research (Beach, Townes, Campbell, and 
Keating, 1976), this particular structured sorting task was employed in the 
third phase of attribute-set verification. 
The participants in this third phase of verification were 34 auditors who 
were taking part in a special program of advanced audit training. As mentioned 
above, these participants also performed a sorting task that utilized the latest 
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version, available at the time, of the attribute definitions (i.e., specific 
evaluative questions) and the categorization scheme (major category and 
attribute labels). Figure 1 provides an illustration of the format in which the 
task was presented; randomly ordered questions (like those shown in the 
table) appeared on the left side of a matrix, and participants were required to 
check the one column (i.e., attribute name) which they felt was most likely to 
contain the given question within its domain. 
As in the case of the pilot study, the data obtained from this latter exercise 
were then carefully analyzed for each question in terms of the distribution of 
participant responses across the possible classification columns. The results 
are portrayed in Tables 1 through 5. Each table corresponds to a major 
category label (e.g., PLAN), and the attributes and questions within this 
category have been reorganized according to the intended attribute headings. 
For each question, the percent frequency distribution of classification re­
sponses (among the 34 participants) is given across the attributes belonging to 
the major category which contains the given question. 
As an example of the results format consider Table 1. The first question 
listed, "Were all audit objectives explicit and clearly specified?", belongs to the 
attribute "Objectives." Of the 34 participants, 63% placed the question into 
the appropriate ("correct") attribute and 3% placed it into the aligned attribute 
"Strategy." Thus, 66% of the participants assigned the question to the 
appropriate ("correct") major category, " P L A N ; " and 34% of the sample put 
the question into various inappropriate ("incorrect") attributes distributed 
across the remaining four major categories. For the second question, 56%, 
23%, and 3% of the participants placed it into the "Objectives," "Strategy," 
and "Research" attributes, respectively; consequently, 82% of the re-
sponders classified the question into the appropriate major category (PLAN) 
and 18% put it elsewhere. The circled number on each line of the table 
represents the modal classification response (i.e., highest frequency of 
assignment) among all possible attribute labels (not just those in PLAN). 
Hence, for every question in the PLAN category, the correct attribute was 
assigned more often than any other attribute identified in Tables 1 through 5. 
The classification matrices shown in the tables provide an index of relative 
classification accuracy (i.e., adherence to the expected classification) as well a 
measure of inter-rater agreement with respect to question classification. 
Examination of the tables shows that the classification accuracy or agreement 
rate is reasonably high. For 29 of the 32 questions, the correct attribute and 
major category were selected by a greater number of participants than any 
other attribute or major category, respectively. In fact, across all 32 questions, 
the median modal selection frequency for the correct attribute was 56% 
compared to a chance value of 14%; for the correct major category, the median 
modal selection frequency was 73% compared to a chance value of 20%. For 
eight of the questions (i.e., ¼ of all questions) for which a classification problem 
was still evidenced in the latter data, additional modifications were made in 
their wording so as to make them better fit the intended attribute/category. 
For example, the question "Were appropriate statistical techniques correctly 
applied and interpreted?" was more often classified under "nature" within 
"PROCEDURES" (26%) rather than under "analysis" within "EVALUA­
TION" (21%). Consequently, the wording of the question was changed to read 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION: 
CATEGORY I, PLAN 
ATTRIBUTE 
ATTRIBUTE QUESTION O b j e c t i v e s S t r a t e g y R e s e a r c h 
CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
O b j e c t i v e s 
Were a l l a u d i t o b j e c t i v e s 
e x p l i c i t and c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d ? 
(63%) 3% 0% 66% 
Were s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s a p p r o -
p r i a t e l y t a i l o r e d t o t h e o v e r a l l 
a u d i t purpose? 56% 
23% 3% 82% 
Were a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t i c a l a u d i t 
a r e a s i d e n t i f i e d ? 27% 32% 29% 88% 
S t r a t e g y 
Was o v e r a l l a u d i t s t r a t e g y a p p r o -
p r i a t e f o r c r i t i c a l a u d i t a r e a s ? 3% 52% 3% 58% 
Were t h e e lements o f t h e a u d i t 
s t r a t e g y a p p r o p r i a t e l y i n t e g r a t e d 
( e . g . , b a l a n c e m a i n t a i n e d between 
p l a n n e d degree o f c o m p l i a n c e and 
p l a n n e d s u b s t a n t i v e t e s t s ) ? 
0% 52% 0% 50% 
R e s e a r c h 
Were c l i e n t ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c -
t u r e and o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s a d e -
q u a t e l y r e s e a r c h e d and i n c o r p o r a t e d 
i n t o t h e a u d i t ? 
0% 30% 59% 89% 
Were r e l e v a n t b u s i n e s s / i n d u s t r y 
f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g economic c o n d i -
t i o n s and government r e g u l a t i o n s , 
a d e q u a t e l y r e s e a r c h e d ? 
0% 0% 91% 91% 
Median Frequency o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 56% 82% 
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TABLE 2 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION: 
CATEGORY II, ADMINISTRATION 
ATTRIBUTE 
ATTRIBUTE QUESTION P e r s o n n e l B u d g e t i n g Management 
CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
D i d a u d i t s t a f f have t h e l e v e l o f 
e x p e r i e n c e / t r a i n i n g / c a p a b i l i t y 
r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s a u d i t ( g i v e n r i s k s , 
n e e d s , e t c . ) ? 
0% 32 972 
P e r s o n n e l Were t h e r e q u i r e d s p e c i a l s k i l l s 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e 
a u d i t team? 
0% 32 832 
Were team members a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
a s s i g n e d t o s p e c i f i c t a s k s ( e . g . , 
were key p e r s o n n e l i n v o l v e d w i t h 
c r i t i c a l a u d i t a r e a s ) ? 
62 152 922 
Were budget e s t i m a t e s f o r work 
a p p r o p r i a t e ? 
0% 82% 32 852 
B u d g e t i n g Was a u d i t budget a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
a l l o c a t e d among a u d i t t a s k s ( e . g . , 
were c r i t i c a l a u d i t a r e a s a p p r o -
p r i a t e l y e m p h a s i z e d ) ? 
0% 82% 62 882 
Were t h e a u d i t t a s k s s c h e d u l e d 
and implemented i n an e f f e c t i v e 
and e f f i c i e n t manner? 
62 21% 29% 562 
Management 
Was t h e a u d i t team e f f e c t i v e l y 
managed t o a l l o w f o r s u f f i c i e n t 
l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
c o m m u n i c a t l o n , f e e d b a c k , e t c ? 
122 32 69% 842 
Was an e f f e c t i v e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n -
s h i p and c o m m u n i c a t i o n channel 
m a i n t a i n e d w i t h c l i e n t r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e s ( e . g . , c h i e f f i n a n c i a l 
o f f i c e r , a u d i t c o m m i t t e e ) ? 
212 02 54% 752 
Median Frequency o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 752 852 
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TABLE 3 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION: 
CATEGORY III, PROCEDURES 
ATTRIBUTE 
ATTRIBUTE QUESTION N a t u r e Scope T i m i n g 
CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
N a t u r e 
Was t h e n a t u r e o f s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e s 
a p p r o p r i a t e g i v e n t h e c r i t i c a l a u d i t 
a r e a s ? 
30% 152 02 452 
Were p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d t o produce 
competent and r e l i a b l e a u d i t I n f o r -
m a t i o n ? 
47% 92 02 562 
Scope 
Was t h e scope ( e . g . , l e v e l o f d e t a i l , 
sample s i z e , e t c . ) f o r each i n d i v i -
d u a l p r o c e d u r e s u f f i c i e n t ? 
02 74% 02 742 
Was e x t e n t o f p r o c e d u r e s , t a k e n 
t o g e t h e r , a p p r o p r i a t e f o r i n v e s t i -
g a t i n g a l l c r i t i c a l a u d i t a r e a s ? 
32 152 02 18% 
T i m i n g 
Were i n d i v i d u a l p r o c e d u r e s 
implemented 1n a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e 
sequence? 
0% 0% 65% 652 
Was each p r o c e d u r e a c c o m p l i s h e d 
a t t h e c o r r e c t p o i n t i n t i m e 
( e . g . , d u r i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
s t a g e o f f i s c a l y e a r ) ? 
02 02 77% 772 
Median Frequency o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 512 612 
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TABLE 4 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION: 
CATEGORY IV, EVALUATION 
ATTRIBUTE 
ATTRIBUTE QUESTION A n a l y s i s Judgment 
CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
A n a l y s i s 
Were a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c a l 
t e c h n i q u e s c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d 
and i n t e r p r e t e d ? 
12% 32% 
Were a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t i c a l l e v e l s 
s e l e c t e d and a p p l i e d w i t h 
r e s p e c t t o m a t e r i a l i t y , r i s k , 
and r e l i a b i l i t y ? 
9% 21% 30% 
Judgment 
Were competent e v i d e n t i a l 
m a t t e r c o n s i d e r e d and i n t e r -
p r e t e d i n a s u i t a b l e manner? 
26% 70% 
Were c r i t i c a l a u d i t judgments 
a d e q u a t e l y r e a s o n e d ? 
18% © 74% 
Median Frequency o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 24% 51% 
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TABLE 5 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION: 
CATEGORY V, CONDUCT 
ATTRIBUTE 
ATTRIBUTE QUESTION C o m p l i a n c e Review F o l l o w - u p 
CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
C o m p l i a n c e 
Was t h e degree o f c o m p l i a n c e w i t h 
o p e r a t i n g p o l i c i e s and p r o c e d u r e s 
o f f i r m s u f f i c i e n t ? 
59% 18% 0% 76% 
Were s t a n d a r d i z e d forms ( f l o w c h a r t s , 
ICQs, c h e c k l i s t s , s t a t i s t i c a l 
a p p r o v a l f o r m s , e t c . ) a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
employed? 
24% 9X 0% 33% 
Review 
Were a p p r o p r i a t e t y p e s o f r e v i e w s 
c o n d u c t e d ( e . g . , w o r k i n g - p a p e r 
r e v i e w ; r e v i e w by t a x , EDP, 
i n d u s t r y o r o t h e r s p e c i a l i s t s ; e t c ) ? 
18% 47% 3X 68X 
Were r e v i e w p r o c e d u r e s performed i n 
a t i m e l y manner? 0% 53% 6% 59X 
Were a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i s i o n s and 
a c t i o n s e x e r c i s e d t o f o l l o w - u p a u d i t 
t e s t and r e v i e w f i n d i n g s ? 
0% 24% 41% 65% 
F o l l o w - U p 
Were problems and c o n f l i c t s , i f a n y , 
f o l l o w e d - u p and r e s o l v e d i n a 
t i m e l y and a p p r o p r i a t e manner? 
0% 18X (65%) 83% 
D i d f o l l o w - u p a c t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
a d a p t t o c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n 
a f l e x i b l e , e f f i c i e n t manner? 
0% 4X 
64% 
68% 
Median Frequency o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 53% 68% 
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as follows: "Were audit findings (in particular, results of statistical tests) 
correctly analyzed?" In fact, the specific questions in the EVALUATION 
category were the most difficult for participants to classify, and the wording of 
all four questions in this major category was altered. As a result of this further 
iteration of modifications, additional refinements in attribute definitions were 
thus made. 
The refined set of questions, attributes, and categories that resulted as a 
product of the third phase of empirical verification was then fashioned into a 
rating instrument called the Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form, which is 
presented in its entirety in the Appendix. The form includes a cover sheet (for 
evaluator and audit identification), instructions for evaluators, and a complete 
list of the rating scales that compose the AQE. A full description of the 
structure of the AQE is provided including major attribute category names, 
attribute labels, and specific attribute definitions (i.e., evaluative questions). In 
addition, the rating procedure used in completing the form is explained. It is 
worth noting that the AQE contains both qualitative, category rating scales 
(sometimes referred to as the "equivalence grouping" method) as well as 
direct, numerical rating scales (which are double anchored). The former scales 
are used for rating individual attributes (i.e., for answering specific questions 
about audit quality), whereas the latter are used to provide global ratings for 
attribute categories and the overall audit. The AQE might, therefore, be called 
a hybrid scale since it combines two different kinds of rating mechanisms. By 
having the individual qualitative judgments within an attribute category precede 
the quantitative, global judgment for the category, the rating procedure 
subscribes to the principles of MAE theory by imposing a "divide and 
conquer" technique upon the evaluator's thought process. 
Discussion 
The Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form was developed with the goal of 
improving upon current, intuitive techniques of audit evaluation in the following 
ways: (1) making explicit what are conventionally implicit considerations; (2) 
quantifying what are usually qualitative descriptions; (3) simplifying the 
representation and integration of what are often complex configurations and 
interrelations among relevant information; and (4) providing an objective and 
general method for rating the overall quality of an audit. To satisfy these 
criteria, the AQE was designed through a systematic and thorough application 
of the principles and methods of multi-attribute evaluation. However, although 
the current version of the AQE may be conceptually sound, it is certain to 
require refinements, and its ultimate effectiveness as an evaluation tool must 
be demonstrated before it can be advocated for general implementation. 
In general, the specific content of the attributes that compose the AQE 
were empirically verified. The verification task, performed by a sample of 34 
auditors, required each evaluative question to be classified according to an 
attribute label (name) and an associated attribute category. The modal 
classification responses from the auditor sample matched the expected 
(intended) classification for all but a few of the 32 basic questions in the AQE, 
indicating that the level of subjective agreement among auditors was reasona­
bly high. These findings suggest that the AQE possesses considerable face 
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validity with respect to the definition and categorization of evaluative attributes 
that contribute to the quality of an audit. In other words, the multi-attribute 
evaluation model in which the AQE is couched appears to be acceptable. 
The development of the AQE is not yet complete. Toward the process of 
validating the practicality and usefulness of the AQE, a comprehensive field 
study, and corresponding set of data analysis, are needed. The study should be 
designed to provide the information necessary for revising and improving the 
AQE components, structure, and rating procedures so that the overall form 
can better serve its intended purpose. Basically, the field study should require 
different raters to actually use the AQE to evaluate several audits performed 
by accounting offices. However, the success of such an evaluation will depend 
upon the cooperative response of qualified evaluators who are asked to 
participate in providing the necessary data. The results of such an investigation 
will enable a determination of how reliable, valid and useful the AQE may be in 
a variety of different audit situations. 
In addition, research efforts should continue toward the systematic evalua­
tion and refinement of the form so that it might become a valuable and generally 
applicable scheme for assessing the quality of an audit. The evaluation process 
should include an investigation of the necessity for, and development of, a 
differential weighting system for normatively combining component ratings into 
derived, higher-order quality scores (e.g., individual question ratings into 
attribute-category scores, or attribute-category ratings into a composite 
(overall) audit score). Similar research efforts applied to a comparable multi-
attribute evaluation form developed in another context have been quite 
successful (e.g., Samet and Levine, 1978). Overall, these developments are 
expected to hold wide implications for improving the utilization of audit 
information and management decision making based on this information. For 
example, the audit evaluation model will provide a necessary initial step toward 
the larger problem of logically including subjective evaluations into a quantita­
tive determination of the cost-effectiveness of various audit elements (e.g., 
Shakun, 1978) and of an overall audit. Furthermore, the model could be turned 
around so as to be employed prescriptively as a management aid for planning 
an effective audit. 
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Appendix 
AUDIT QUALITY EVALUATION (AQE) FORM* 
* Copyright © Theodore J. Mock and Michael G. Samet 
Audit Title and/or Identification No.: 
Evaluator's Name: 
Office: 
Telephone: 
Date: 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR EVALUATORS 
The Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form represents a systematic 
technique for evaluating the quality of an audit engagement. The AQE is 
geared to a high-level evaluation of an audit. The approach is bu i l t 
upon a decomposition of an engagement into many descriptive characterist ics 
or attributes which ref lect audit qual i ty . The attributes are log ica l ly 
clustered into categories so that the qual i ty of various components of 
the audit can be independently assessed. The attributes are, in turn, 
composed of a few br ie f questions which address associated aspects of 
audit qual i ty . 
As shown below, each category is composed of a set of related 
attributes. For example, the f i r s t category, "PLAN," is composed of three 
attributes labeled "Objectives," "Strategy," and "Research." A separate 
rating sheet i s provided for each attribute category which l i s t s the 
constituent attr ibutes , along with the corresponding speci f ic questions 
used to evaluate audit qual i ty . Your source of information for answering 
these questions would normally be the contents of audit work papers and 
relevant summary documents (e .g . , practice review memo). 
STRUCTURE OF AUDIT QUALITY EVALUATION (AQE) FORM 
I. PLAN 
A. Objectives 
B. Strategy 
C. Research 
II . ADMINISTRATION 
A. Personnel 
B. Budgeting 
C. Management 
III. PROCEDURES 
A. Nature 
B. Scope 
C. Timing 
IV. EVALUATION 
A. Analysis 
B. Judgment 
V. CONDUCT 
A. Compliance 
B. Review 
C. Follow-up 
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The AQE rating procedure is identical for each of the attribute 
categories: each attribute-related question within a category is answered 
separately, then a single overall assessment is given for the entire 
category. You are required to respond to each question with respect to 
the particular audit under evaluation. The rating is made on a 3-point 
scale as either "Yes," "Yes, except f o r . . . , " or "No. . . ," and the appro-
priate box is checked. This evaluation reflects how well you feel the 
audit measures UP on the respective question. Whenever the "Yes, except 
f o r . . . " or "No..." box is checked, you are required to explain the basis 
for this rating by commenting on the exceptions, evidence of inadequacy 
fai lure in the performance of the audit, etc. For this purpose, space has 
been provided on the right-hand side of the rating sheet. 
In certain situations, you may be unable to meaningfully answer 
a given question because of insufficient information. Thus, a box (to 
the right of the quality rating), labeled "Poor Documentation," is 
provided that should be checked when you feel that the necessary documen-
tation is either unavailable, unclear, or inadequate. Even when you have 
made a quality rating in response to the attribute question, you can s t i l l 
check the "Poor Documentation" box to indicate that you think the relevant 
documentation is poor. Whenever you do check the "Poor Documentation" box, 
you should brief ly state your just i f icat ion in the space provided to the 
right. 
Once you have completed ratings for each question belonging to the 
attribute category, a global rating is called for that represents your 
assessment of the overall quality or "goodness" of the entire category. 
As shown on the bottom of each rating sheet, this rating is made on a 1 
to 5 scale as follows: 1 - "Major Problems", 2 - "Minor Problems", 
3 - "Average", 4 - "Good", and 5 - "Excellent"; you may use decimal 
ratings such as 1.5 or 3.5. Above the global rating scale, space is 
available to enable your free-form comments about the global rating for 
the category. You can also use this space for additional comments about 
individual attribute ratings. 
After the assessments have been completed for the five attribute 
categories, you are asked to make a final rating for the overall quality 
or "goodness" of the entire audit engagement. This rating is also made 
on a 1 to 5 scale extending from "Major Problems" (1) to "Excellent" (5), 
with decimal ratings permitted. Again, on this last rating sheet, your 
comments are encouraged. Final ly , you are asked to indicate about how 
much time you spent to complete the AQE form. 
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I. PLAN 
QUESTION 
A . OBJECTIVES 
( 1 ) Were a l l a u d i t o b j e c t i v e : 
e x p l i c i t and c l e a r l y 
s p e c i f i e d ? 
( 2 ) Were s p e c i f i c o b j e c -
t i v e s a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
t a i l o r e d to the o v e r -
a l l a u d i t purpose? 
3 . STRATEGY 
( 1 ) Were appropr iate c r i -
t i c a l a u d i t areas 
i d e n t i f i e d ? 
( 2 ) Was o v e r a l l a u d i t 
s t r a t e g y appropr iate 
f o r c r i t i c a l a u d i t 
areas? 
(3) Were the elements o f 
the a u d i t s t r a t e g y 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y i n t e -
grated ( e . g . , balance 
maintained between 
planned degree o f 
compliance and planned 
s u b s t a n t i v e t e s t s ) ? 
C. RESEARCH 
( 1 ) Were c l i e n t ' s o r g a n i -
z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and 
o p e r a t i n g procedures 
adequately researched 
and incorporated i n t o 
the a u d i t ? 
( 2 ) Were r e l e v a n t business/ 
i n d u s t r y f a c t o r s , i n -
c l u d i n g economic con-
d i t i o n s and government 
r e g u l a t i o n s , adequately 
researched? 
Comments 
GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 5 
Major Minor Average Good E x c e l l e n t 
Problems Problems 
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ANSWER 
EXPLANATION Yes 
Yes 
Except 
f o r . . . No. 
Poor 
Documen-
t a t i o n | 
Table 
I I . ADMINISTRATION 
QUESTION 
A . PERSONNEL 
(1) Old audit s t a f f have the 
l e v e l o f experience/ 
t r a i n i n g / c a p a b i l i t y 
requi red f o r t h i s a u d i t 
(given r i s k s , needs, 
e t c . ) ? 
(2) Were the required 
s p e c i a l s k i l l s appro-
p r i a t e l y represented on 
the a u d i t team? 
(3) Were team members appro-
p r i a t e l y assigned to 
s p e c i f i c tasks ( e . g . , 
were key personnel 
involved w i t h c r i t i c a l 
a u d i t areas)? 
3. BUDGETING 
(1) Were budget est imates 
f o r work appropr iate? 
(2) Was a u d i t budget appro-
p r i a t e l y a l l o c a t e d among 
a u d i t tasks ( e . g . , were 
c r i t i c a l a u d i t areas 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y empha-
s i z e d ) ? 
C. MANAGEMENT 
(1) Were the a u d i t tasks 
managed (scheduled , 
implemented, e t c . ) i n 
an e f f e c t i v e and e f f i -
c i e n t manner? 
(2) Was the a u d i t team 
e f f e c t i v e l y managed to 
a l low f o r s u f f i c i e n t 
l e v e l s of p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n , communication, 
feedback, e t c . ? 
(3) Was an e f f e c t i v e 
working r e l a t i o n s h i p 
and communication 
channel maintained 
w i t h c l i e n t r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e s ( e . g . , 
c h i e f f i n a n c i a l 
o f f i c e r , a u d i t 
committee)? 
GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY 
I I i 
1 2 3 4 5 
Major Minor Average Good E x c e l l e n t 
Problems Problems 
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Comments 
ANSWER 
Yes 
Yes 
Except 
f o r . . . No.. 
Poor 
Documen-
t a t i o n EXPLANATION 
I I I . PROCEDURES 
QUESTION 
A. NATURE 
(1) Was the nature of s p e c i f i c 
procedures a p p r o p r i a t e 
given the c r i t i c a l a u d i t 
areas? 
(2) Were procedures e f f e c t i v e 
in producing competent 
and r e l i a b l e a u d i t i n f o r -
mation? 
3. SCOPE 
(1) Was the scope ( e . g . , 
l e v e l o f d e t a i l , sample 
s i z e , e t c . ) f o r each 
i n d i v i d u a l procedure 
s u f f i c i e n t ? 
(2) Was extent of procedures, 
taken together , a p p r o p r i a t e 
f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g a l l 
c r i t i c a l a u d i t areas? 
C. TIMING 
(1) Were i n d i v i d u a l procedures 
implemented i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
time sequence? 
(2) Was each procedure accom-
p l i s h e d at the c o r r e c t 
p o i n t i n time ( e . g . , 
dur ing the a p p r o p r i a t e 
stage of f i s c a l y e a r ) ? 
Comments 
GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 5 
Major Minor Average Good E x c e l l e n t 
Problems Problems 
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ANSWER 
Yes 
Yes 
Except 
f o r . . . No. 
Poor 
Documen-
t a t i o n EXPLANATION 
IV. EVALUATION 
QUESTIONS 
A. ANALYSIS 
(1) Were audit f indings ( in 
p a r t i c u l a r , r e s u l t s of 
s t a t i s t i c a l tests) 
c o r r e c t l y analyzed? 
(2) Were the c r i t e r i a 
levels (with respect 
to m a t e r i a l i t y , r i s k , 
and r e l i a b i l i t y ) 
appropriately u t i l i z e d ? 
3. JUDGMENT 
(1) Was the audit evidence 
interpreted in a sui table 
manner? 
(2) Were c r i t i c a l audit 
judgments reasoned 
adequately? 
Comments 
GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY 
Major Minor 
Problems Problems 
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EXPLANATION 
ANSWER 
Yes 
Yes 
Except 
f o r . . . No. 
Poor 
Documen-
t a t i o n 
V. CONDUCT 
ANSWER 
QUESTION 
A. COMPLIANCE 
(1) Was the degree of com-
p l i a n c e w i t h operating 
p o l i c i e s and procedures 
of f i rm s u f f i c i e n t ? 
( 2 ) Were standardized forms 
( f l o w c h a r t s , ICQs, check-
l i s t s , s t a t i s t i c a l approval 
forms, review forms, e t c . ) 
appropr iate ly used in 
compliance with gu idel ines 
of firm? 
8. REVIEW  
(1) Were appropriate types of 
reviews conducted ( e . g . , 
working-paper review; 
review by t a x , EDP, industry 
or other s p e c i a l i s t s ; e t c . ) ? 
( 2 ) Were review procedures 
performed in an e f f e c t i v e 
and t imely manner? 
C. FOLLOW-UP  
(1) Were appropriate decis ions 
and act ions exercised to 
fo l low-up audit t e s t and 
review f i n d i n g s ? ............ 
( 2 ) Were problems and c o n f l i c t s , 
i f any, fol lowed-up and r e -
salved in a t imely and 
appropriate manner? 
(3) Did fo l low-up act ions 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y adapt to 
changing audit circumstances 
in a f l e x i b l e , e f f i c i e n t 
manner? | 
Comments 
res 
res 
Except 
f o r . . . No. 
Poor 
Documen-
t a t i o n EXPLANATION 
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GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 5 
Major Minor Average Good E x c e l l e n t 
Problems Problems 
OVERALL QUALITY OF AUDIT 
1 2 3 4 5 
M a j o r M i n o r A v e r a g e Good E x c e l l e n t 
P r o b l e m s P r o b l e m s 
OVERALL RATING 
COMMENTS 
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Discussant's Response to 
A Multi-Attribute Model for Audit Evaluation 
Joseph X. Loftus 
Price Waterhouse 
The ability to objectively determine the quality of an audit engagement has 
thus far eluded accounting firms and others interested in auditing. It has been 
suggested that if the annual report does not contain any typos, the auditor is 
not sued, obtains full realization of fees and is reappointed, the audit, at least in 
the eyes of the auditor, is of high quality. That assessment is somewhat 
cynical. Ted Mock and Michael Samet in their paper bring to bear a much more 
reasonable approach for determining a meaningful measure of the quality of an 
audit. 
I concur with the authors that multi-attribute evaluation (MAE) provides a 
framework for evaluative analysis. However, I submit it is only a framework. 
Any evaluation analysis—any attempt to conclude as to quality—ultimately 
rests on the judgments, subjective judgments, of the evaluator. Yes, there are 
exceptions. We would all agree that the more famous auditing busts over the 
years were indeed audits with major problems. We have all reviewed audit 
workpapers which under any test would support calling the audit "excellent." 
Most audits would fall within the extremes and it is here that subjective 
elements are important. KNOW THY RATER is crucial in analyzing any results 
of any evaluation, whether it be the evaluation of an audit, evaluation of 
personnel or an evaluation of an auditing textbook. 
Peer Review Experience 
To date, the peer review committee of the AICPA SEC Practice Section 
has reviewed and accepted some 400 peer review reports. The objective of a 
peer review is to determine whether the quality control system of a firm met 
the objectives of the AICPA quality control standards and was being complied 
with so as to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming with 
professional standards. Crucial to any such determination is the review of the 
firm's auditing and accounting engagements. As a result of the review, the 
reviewers issue a report and, if they note matters which would result in 
substantial improvement in the reviewed firm's quality control policies or 
procedures, the reviewers issue a letter of comments. The most difficult 
problem confronting the peer review committee is the unevenness of reporting 
resulting from this process. Some reviewers will consider an item so serious as 
to cause a modified report, while others, confronted with the identical 
situation, would issue an unqualified report but mention this matter in the letter 
of comments. We had our first peer review under the aegis of the SEC Practice 
Section in 1978. We have tinkered with the process ever since in a futile 
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attempt to resolve the "unevenness" problem. We have one consolation—the 
profession has been trying for a substantially longer time to define materiality. 
The Mock/Samet AQE Form 
The Audit Quality Evaluation form developed by Ted and his co-author 
would minimize the subjective element inherent in an evaluation process. It is 
certainly a vast improvement over the approaches currently in vogue. For 
example, after reviewing a set of audit or accounting workpapers a peer 
reviewer is asked to conclude with respect to two broad questions—whether 
he believed that (1) the firm had a "reasonable basis under professional 
standards for the opinion it expressed" and (2) the financial statements 
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles. 
As to the methodology, I certainly have no quibble with the methodology 
followed by the authors in developing the AQE form. Indeed, I'm impressed. 
However, in the classical auditor's fashion, I must hedge by pointing out I'm 
not an expert in developing or testing a multi-attribute evaluation model. 
Nevertheless, the major categories—Plan, Administration, etc. seem appropri­
ate as do the attributes and questions within the individual categories. 
Allow me one personal bias in regard to the form itself. My limited 
experience indicates that forcing an evaluator to conclude "yes" or "no" to a 
given question is generally better than allowing a "yes but" or a "yes, except 
for." Too often evaluators use the "yes, except" option as an escape from 
making a hard, perhaps distasteful, call. The "except for" can be so 
overwhelming, so significant, that it negates the yes answer and the reviewer 
of the form is left to make the judgment as to whether the true answer is 
"yes" or "no." 
The accommodation in the form to allow a conclusion on the sufficiency of 
audit documentation is a sound idea. In the peer review process, we have been 
plagued by the lack of documentation of key audit judgments. The lack of 
adequate documentation is the most frequent weakness found in a review. An 
observation that documentation is inadequate leads to the obvious question as 
to whether the work was really performed. In some cases, collaborating 
evidence is available. In other cases, one wonders. A quick review of a 
compendium of peer review comments compiled from letters of comments 
accepted by the SECPS peer review committee during the nine-month period 
ended in March 1982 indicates well over half of the comments are connected 
with the question of documentation. As a result of the findings of the peer 
review process, both the Auditing Standards Board and the Quality Control 
Standards Committee of the AICPA have issued guidance in the area of 
documentation. The ASB recently issued SAS No. 41 entitled Working Papers. 
The Quality Control Committee issued an interpretation in April specifying the 
level of documentation required for the nine elements of quality control 
enumerated in Statement on Quality Controls No. 1. For example, among the 
reports accepted at the peer review meeting earlier this week was a report and 
letter of comments covering a peer review of one of the larger firms. All of the 
matters noted in the letter of comments related to documentation: 
• The firm should document procedures followed in resolving independ­
ence questions; 
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• The following areas were not adequately documented in accordance 
with firm policies: 
—Auditing procedures followed in the areas of related party transac­
tions; 
—Procedures performed in connection with the acceptance of new 
clients and the decision to retain existing clients; 
—Disagreements with clients and resolution thereof; 
—Procedures performed between balance sheet date and report date. 
• Firm policy should be amended to provide guidelines for the extent of 
audit consultation and the related documentation; 
• Document the evaluation of the adequacy of the client's internal 
controls, including EDP controls. 
It would be interesting to see how evaluators using the AQE form will react 
to the documentation questions. 
To wrap up this part of the discussion, I agree with the authors that 
research efforts should continue in this area. The AQE has the potential for 
being a useful technique in evaluating an audit. The technique also has potential 
in other areas of concern to auditors, for example, promotion of staff to 
partner. The authors have developed a tool which could be of benefit to 
auditors and the users of their product. 
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6 
Some Thoughts on Materiality 
Kenneth W. Stringer 
New York University 
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Retired 
Introduction 
The invitation for this paper resulted from discussions with Professor 
Stettler at and subsequent to the 1981 Deloitte Haskins & Sells AuditSCOPE 
Update Seminar. The purpose of that seminar was to stimulate academic 
interest and research on the subject of materiality. That subject was chosen 
because the author and his associates involved in planning the seminar believe 
materiality is a pervasive problem that needs further attention by those who 
have responsibilities for financial reporting. 
Management is forced to make decisions about materiality in preparing 
financial statements and auditors are forced to make similar decisions in 
planning, performing and reporting on audits of such statements. Both 
management and auditors face the potential need to defend their decisions in 
the event of challenges by those who use financial statements and audit reports 
as one of the various sources of information used in making investment 
decisions. Although not a pleasing prospect to either management or auditors, 
this potential is reasonable because the underlying concept of materiality is 
oriented toward the influence of financial information on users' decisions. 
Yet no quantitative standards or guidelines have been developed by 
professional organizations in the U.S. and, in my view, relatively little useful 
results have been provided by user-oriented academic research. Research to 
date that relates, directly or indirectly, to materiality has consisted largely of 
behavioral experiments and opinion surveys based on hypothetical situations, 
and studies of the impact of accounting information on stock market prices. The 
latter, however, have been concerned more directly with the efficient market 
hypothesis and with policy questions concerning the establishment of account­
ing principles than with questions about materiality with reference to the 
financial statements of individual companies. Therefore, I believe management 
and auditors are sailing the uncharted waters of investors decisions without 
taking soundings to map the decision-making process and the parameters that 
lie below the surface. 
I think the hazard and the challenge arising from this situation are obvious. 
From this perspective, I will comment briefly on the efforts of the FASB to deal 
with materiality, and make a few observations and suggestions for considera­
tion by others. 
131 
FASB Actions 
The FASB included a project on materiality on its initial agenda and 
assigned a relatively high priority to the project for some time thereafter. As a 
result, a comprehensive Discussion Memorandum was issued, substantial 
effort was expended by various organizations in performing research and 
preparing written responses, and public hearings were held for oral presenta­
tions to and discussions with the Board. From this encouraging beginning, the 
mountain labored and brought forth a mouse in the form of a few paragraphs 
dealing with materiality in Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 2, "Qualita­
tive Characteristics of Accounting Information." In these paragraphs the 
Board reiterated the usual generalities that are expressed when the subject is 
discussed, but did little or nothing to add to or clarify existing concepts and 
provided no quantitative guidance. It included the obvious comments about the 
need for judgment in dealing with unusual situations, but said nothing about 
points of departure or benchmarks for the usual situations. In declining to do 
so, the Board indicated that those respondents who wanted it to issue 
quantitative guidelines were in the minority. Without knowing the Board's 
rules for weighing responses, it is interesting to observe that the three 
organizations that represent the preparers, the auditors, and a major segment 
of users of financial statements all endorsed the issuance of such guidelines by 
the Board. Excerpts from the responses of the Financial Executives Institute, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the Financial 
Analysts Federation are attached as Appendix A to this paper. 
Appendix B is a report on a research study, "The Impact of Earnings on 
Stock Prices," which I conducted at the request of the AICPA and submitted 
to the FASB in response to its Discussion Memorandum. The premise 
underlying this research was that knowledge of the sensitivity of stock prices 
to reported earnings is relevant to materiality decisions in view of the user-
oriented concept of materiality. Although this study was described in the 
Discussion Memorandum and commented upon favorably by several Board 
members at the public hearing, it was buried without the dignity of even a 
footnote reference in Statement No. 2. Instead, the Board described the 
general approach and referenced it to an article that was written by two 
professors who had been given a research grant by my firm's Foundation to 
review the approach and other aspects of the subject while the research was in 
progress. The board concluded that the approach was "too blunt an instrument 
to be depended on to set materiality guidelines." 
Without challenging the Board's conclusion concerning this particular 
study, the report is being exhumed for an autopsy with the hope that a post­
mortem will suggest ways to sharpen the instrument so that it can serve a 
useful purpose. I remain optimistic that this can be done if academic re­
searchers or research-oriented practitioners study the problem seriously. Such 
study is particularly timely now because the subject of Materiality and Audit 
Risk is currently on the agenda of the Auditing Standards Board. With this view 
in mind, I set forth in the remainder of this paper a brief summary of my 
observations concerning the research results, some suggestions for further 
research, and some comments on other matters. 
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Research Results 
The relative correlation between stock prices and the various earnings 
models summarized in Table 2 of the report conformed generally to my prior 
expectations, although the lower correlations with the five-year models 
presumably would not conform with the expectations of those who emphasize 
the importance of trends and growth rates. The other results in the first phase 
of the study which conformed to my expectations were the fact that the 
correlations were better for ordinary earnings than for earnings after extraordi­
nary items or for cash flow. The most surprising result to me was the slightly 
higher correlation for historical earnings than for forecasted earnings. I had 
expected the latter to be significantly higher and, as indicated in the report, 
was unable to explain this result. 
The results of the second phase conformed generally to my expectations in 
that the use of additional variables improved the correlation with stock prices, 
and that no single variable among those added was predominant, as shown in 
Table 6. I was surprised, however, that earnings were excluded from the set of 
significant variables for slightly more than half of the companies, as shown also 
in Table 6. For 18 of the excluded companies, however, the five-year earnings 
growth rate was a significant variable. Thus, either earnings or an earnings 
growth rate was significant for about two-thirds of the companies. 
Further Research 
As readers may reasonably infer from my earlier comments, I believe 
further research along the general lines indicated in the accompanying paper 
would be useful. With the passage of time, quarterly historical and forecasted 
earnings are now available for more years and such additional data offer the 
potential for better results. 
The variables used in my study included both the levels of stock prices and 
earnings and the changes in those levels. However, the accompanying paper 
presented results in terms of levels only because those results appeared to be 
more significant. Nevertheless, I suggest that changes be studied further in 
any additional research that is performed. In addition, I suggest that dif­
ferences between actual changes and expected changes, as indicated by 
historical standard errors or by variations from forecasts, be considered as 
possible explanatory variables. 
I also suggest further study of both the underlying concept and the 
parameters of the decision model presented in the accompanying paper. 
Although I am convinced that the cost of making changes in investment 
portfolios is one constraint on the sensitivity of changes in stock prices to 
changes in earnings as discussed in the accompanying paper, there may be 
other and possibly more important constraints that should also be considered. 
For example, the cost of analyzing financial information for use in making 
investment decisions may be more important than the cost of executing the 
related transactions. Further, behavioral limitations on decision-making proc­
esses may be another form of constraint that should be considered. The report 
of my study focused entirely on composite results for the 100 companies for 
133 
each of the models considered. This was done in the interest of simplicity and 
what I then considered would be most useful for the FASB's purposes. 
However, the reported results could be improved substantially by using for 
each company the model that gave the best correlation for that company. This 
methodology as a starting point for applying judgment in individual situations 
may be worthy of further consideration in lieu of generalized quantitative 
guidelines. 
Other Matters 
The effect of an item on the trend of earnings is mentioned frequently in 
discussions of materiality, with the implication that this is a more stringent 
consideration than those that apply in determining the effect of an item on 
earnings for the current period. I believe these implications have resulted in an 
overemphasis or possible misunderstanding, because the effect on the current 
period will equal or exceed the effect on a projection of a trend to the next 
period with the limited exception of projections of a trend computed from either 
two or three periods only.* These exceptions, of course, should be considered 
in any situation in which users might reasonably be expected to rely on trends 
for two or three periods only, which presumably would be rare. 
Some discussions of materiality also attribute additional significance to an 
item that changes a loss to a profit, or a downward trend to an upward trend. 
Beyond the actual effect of trends on projections as explained above, I believe 
this perception is more subjective than substantive. 
The research study focused entirely on public companies, and primarily on 
earnings as the critical component or primary interest of the external users of 
financial statements of such companies. The primary interest of such users, 
however, is likely to shift from earnings to financial position if there is a 
significant concern about the liquidity or solvency of the company. Further, the 
principal external users of financial statements of private entities ordinarily are 
the present or prospective creditors and their primary interet is likely to be in 
liquidity or solvency, with earnings being of interest primarily in that context. 
When liquidity or solvency is the principal matter of concern, the primary 
interest of creditors and owners is likely to center on their claims and their 
equity, respectively. Creditors, however, are likely to be interested also in 
owners' equity as one measure of the margin of security for their claims. Both 
groups are likely to be interested also in current assets as a primary source of 
funds to provide liquidity. Therefore, current assets and owners' equity are 
likely to be the more critical components when liquidity or solvency is the 
principal matter of concern to external users of financial statements. 
My last comments on specific matters relate to the problem that may be 
described as one of nominal amounts or differences. The significance of 
earnings and of any related measure of materiality obviously diminishes as 
* The projected effect on the next period (P) of a change in an item in the current period (C), based 
on the trend for a given number of periods (N) may be computed from the following formula: 
P = C(4/N). Thus the projected effect of an item based on a trend computed from two or three 
periods would be 2 or 1.33, respectively, times the current effect. 
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earnings approach zero. In these circumstances, the matter of primary interest 
to investors is that the results of operations are substantially below normal 
expectations, rather than whether they are above or below the breakeven 
point by some nominal amount. I think the same rationale can reasonably be 
applied as the excess of working capital, or some other specified component of 
financial statements, over the minimum required under a loan agreement 
approaches zero. Although a nominal decline below such requirements tech­
nically would be a default, I doubt seriously that the practical consequences 
resulting solely from such a default ordinarily would differ materially from those 
where the requirements were exceeded by a nominal amount. 
In addition to the above perceptions of the practical needs of users in such 
circumstances, two other considerations are relevant from the perspective of 
auditors. The first of these is that it is impracticable from a cost/benefit 
viewpoint to expand the scope of audit tests to the degree necessary to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting errors that would be material if measured in 
relation to the foregoing amounts or differences as they approach zero. The 
second consideration is that the customary type of auditor's report relating to 
compliance with loan agreements is in the form negative assurance, and 
explicitly states that the examination was not directed primarily toward 
obtaining knowledge of noncompliance. I want to emphasize that both of these 
considerations are related solely to the scope of the auditor's examination, and 
are not intended to imply that special attention need not be given to known or 
reasonably estimated errors or to questions concerning disclosures in the 
circumstances described above. 
I hope my comments on the matters mentioned in this paper will be helpful 
in stimulating consideration of materiality by the Auditing Standards Board and 
by academic researchers. The present situation which requires management 
and auditors to apply a clearly quantitative concept of materiality without the 
benefit of authoritative quantitative guidelines or methodology invites, and 
indeed requires the courts to fill this void on an after-the-fact, case-by-case 
basis when litigation arises. More important in the public interest however, is 
the need for professional guidance in the multitude of day-to-day decisions that 
are required but never involve litigation. 
Appendix A 
Excerpts from Responses to 
FASB Discussion Memorandum on Criteria for Determining 
Materiality by Representatives of Preparers, 
Auditors and Users of Financial Statements 
Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives Institute (CCR 
Committee) 
The CCR Committee concurs that there is a need for materiality criteria, 
and we recommend that the FASB proceed with its deliberations and that the 
statement be issued with the explicit recognition that the statement of criteria 
will be subject to reexamination upon completion of the Board's project on the 
conceptual framework for accounting and reporting. 
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While we believe that a standard which establishes criteria for determining 
materiality cannot be finalized until the FASB adopts a statement on the 
objectives of financial reporting (a statement which we recognize must, of 
necessity, be subjected to lengthy FASB due process procedures), we are not 
suggesting postponement. On the contrary, we believe that the issuance of a 
statement on materiality at this time will enhance the credibility of financial 
reporting, even though the Board may announce its intention to reexamine and 
possibly amend the criteria after the "objectives" have been adopted. 
We recommend that the Board establish a point of departure or threshold 
for the materiality decision process. We believe that a threshold of 5% of net 
income has support, since it seems to be the lower end of the issuer range and 
the upper end of the user range. While the need for a threshold for balance 
sheet items appears to be less urgent, we would anticipate that a threshold for 
the balance sheet would be higher than 5%, with the possible exception of 
situations relating to liquidity concerns and in the case of accounting changes. 
The adoption of quantitative criteria accompanied by logic and illustrative 
examples by the FASB would probably have an important influence on the 
courts in future litigation. The FASB statement should provide financial 
executives with a more authoritative basis for materiality decisions, as well as 
enhance the credibility of published financial reports. 
Accounting Standards Task Force on Materiality of the Accounting Standards 
Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (The Division) 
The Division believes that an FASB Statement establishing materiality 
criteria should be issued. Such a Statement would, perhaps, need to be 
reconsidered upon issuance of a Statement on the objectives of financial 
statements. Nevertheless, it is believed that a Statement at this time on 
materiality would provide guidance to the preparers of financial statements 
which would enhance the utility of financial statements and contribute to the 
understanding of users. 
The Division was guided by practical considerations in recommending the 
criteria discussed below. The Division believes that quantitative criteria should 
be established and should be based on the assumption that an amount that is 
5% or more of an appropriate denominator may reasonably be presumed to be 
material. The Division believes that this perception of the threshold of 
materiality could gain general acceptance and would be workable in practice. 
However, a minority within the Division believes the quantitative criteria 
should be a percentage greater than 5%. . . . 
There should be a presumption that a matter is material if its current or 
potential effect is 5% or more of income or loss from continuing operations (i.e. 
income or loss before discontinued operations, extraordinary items and 
cumulative effect of an accounting change). Where necessary to prevent the 
use of an unreasonably low amount as a denominator, average income if greater 
than the current year's income (or loss) should generally be used. The Division 
recommends using an appropriate period (e.g., five years) to calculate average 
income, and loss years or "abnormal" years should be excluded from the 
calculation if the result would be to distort the average. The Division believes 
that income from continuing operations is a more useful base for decision 
making than net income, because this amount is more representative of the 
ongoing operations of the enterprise. 
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In certain unusual circumstances, even the use of average income would 
result in an overly stringent determination of materiality. For example, if a 
company's income from continuing operations for the past five years is near 
zero, 5% of this amount would not usually result in an amount which could 
reasonably be considered material. Where the quantitative criteria would 
clearly result in an overly stringent requirement, judgment is essential and a 
more appropriate base upon which to make the calculation should be selected. 
For example, in some circumstances 5% of net worth might serve as a 
substitute for income, and items which are 5% or more of this substitute would 
be presumed to be material. In other situations, published sources of average 
rates of return for particular industries might serve as a guide for selecting an 
income substitute. 
The Division has concluded that it is not feasible to formulate quantitative 
materiality criteria based on earnings trends, since these trends vary so widely 
among companies. For example, a 5% increase in income over the prior year 
might be considered "normal" in one company, "significantly better than 
average" in another, and "significantly worse than average" in a third. In 
addition, if income increased 3% over the prior year and a "trend of earnings'' 
factor was part of the criteria, the materiality level would be extremely low. 
Further, it is not known whether or not the treatment of an item which affected 
income by less than 5% but affected the "trend of earnings" by a higher 
percentage would have an effect on an investment or lending decision of a user 
in the majority of circumstances. 
There should be a presumption that a matter is material if its current or 
potential effect is 5% or more of the appropriate balance sheet caption as 
follows: current assets—5% or more of total current assets; current lia­
bilities—5% or more of total current liabilities; noncurrent assets or liabilities— 
5% or more of total assets. . . . 
The Financial Analysts Federation 
With regard to the income statement, the financial effect of a matter should 
be viewed in the context of its relationship to the change in net income. For 
example, items might be deemed material if they exceeded 5 percent of net 
income or 20 percent of the change in net income from the prior-period. In no 
case shall an amount less than 2 percent of the average net income for the most 
recent three years be considered material. Thus, materiality criteria would not 
only be related to a level of net income, but also to the change in net income. 
Balance sheet matters could be handled in a similar manner. For example, 
items could be deemed material if they account for more than 5 percent of net 
quick assets, net working capital, or shareholders' equity. 
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Appendix B 
The Impact of Earnings on Stock Prices* 
Introduction 
The research study described in this report was conducted at the request 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and is being 
submitted to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in response to 
the FASB Discussion Memorandum dated March 21, 1975 relating to "Criteria 
for Determining Materiality." As contemplated in the AICPA's request, the 
research was conducted by the author and this report has not been reviewed or 
endorsed by any committee or representative of the AICPA. 
Chapter II of the Discussion Memorandum discusses the concept of 
materiality in accounting and includes various definitions that have been 
promulgated or proposed for implementation of this concept. The central 
theme common to these definitions is that something is material if it would 
influence an investor's decision. In recognition of this decision-oriented 
formulation of the concept of materiality, Chapters V and VI set forth the 
results of interviews and other research concerning investors' decision 
processes. The interviews and other research underlying those chapters 
provided the basis for a comprehensive general description of investors' 
decision processes, but not for a definitive formulation of decision models with 
quantification of the variables comprehended in the models. 
Such models are necessary if standards for materiality are to be related 
effectively to the impact of accounting information on investors' decisions. This 
may be illustrated by two oversimplified and extreme examples. Assume first, 
that the price of a particular stock was known to be exactly a given multiple of 
earnings; and second, that its price was known to be exactly a given multiple of 
the S & P average. In the first case, a change of 1% in earnings would cause a 
change of 1% in price, but in the second case the same change in earnings 
would not cause any change in price. If materiality is to be related to the effect 
on investors' decisions, the materiality of a given change in earnings clearly 
would be different under the two assumed models. 
The purpose of the research described in this report was to determine 
whether a useful composite decision model might be derived from a study of 
the correlation between earnings and stock prices for reasonable sample of 
companies for a period of several years. The premise underlying this approach 
is that, given a general description of the principal factors considered in the 
decision process, the relative weight given to the respective factors may be 
inferred from the pattern of behavior suggested by such correlations. 
This study was not conducted under any illusion that it would produce a 
precise or conclusive model, but only to determine whether it could provide 
information that would be useful in considering possible standards for mate­
riality. To whatever extent the study may provide insight into investors' 
* The author gratefully acknowledges the services of his partner, Dr. Maurice S. Newman, in 
providing mathematical consultation and computer prograrnming; and of his research assistants, 
Mr. Steven Gillingham and Miss Swati Desai, in maintaining files, processing data, and assisting in 
other respects. 
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behavior, it may also be relevant to the FASB's consideration of the objectives 
of financial statements and the conceptual framework of accounting. 
If, however, this study or other information furnished to the FASB does not 
provide a basis for inferring a decision model that is considered sufficiently 
definitive to be useful in establishing criteria for accounting materiality, this 
would appear to leave two remaining alternatives. The first alternative would 
be to establish quantitative criteria with appropriate flexibility based on the 
subjective perceptions of users, preparers, and auditors as to reasonable levels 
of sensitivity and practicability. The first alternative was advocated in the 
response to the Discussion Memorandum which was submitted by the 
AICPA's Accounting Standards Task Force on Materiality. The second 
alternative would appear to be a conclusion by the FASB that quantitative 
criteria are not feasible. 
Data and Methodology 
This study was described on page 44 of the Discussion Memorandum as 
follows: 
The study focuses principally on earnings per share in relation to the 
market prices of securities. It seeks to establish the extent of the 
relationship of those factors and, in turn, to determine whether any 
general inferences can be drawn about the sensitivity of investment 
decisions to earnings per share. 
The analysis comprehends 300 enterprises selected from the 
COMPUSTAT tapes of data for 1800 enterprises. Preliminary analysis 
has been confined to 100 enterprises, but will be extended to 300. 
In the first phase of the study, various earnings per share amounts 
are being correlated through regression analysis with average stock 
prices for each enterprise over a period of fifteen years. The earnings 
per share amounts included in the study are the five-year moving 
average, the five-year trend line (both exponential and linear), and 
various current measurements, combined in some cases with growth 
rates. The results of these analyses are expected to give indications of 
the most significant earnings per share amounts, insofar as it may be 
inferred that such information influences investment decisions. 
The second phase of the study introduces other factors to ascertain 
those that are significant in combination with earnings per share. These 
other factors include changes in earnings per share, dividends, changes 
in dividends, book value, the Standard & Poor's Industrial Stock Price 
Index, price stability, interest rates, enterprise sales, changes in sales, 
non-recurring income statement items, earnings variability, growth 
rates, turning points in growth rates, and changes in trends. 
The final phase of the study will attempt to determine whether 
inferences can be drawn concerning the sensitivity of stock prices to 
earnings per share that would provide any useful basis for establishing a 
materiality standard. 
Data 
The study was based primarily on annual data for the twenty years ended 
December 31, 1972. In order to permit the use of averages, trends, and other 
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data based on prior periods, the latest fifteen of the twenty years of annual data 
were used directly in the regression analyses. 
The companies selected were from among those included in the Standard & 
Poor's Industrial Classification. The data files were screened using two criteria 
before making the final seletion systematically with a random start. The 
screening criteria used were (1) a full set of data for the periods covered and 
(2) fiscal years ending December 31. 
Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, the mathematical technique used for this research 
was regression analysis, which was applied through use of a stepwise multiple 
regression computer program. This methodology is generally accepted for use 
in studies having characteristics similar to those involved in this research. Any 
extensive explanation of regression analysis is beyond the scope of this report 
but may be found in standard textbooks on the subject or to a more limited 
extent in those on statistics or quantitative methods generally. The following 
brief explanation is considered sufficient for this report. 
The purpose of regression analysis is to compute a mathematical function 
or equation that will best express the pattern or relationship existing between 
two or more sets of quantitative data (variables). The variable of primary 
interest is referred to as the "dependent" variable, and those whose 
relationship to the dependent variable is to be studied are referred to as the 
"independent" variables. In this study, average stock prices (the annual high-
low average as carried on the COMPUSTAT tapes, adjusted for stock 
dividends and splits) were used as the dependent variable, and earnings and 
other data described in more detail later were used as the independent 
variables. "Simple" regression refers to the use of only one independent 
variable, while "multiple" regression refers to use of more than one independ­
ent variable. 
The regression function derived from a regression analysis may be in the 
form of a linear or a non-linear equation. The form of a simple linear function is 
as follows: 
Y'j = a + bXi 
Where: 
Y' = estimated value of dependent variable. 
a = a constant value computed in the regression analysis. 
b = a coefficient (multiplier) computed in the regression analysis. 
X = the actual value of the independent variable. 
i = a subscript indicating a particular value included in the set of 
values of the respective variable; for example, i = 1,2, . . .15 
if annual values of X and Y for 15 years are used in the 
regression analysis. 
The form of a multiple linear function is the same as that described above for a 
simple function except for the addition of a separate coefficient (b) for each 
additional independent variable (X). 
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The actual value of each of the dependent variables (Yi) will differ from the 
corresponding estimated values (Y'i) by an amount referred to as the 
"residual" or "individual error of estimate" (ei) and the relation between the 
actual and estimated values of the dependent variable may be expressed as 
follows: 
Yi - Y ' i = ei 
The computations by which the regression function is determined are 
designed to provide the "best fit" by minimizing the sum of the squares of the 
individual errors of estimate. The quantity minimized for this purpose is the 
sum of the squares, rather than of the actual amounts of the individual errors, 
because the actual errors will be both positive and negative and their sum will 
always be zero. A statistic commonly used as a measure of the closeness of the 
relationship between the variables, or the "goodness of fit" of the regression 
function, is the "coefficient of correlation." The range of values for this 
coefficient is from 1 to 0, indicating perfect correlation or the lack of any 
correlation, respectively. 
The details from one of the analyses made in the course of the study are 
presented to illustrate the matters discussed above in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Regression 
Actual Data* Estimate of Error of 
Year EPS (X) Price (Y) Price (Y') Estimate (e) 
1958 .474 8.185 9.380 -1.195 
1959 .326 9.169 7.977 1.192 
1960 .698 9.469 11.502 - 2.033 
1961 .615 11.888 10.715 1.173 
1962 .831 10.641 12.762 -2.121 
1963 .906 13.660 13.473 .187 
1964 1.414 18.391 18.287 .104 
1965 1.800 23.285 21.945 1.340 
1966 2.377 24.916 27.412 - 2.496 
1967 1.935 24.878 23.224 1.654 
1968 2.520 36.950 28.767 8.183 
1969 3.420 38.150 37.296 .854 
1970 3.160 28.650 34.832 -6.182 
1971 1.720 22.450 21.186 1.264 
1972 1.840 20.400 22.324 -1.924 
Average 1.602 20.072 20.072 -0-
The regression function for this example is a constant of 4.888 and a coefficient of 9.476, and the 
coefficient of correlation is .95. 
* The actual data used in this example and throughout the study have been adjusted for stock 
dividends and splits. 
The foregoing example is presented graphically in two forms. In Chart A 
each point represents the actual EPS and the actual average price for a 
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particular year as shown in Table 1 above. The solid line represents the 
regression estimates, and the distance between the line and the individual 
points plotted represents the errors of estimate. This form of graph illustrates 
the linearity of the regression estimates, but does not show the data by years 
and cannot be used where more than one independent variable is included in 
the regression function. 
Chart B shows the same information in a form that obscures the linearity of 
the regression function but overcomes the two objections mentioned above. In 
this chart the points connected by the dotted line represent the actual prices 
and those connected by the solid line represent the estimated prices for the 
particular years, and the distances between the respective points represent 
the errors of estimate. 
The foregoing example may also be used to illustrate the distinction 
between the regression coefficient for EPS, the price-earnings ratio, and the 
price-earnings sensitivity. The price-earnings ratio is discussed because of its 
common usage but it was not used in this study for the reasons given below. 
The price-earnings ratio is itself a variable, and may be used in either a 
historical or a prospective sense. Historically, it represents the ratio between 
actual or average price for a particular date or period and actual earnings for a 
particular period. Prospectively, it may refer to the ratio of current price to 
estimated earnings for a period ending in the future, or to an estimated ratio of 
future price to future earnings. Mathematically, the price-earnings ratio would 
be equivalent to the regression coefficient if and only if the constant term in the 
regression function is 0 and no independent variables other than EPS are used. 
Because of these exceptions, the use of an average price-earnings ratio to 
compute ratio estimates will not provide as good correlation with actual prices 
as that provided by regression estimates. 
In the foregoing example, the average historical price-earning ratio would 
be 12.529 [20.072/1.602], in contrast to the regression coefficient of 9.476 
shown in Table 1; and the correlation of ratio estimates would be .88, in 
contrast to .95 for the regression estimates. 
In this report, "price-earnings sensitivity" (PES) refers to the estimated 
average percentage change in price associated with a 1% change in earnings 
based on the regression function. It is clear from the form of the simple and 
multiple regression functions discussed earlier that the PES factor would be 1 if 
and only if the constant and any terms other than the one for EPS are 0. If the 
net effect of such terms is positive the PES factor will be less than 1, and if the 
net effect is negative the factor will be greater than 1. It should be noted that 
the sensitivity depends on the relationship of the EPS term to the other terms 
in the regression function, rather than on the magnitude of the EPS coefficient. 
In the foregoing example the PES factor is .76 [(9.476 x 1.602)/20.072]. 
A final point concerning the methodology deserves emphasis. This is that 
regression analysis identifies and measures a mathematical relationship, but 
does not necessarily establish a logical cause-and-effect relationship between 
the dependent and the independent variable(s). As one example, a close 
correlation might be established between rainfall and floods using either as the 
dependent variable; in this event it would be logical to infer that rainfall causes 
floods, but not that floods cause rainfall. Another classic example is that a high 
correlation was once found between increases in teachers' salaries and 
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increases in sales of liquor, but this does not establish that the latter is caused 
by the former; the more logical inference is that both of the increases are 
caused by one or more common factors not included as variables in the 
analysis. The simple examples are given to emphasize the need for logical 
analysis and judgment in interpreting the results of regression analysis. For 
this reason the variables used in this study have been restricted to those for 
which it is plausible to expect that a meaningful relationship may exist, based on 
the description of the investors' decision processes and the other research 
referred to in the Discussion Memorandum. 
Earnings 
Since decision models may use earnings data from various periods and in 
various ways, the first phase of the study was designed to determine which of 
various assumed earnings models provided the best correlation with stock 
prices before considering any other variables. The Discussion Memorandum 
and accepted investment concepts indicate that the earnings with which 
investors are primarily concerned are those expected in the future. Conse­
quently, the assumed models used in this study are considered surrogates for 
expected earnings. 
The Discussion Memorandum and accepted investment concepts also 
indicate that the primary interest of investors is in ordinary or recurring 
earnings. For this reason, references to earnings or EPS in this report 
exclude, unless otherwise noted, amounts identified as extraordinary in the 
COMPUSTAT tapes from which the data were obtained for this study. It 
should be noted that the amounts so designated may not necessarily conform 
with accounting practices prevailing during the respective years or at the 
present time. 
The various ordinary earnings models used in the study and the results 
obtained are discussed in the following section, and extraordinary items are 
considered separately in the next section of this report. 
Ordinary Earnings 
Because of the requirements for five-year summaries of earnings in 
prospectuses and annual reports, several models based on five-year periods 
were used. These models were included because of the frequent references in 
accounting and investment literature to average earnings, trends, and growth 
rates. These models are described more specifically below. 
Five-Year Average—This model assumes that the average annual EPS 
for the most recent five fiscal years is the surrogate for expected 
EPS for the current year. 
Five-Year Linear Trend—This model assumes that the trend of EPS for 
the most recent five fiscal years, projected through the current 
year, is the surrogate for expected EPS for the current year. 
Five-Year Exponential Trend—This model is similar to the previous one 
except that it is based on an exponential rather than a linear 
function. 
Five-Year Linear Growth Rate—This model assumes that EPS for the 
preceding fiscal year, projected on the basis of the average annual 
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growth rate in EPS for the most recent five fiscal years, is the 
surrogate for expected EPS for the current year. 
The following additional models involving earnings for the current and prior 
year were also used. In these, as well as in those discussed above, a clear 
identification of the respective periods referred to is important. Throughout 
this report the "current" period refers to the period for which the average 
stock prices are determined and in which the financial statements for the 
"prior" period are issued; at the present time, for example, 1976 is the 
current year and 1975 is the prior year. Discussion of the additional models 
follows: 
Prior Year—This model assumes that the EPS for the prior year is the 
surrogate for expected EPS for the current year. It should be noted 
that this is the latest fiscal-year EPS on which materiality and 
investment decisions may be focused. 
Current Year—This model assumes that the actual EPS for the current 
year is the surrogate for the expected EPS for that year. Since the 
actual EPS for the current year, of course, cannot be known during 
that year this model is tantamount to assuming perfect foresight. 
Although this assumption is unrealistic, it appears useful for analyti­
cal and comparative purposes. 
Average of Prior and Current Years—This model assumes that the 
average of the EPS for the prior and current years (referred to 
hereinafter as the "average EPS") is the surrogate for the 
expected EPS for the current year. This model attempts to 
compensate in a simplistic way for the decreasing relevance of the 
prior information, and the increasing availability and relevance of the 
current information from quarterly reports and other sources, as 
the current year progresses. 
For each of the models described above, time-series regression analyses 
were prepared for each of the 100 selected companies for the 15 years ended 
December 31, 1972, using data for those 15 years and for the preceding 5 
years for those models that required such data. The results are summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 
Average Number 
Earnings Model Correlation* Significant* 
Five-year models: 
Average .33 43 
Trends: 
Exponential .50 62 
Linear .55 68 
Growth rates—linear .62 77 
Prior year .63 78 
Current year .66 80 
Average (prior and cur­
rent) .70 84 
* In this table and elsewhere in this report, unless otherwise noted, the statistical significance of 
correlations has been determined at the .05 level and average correlation has been computed for 
100 companies, with those that were not significant being treated as zeros. 
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The pattern shown in Table 2 suggests clearly that the most recent 
earnings information available is the most closely related to stock prices. This 
suggests also that information about prior averages, trends, and growth rates 
may be overemphasized. Based on the results shown in Table 2, average EPS 
for the prior and current periods is used as the variable for ordinary earnings in 
the analyses discussed in the remainder of this report unless otherwise 
indicated. 
An analysis was also prepared using average EPS to determine whether an 
exponential function would provide a better correlation than that obtained from 
the linear function as reported above. The form used for this purpose was: log 
Y' = a + bX. This form was used to the exclusion of those that involve log X 
because logarithms do not exist for negative values and average EPS (X) was 
negative for various companies for various years. The average correlation from 
this exponential function was .65 with 78 significant correlations, as compared 
with .70 and 84 respectively from the linear function as shown in Table 2. This 
suggests that the latter is more relevant for the purpose of this study. 
To complement the time-series analyses reported above, cross-sectional 
analyses were prepared for each of the 15 years using average stock prices and 
average EPS for each of the 100 companies in each of the 15 years. The 
average of the correlations obtained for each of the 15 years was .80. 
Because of the widespread interest in forecasts of earnings, analyses were 
run to determine the correlation of forecasted earnings with stock prices and to 
compare such correlation with that of historical earnings. The source of the 
forecasts used for this purpose was the Standard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster 
from 1967, the earliest calendar year available, through 1972. This publication 
lists the most recently available forecasts of EPS for the current fiscal year by 
various analysts. The data used in this study were compiled generally as 
follows. For each calendar year, the issue used was the one dated nearest the 
mid-point of each calendar quarter. Where forecasts from several analysts 
were given, any which appeared to be extreme in relation to the others were 
eliminated and the average of the remainder was used for the particular 
quarter. The average of the forecasts so determined for each quarter was used 
for the year. 
The results obtained from using forecasted earnings determined on this 
basis for each of the 100 companies for the six years indicated above, and from 
using the historical average EPS for the same six years are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Average Number 
Correlation Significant 
Forecasts .41 45 
Historical .44 48 
The results shown above are substantially lower than those shown in Table 2 
for historical earnings. This appears to be caused primarily by the effect of the 
lower number of years used in the tests of significance. To eliminate this effect, 
analyses were run using the same data, but with the significance tests 
suppressed. These analyses showed average correlations of .60 for forecasts 
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and .69 for historical, with the latter being more comparable to the results in 
Table 2. Apart from the level of correlation, however, the more important 
result is that both sets of analyses show lower correlation for forecasts than for 
historical earnings. 
This somewhat surprising comparison suggests that either (1) the relative 
weight given to forecasts versus historical earnings in investment decision may 
be less than the popular belief, or (2) the analysis is faulty in some respect. As 
to the latter possibility, several observations seem pertinent. Insofar as the 
author was able to determine, the publication used is the most comprehensive 
compilation publicly available. The average of quarterly forecasts for the 
current year should provide a more timely measure of expectations throughout 
the year than the average of the earnings of the current and prior years as used 
in the historical analysis; otherwise the time frames are the same in the 
respective analyses. Three possible sources of bias in the data used are as 
follows: (1) forecasts not included in the publication used, (2) differences 
between the relative number of investors who may have been influenced by the 
different forecasts included and the relative number implicit in the averages 
used, and (3) the extremes eliminated in computing the averages as discussed 
earlier. The author doubts that any of these possible sources of bias is 
significant. 
Extraordinary Earnings 
As indicated earlier, the foregoing analyses were based on the assumption 
that the earnings of primary interest to investors exclude extraordinary items. 
To test the validity of this assumption, an analysis was prepared for the 100 
companies for 15 years using the average total EPS (including extraordinary 
items) as the independent variable. The average coefficient of correlation from 
this analysis was .65 as compared with that of .70 obtained by using average 
ordinary EPS. This result, combined with the evidence cited in the Discussion 
Memorandum and other sources, seems to confirm the validity of the 
assumption that ordinary earnings are of primary interest to investors. 
Cash Flow 
There have been suggestions that investors may give more attention to 
cash flow than to earnings, either because they consider it more important, 
more objective, or more comparable between companies. For this reason, an 
analysis was prepared using average cash flow as the independent variable. 
This analysis showed an average correlation of .58 as compared with .70 for 
average earnings. This comparison suggests that investors do not consider 
cash flow more significant than earnings, and accordingly cash flow was not 
used further in this study. 
Other Variables 
In the second phase of this study, the other variables mentioned earlier 
under "Data and Methodology" as quoted from the Discussion Memorandum 
were used in various combinations. Those for which the results were 
considered of interest are discussed in this section. 
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In addition to the level of ordinary earnings as discussed above, the five-
year growth rate and variability of such earnings, and extraordinary earnings 
were used because of their possible relevance to earnings expectations. 
Dividends were used because of the general presumption that the distinction 
between distributed and undistributed earnings is significant to investors. The 
average of the dividends for the prior and current years was used for the 
reason explained earlier with respect to the use of average earnings. Book 
value was used primarily to test the prevalent presumption that it is not 
significant to investors. The market-related variables used were the Standard 
& Poor's average of stock prices for 425 industrial companies and an index of 
price stability (or variability). It was assumed that the S&P average would 
appropriately measure the combined effect of external factors affecting the 
market generally, and accordingly no effort was made to analyze any such 
factors individually. The use of average prices by industry classifications was 
considered impracticable because of the difficulty of establishing consistency in 
such classifications for the number of years covered, and was considered 
unnecessary because of the limited effect of such classifications indicated by 
earlier studies. The price stability index was computed for each company for 
each year by dividing the high-low price range by the corresponding price 
average. 
Three of the variables mentioned in the preceding paragraph—dividends, 
book value, and the S&P average—appear to be of sufficient interest to 
consider individually. The average correlation obtained from the respective 
analyses in which these variables were used was as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Average Number 
Variables Correlation Significant 
Average dividends .53 67 
S & P average .36 53 
Book value .39 48 
A multiple set of variables, consisting of average EPS and all of those 
mentioned in the second preceding paragraph, was used in (1) time-series 
analyses covering 15 years for each of 100 companies and (2) cross-sectional 
analyses covering 100 companies for each of 15 years. The results obtained 
from these analyses and a comparison with those obtained from using average 
EPS only are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Multiple Average 
Variables EPS Only 
Time-series analyses: 
Number significant 95 84 
Average correlation .85 .70 
Cross-section analyses: 
Number significant 15 15 
Average correlation .82 .80 
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As was expected, the use of multiple variables improved the overall results of 
the time-series analyses by companies but reduced the number of companies 
for which average EPS was a significant variable. This reduction was from 84 to 
45. 
The following summary shows the number of companies for which 
significant correlations were obtained and the number of such companies for 
which the respective variables were included in the significant set of variables, 
with an analysis indicating whether average EPS was included or excluded from 
the significant set: 
Table 6 
Total Average EPS 
Significant Included Excluded 
Companies 95 45 50 
Variables:* 
Average EPS 45 45 -
S&P average 24 7 17 
Book value (beginning) 22 8 14 
Average dividends 21 7 14 
Five-year earnings: 
Growth rate 20 2 18 
Variability (standard error) 14 10 4 
Extraordinary earnings 11 2 9 
Price stability index 9 3 6 
* The total of the variables listed exceeds the number of companies because of the cases in which 
more than one variable was significant for a particular company. 
The number of years for which the respective variables were significant in 
the cross-sectional analyses is shown below: 
Table 7 
Variables Years 
Average EPS 15 
S&P average 0 
Book value (beginning) 1 
Average dividends 9 
Five-year earnings: 
Growth rate 0 
Variability (standard error) 6 
Extraordinary earnings 0 
Price stability 8 
Price-Earnings Sensitivity 
The average price-earnings sensitivity factors computed as stated pre­
viously from the principal analyses are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Multiple 
Variables 
Average 
EPS Only 
Time-series analyses-
Average sensitivity based on: 
Total companies (100) .46 .78 
Number of companies for 
which average EPS was 
a significant variable 
(45 and 84, respectively) 1.02 .93 
Cross-sectional analyses-
Average sensitivity based 
on total companies .83 .99 
With the foregoing presentation of data concerning price-earnings sen­
sitivity, we move to the more difficult problem of evaluation of the possible 
implications for establishing criteria for materiality in accounting. For this 
purpose, we consider first the time-series vs. cross-sectional analyses, and 
second the use of multiple variables vs. average EPS only. 
In considering the relative merits of time-series and cross-sectional 
analyses for the purposes of this study, it appears that the advantages of one 
are the disadvantages of the other and vice versa. The time-series analyses for 
individual companies eliminate the effect of differences between companies, 
while the individual cross-sectional analyses eliminate the effect of differences 
between years. Consequently, the results of the respective analyses are 
somewhat complementary. On balance, however, it appears that the time-
series analyses may be more meaningful for this study because the variability 
between companies is greater than that between years. This is indicated by the 
fact that the average of the relative standard errors of estimate for the 
multiple-variable cross-sectional analyses was .48 as compared with .14 for the 
corresponding time-series analyses. 
Conceptually, the results from using multiple variables are preferable to 
those from using only average EPS for two reasons. First, the plausibility of 
significant variables other than EPS is established in the Discussion Memoran­
dum and investment literature. Second, the correlation obtained from the use 
of multiple variables is higher. However, it is difficult to discern significant 
patterns or in some cases a rationale for the regression functions developed 
from the multiple variables for individual companies. 
The multiple-variable analyses present a dilemma in that they show average 
EPS as being significant for only 45 of the 100 companies. For this reason, any 
use of the average from such a skewed distribution of the 100 companies would 
be questionable. Conversely, any use of the average for the 45 significant cases 
could result in unduly restrictive criteria for companies as to which EPS may 
not be significant. However, the latter appears to be the more acceptable of the 
two unattractive alternatives offered by the multiple-variable analyses. 
Another possibility is to discount the conceptual preferability of the 
multiple-variable analyses and assume that EPS data were the only significant 
variable. Pragmatically, the difference between this approach and the alterna-
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tive suggested in the preceding paragraph would not be very great (1.02 vs. 
.93) as shown in Table 8. 
Materiality Decision Model 
Given any level of price-earnings sensitivity, further consideration is 
required to translate such information into logical criteria for accounting 
materiality. The considerations required for this purpose are referred to herein 
as a materiality decision model. 
Any change in earnings could be considered material at any level of 
sensitivity if changes in investment portfolios could be made without incurring 
costs. This is not the case, however, and consequently such costs should be 
included in the decision model. Further, since changes in investments involve 
two transactions, the model should include the costs of both. 
The principal costs to be considered are commissions and the price effects 
of blockage (size of blocks traded). A recent report by the SEC (Second Report 
to Congress on The Effect of the Absence of Fixed Rates of Commission, 
dated March 29, 1976.) indicates that the average commission as a percentage 
of the principal value of all trades is approximately 1.6% for individuals and .6% 
for institutions. Discussions with investment personnel familiar with "best 
execution" trading strategy, which is designed to minimize the total of 
commission and blockage costs, indicate that the latter ordinarily are signifi­
cantly greater than the differential between the average commission costs of 
individuals and of institutions. Consequently, it seems reasonable for the 
purpose of this study to consider that the average cost of changing from one 
investment to another is at least 3.2% (1.6 x 2). 
An important consideration in the decision model is that incurrence of 
transaction costs is certain, while realization of the expected benefits is 
uncertain. Consequently, the cost-benefit inequality inherent in the model 
requires that the expected benefits be expressed in terms of a high degree of 
assurance. This can be accomplished by using the standard error associated 
with the sensitivity factor to compute a "lower sensitivity limit" for compari­
son with the transaction costs. Since a range of three standard errors around a 
statistical estimate provides virtual certainty where a normal distribution of 
such estimates may reasonably be assumed, a lower sensitivity limit computed 
on this basis seems appropriate for use in the model being discussed here. 
Such a limit represents the maximum change in price that could be considered 
virtually certain from a 1% change in earnings—in contrast to the estimated 
change based on the sensitivity level, as to which there is an equal risk of 
variation in either direction. Based on the average standard error applicable to 
the sensitivity factor of 1.02 shown in Table 8 the lower sensitivity limit 
computed as suggested above is .50. 
The materiality decision model described above can be summarized as 
follows: 
M = C/S 
Where: 
M = Materiality limit—the maximum effect on ordinary earn­
ings that would be immaterial. 
C = Cost of change in investments. 
S = Lower limit of price-earnings sensitivity. 
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Based on this model and the data presented earlier, a reasonable materiality 
limit in relation to effect on ordinary earnings for a year would be 6.4% 
(3.2/.5). 
The data and rationale culminating in the foregoing computation should be 
evaluated in the context of the caveat expressed earlier: "This study was not 
conducted under any illusion that it would produce a precise or conclusive 
model, but only to determine whether it could provide information that would 
be useful in considering possible standards for materiality." Two considera­
tions seem particularly relevant in evaluating the usefulness of this study. 
First, insofar as known to the author, it is the only approach that has been 
developed for considering materiality criteria analytically rather than subjec­
tively. Second, the results of the study tend to corroborate the general range 
of subjective judgments expressed by many practicing accountants. For 
example, the response by the AICPA's Accounting Standards Task Force on 
Materiality recommended a level of 5% of ordinary earnings, with appropriate 
flexibility for unusual circumstances, which compares with 6.4% developed in 
this study. (The author of this study was a member of the AICPA Task Force 
but the study had not been completed, no preliminary conclusions had been 
formed, and no consideration was given to the study at the time the 
recommendations of the Task Force were formulated.) 
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Discussant's Response to 
Some Thoughts on Materiality 
Joseph J. Schultz, Jr. 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
In addition to it being a real pleasure to be here at Kansas and to have the 
opportunity to exchange ideas with you, I am particularly honored to have the 
distinction of discussing the paper by Ken Stringer. I know of no other 
individual who is more responsible for moving the technical aspect of audit 
practice along more than Ken. I suspect that Ken would be the first to admit 
that progress is not always achieved without a few detours along the way. I 
think we would all acknowledge that without taking a few side trips down these 
unchartered roads, life would become static and dull. My remarks today center 
on the proposition that once again Ken is moving us in the right direction, but 
not necessarily along the four-lane. My remarks today will be divided into 
issues related to the paper and ideas on materiality generally. 
The Paper 
The concept of materiality is a threshold concept that relates to the users of 
information who make a myriad of decisions. In our society, a major group of 
these decisions are made by investors who buy, sell or hold securities based on 
this information. We, as accountants and auditors, are interested particularly in 
the role that financial statements play in that set of information. Society gives 
us general direction in carrying out our role as auditors. An indication of some 
of this direction is evidenced in the following excerpts. 
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the 
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information 
required to those matters about which an average prudent investor ought 
reasonably to be informed. Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02. (Emphasis 
added.) 
. . . A fact which if it has been correctly stated or disclosed would have 
deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing 
the securities in question. Escott, et al. v. BarChris Construction 
Corporation. 283 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y.) 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.) 
The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man would 
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction in question . . . (and the above test would encompass any 
fact) which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the 
value of the corporation's stock or securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co. 401 F2d 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.) 
There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
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significantly altered the "Total mix" of information made available. 
TSC Industries, Inc., et al. v. Northway, Inc. 426 US 438 (1976). 
(Emphasis added.) 
These guidelines provide us with some direction that is unambiguous. 
• Materiality is user oriented. 
• Materiality is part of a total mix of information. 
• The item subject to a materiality decision must have a substantial 
likelihood of significantly altering the total mix of information. 
The excerpts, however helpful in their direction, fail to clarify a number of 
issues. For example: 
• Should the auditor look solely to the investment community in judging 
materiality? 
• How can the auditor identify the users' mix of information? 
• Furthermore, how can the auditor assess the current state of the 
users in order to know what change would represent a substantial 
likelihood of significantly altering the user's mix? 
• Should attention focus on the market value of the security or on the 
reasonably prudent investor? 
This last point is subtle. Beaver (1968, pp. 69-70) differentiates between 
two types of market reaction to information—individual reaction within the 
market place (volume change) and aggregate market reaction (price change). 
Notice that only the guidance from the Texas Gulf Sulphur case directly 
mentions the market price and it is mentioned in conjunction with the individual 
orientation. Yet, the other three—including the most recent—still cling to the 
individual orientation. While this differentiation may not be terribly important in 
determining damages from an investors' standpoint, as such damage is based 
on changes in market price, it presents a problem for the auditor in assessing 
other users' needs and for basing his or her materiality judgments on any 
individual's judgments—even a reasonably prudent investor's. 
The Market Data Approach 
By adopting a market data based approach, Ken chooses to address the 
investment community, to consider the total mix of information that affects the 
prices, and to measure the sensitivity of the price to movements in several 
accounting variables (particularly net income). Finally, Ken elects to ignore the 
individual and focus instead on the market value of the security. Ken's paper 
represents a serious attempt to deal effectively with each of these major 
issues. In that regard, it is exemplary. However, as Dyckman, Downes, and 
Magee (1975) point out, this market based approach is not without peril. 
Indeed, as all researchers who have filtered through study after study know, 
there is no one project that is significantly likely to provide the answer to 
serious problems. Ken's paper and materiality fall into this category. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with Ken's approach is that the time 
series of earnings levels and security price levels are probably nonstationary. 
Because they are not stationary their relationship, as expressed by a 
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correlation coefficient, is likely to be overstated. The accompanying figure may 
help us gain some insight into this problem. Chart A in Ken's paper gives us a 
picture of two variables which are highly dependent. Indeed, Ken reports a 
correlation of 0.95. However, one may justifiably raise several questions. Is 
there some underlying variable creating a trend in each of these variables? 
Also, is there some trend that each of these variables follows as a result of this 
other variable? Francis (1976, p. 587) cites a study that indicates that New 
York Stock Exchange stock prices rose about 6.8 percent per year from 1926 
through 1965. It is likely that EPS also rose during this period. Indeed, it is 
likely that both have continued to rise generally until I invested about a year 
ago. 
Let us examine Figure 1, which represents the data from Table 1 
rearranged against time. The X's on the diagram represent EPS. The 0's 
represent price. I believe the impact of time is evident and generally consistent 
with an increasing trend for both of these variables. 
How then can we get away from this problem? One way may be to fit 
various models to the data as they stand, which could compensate for the drift. 
Another way is to use a first difference model. That is, contrast the changes in 
EPS with the comparable changes in price. Figure 2 represents these first 
differences plotted against one another. The correlation coefficient of this 
series is .60. Notice that the amount of "explained" association has fallen from 
about 90% using Ken's approach to about 36% using a statistically more 
correct approach. This rearrangement points out a major problem with looking 
at the raw data—namely that the strength of the relationships is overstated and 
the significant number of relationships is overstated. Neter and Wasserman 
(1974, pp. 352 ff.) point out other problems. Francis (1976, pp. 587-588) points 
out that even the distribution of first differences is unstable. Since this 
evidence regarding the first difference is not as compelling, one might try to 
construct a measure based on first differences. One potential model may take 
the following form. 
Price t + 3 + Dividends - Price t - 9 = a + b EPS - E P S 
year ended year ended 
month t month t -12 
This model would help the nonstationary problem, recognize the prepon­
derance of findings regarding the time patterns of earnings, and assist with the 
problem of getting the amount of return matched to the period affected by the 
earnings' release time. One may also wish to try to use quarterly data (Foster, 
1978, pp. 106 ff.). However, I feel that both these approaches are rather 
crude, and it seems to me that a model based on returns is a better approach. 
Francis (1976, pp. 588 ff.) indicates that such an approach may be better—at 
least given the statistical properties of security prices over time. Furthermore, 
using return data as the dependent variable would more closely relate to 
existing investment theory and practice models as I understand them. 
The cross sectional analyses in the paper are subject to some rigorous 
statistical assumptions. With this in mind, I shall not discuss them, but merely 
refer interested parties to work by Johnston (1972). 
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Figure 1 
Price and EPS Plotted Against Time 
Data from Stringer's Table 1 
Price EPS 
1960 1965 
Year 
1970 
x = EPS 
o = Price 
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Figure 2 
Price versus ΔEPS Data 
from Stringer's Table 1 
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ΔPrice 
Some Specific Observations 
The key point that should come out of my remarks is that Ken's work 
attempted to establish a paradigm that did describe behavior of prices as 
related to accounting data while considering many of the relevant issues. Since 
some of the problems that I have cited came into the literature after Ken's 
work, it should not bear adversely on his study. Rather, it should advance the 
challenge to those among us who are equipped to. perform such research. I 
should also add that Dopuch and Watts (1972, p. 184) have proposed using 
time-series methodology to assist the auditor in making materiality decisions. 
Kaplan (1978) has cited some problems with these approaches, but Foster 
(1978b, pp. 47-48) has observed that they may not be insurmountable. The 
Dopuch-Watts' proposal would acknowledge a significant change in net income 
brought on by an item subject to a materiality decision as one criterion. I think 
we must remember that any of these models are merely surrogates for true 
materiality. 
If we pursue a market-based approach, we should bear in mind several 
problems. First, it is unlikely to yield a model that is sufficiently sensitive to 
potential changes in accounting numbers that will help us much. This may be 
judged by some to imply the immateriality of such potential changes. Secondly, 
while it could be arguably better than the individual approach in assessing the 
impact of potential changes in an accounting number in a mix of information, it is 
not without problems in that such a model must be forward looking and 
necessarily depend on estimates. Thirdly, while it may better approach the 
social welfare paradigm than the individual approach, it does not, per se, 
constitute an appropriate measure for such paradigm (cf. Gonedes and Dopuch, 
1974). Finally, it is not readily apparent that the courts would accept this 
approach even though one might conjecture that it would be acceptable based 
on some interpretations of market-based theory and the prudent man rule 
applicable to decisions of pension fund trustees under ERISA (Pozen, 1977). 
Foster (1980) points out some other issues that should be considered before 
attacking the topic using this approach. 
The User Approach 
Let me change orientation now and discuss the individual user approach to 
determination of materiality levels. Ken's paper implied that some materiality 
guidelines should be proposed for the "usual'' situation. I am not sure that I 
understand this term. It seems to me that financial statements are likely to be 
used for a given company at a given point in time primarily for either equity 
investment decisions or credit decisions. There is implied support in this use 
specificity in professional standards. SAS No. 39 "Audit Sampling" (1981) 
indicates that the auditor should consider the effect of any potential misstate­
ment on the expected use of such financial statements in determining ultimate 
risk. If the auditor knows a client well, then it should be possible to assess the 
intended principal use of the statements in most cases. Where there appears to 
be an "ordinary" situation, the auditor should be able to adequately assess the 
materiality bounds pretty well. I base this conclusion on the proposition that 
very, very few audits result in any serious allegations of misstatement. Thus, 
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the cost of the variability in materiality levels on the audit may be measured on 
a societal basis primarily by a misallocation of resources. In an "ordinary" 
case, this misallocation may take the form of an interest rate that differs from 
optimal or a security price that differs from optimal. Both of these differentials 
are probably minor. For, when trying to measure this misallocation, notice that 
financial statement numbers are only part of a complex set of other information 
on which interested parties base their decisions. Other components might 
include product development prospects, market share, quality of management, 
etc. Note also that these decisions are primarily based on future states of these 
variables and therefore are likely to contain a considerable degree of variation 
and subjectivity. Therefore, I see no immediate cost justification for imple­
menting an unduly rigid materiality rule for "ordinary" audits. 
What is an "ordinary" audit? I am not sure that I know, but I can offer a 
few under-developed guidelines. An ordinary audit involves an auditee who is 
not in financial distress, who is not an apparent merger target, who is not intent 
on spinning off subsidiaries, who is not registering securities, who is not 
blessed with management of doubtful integrity and who is not encumbered with 
a lousy internal accounting control system. These characteristics are meant to 
represent potential criteria that would have to be combined in some unknown 
manner to identify "extraordinary" audits. I feel sure that members of the 
AICPA Task Force on Materiality and Audit Risk as well as Albrecht, Romney, 
and others (cf. Albrecht, et al., 1982) could suggest other danger signals. The 
key point I want to make is to have these types of clients bear the cost of more 
stringent materiality bounds and more auditor time. 
In such situations the prudent audit firm may wish to alter the nature of the 
audit procedures, involve more senior audit personnel, and push the timing of 
such procedures back as far as practicable. Thus, the extent of testing, which 
would be the primary variable affected by a quantitative guideline, would be 
only one dimension triggered by auditees in this unusual category. A broader 
view of materiality in conjunction with audit risk should increase the real audit 
quality associated with these financial statements. The risk would lie primarily 
with the accounting firm to do the job. Failures on its part could be expected to 
lead to market pressures that would diminish the reputation of the firm—even 
to the point of ruin. 
Since the profession will also be damaged to an extent with any audit 
failure, it should provide guidance on characteristics that denote an extraordi­
nary audit. For example, it could propose the assistance of one or more outside 
specialists in such audits. This action would raise the auditor's loss function if 
he ignored such guidance and the financial statements subsequently proved to 
be materially in error. On the other hand, the auditor who followed such 
guidance should have gone a long way toward establishing a good faith defense 
in the event that the statements were determined to be materially in error. At 
the present time, the auditor alone assesses the users' decision models, their 
current portfolio state, their attitudes toward risk, and so on. For a single 
unknown user in society, accurate assessment is impossible. Thus, the auditor 
could call in an expert financial analyst for the client's industry or an expert 
lending analyst familiar with the client's industry or some combination of one or 
more of each of these. The auditor could have him, her, or them assess the 
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critical assertions in the financial statements. I personally believe that some 
type of multiple attribute utility function could then be developed to assist the 
auditor in determining which numbers or disclosures in the statements were in 
the critical, threshold range. This in turn would allow the auditor to address 
those areas with the appropriate intensity to meet his or her own utility 
function. 
An alternative approach would be to set some percentage of some earnings 
figure for an overall materiality bound. My understanding of firm valuation 
research (e.g., Miller and Modigliani, 1961) and other research findings (cf. 
Foster, 1978) including those from behavioral decision theory research (cf. 
Libby, 1981) leads me to believe that this referent is the most reasonable 
single candidate. Furthermore, it could satisfy the need that any specific 
guidance in any Statement on Auditing Standards at the current time must be 
relatively straight-forward and simplistic. Therefore, I believe this one would 
be as good or better than any other based on current knowledge. 
More Finite Guidance? 
If, however, more finite guidance is deemed necessary and appropriate, I 
feel the materiality bound should be set at one percent of net income. Such a 
bound would undoubtedly create an increased demand for auditors and tend to 
place upward pressure on my salary level. Of course, I am not serious about 
such a stringent bound. Rather, I wish to make the point that as auditors we 
should not let our strong desire for a quality product from a profession that is 
dear to many of us assembled here, lead us to standards that are apparently too 
costly for any reasonable benefit to our society. This proposition holds even if 
we perceive that that same society has unleashed some competitive forces 
upon us recently that, in my opinion, tend to reduce audit quality. One minor 
encouraging sign in this matter currently lies in my desk drawer in my desk 
back in Urbana. That is, someone has done a paper that strongly suggests that 
the perceived prestige and quality of members of the traditional Big Eight are 
positively related to the perceived cost of their services. If this perception 
carries over to actions (including increased quality of audit with increased cost) 
then audit clients with "better" audit firms may benefit by lower costs of 
borrowing, because the subjects of this study were the chief financial officers at 
the nation's 25 largest banks. 
I have not discussed any specific research projects, but I feel we could do 
research at the individual level to help with generating an appropriate 
methodology for eliciting the outside specialists' multiple attribute utility 
function or contribute some studies that could assist the task force in 
determining if setting a selected percent of income for planning materiality 
would increase the consensus of judgments among auditors. 
Before I end, I thank Ken for writing a paper that made me think about this 
important issue. I also thank Howard and Don for asking me to be a discussant 
which undoubtedly piqued my own utility function. Finally, I hope my ideas 
further the progress on the issue of materiality judgments in auditing. 
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SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews: 
The Gap in GAAS 
Robert S. Kay 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Overview of the Paper 
This paper explores the guidance given to auditors in early 1981 in SAS 34, 
"The Auditor's Considerations when a Question Arises About an Entity's 
Continued Existence," in comparison with procedures contained in the 
AICPA's 1980 Guide for a Review of a Financial Forecast ("forecast guide"). 
In the author's opinion, there is little differentiation in the satisfaction the 
auditor/reviewer is to obtain under these two forms of guidance, and the result 
may be that the auditor will be called upon for failure to have performed at the 
level of the forecast guide. Neither document has been in existence long 
enough for such problems to have matured, but based on the evolution of 
accountants' liability, the author foresees significant challenges in court unless 
the auditing profession promptly reconciles the two documents. 
It is important to recognize that the forecast guide calls for a display of the 
most probable future result, which could be considerably more difficult to 
achieve than the prediction implied by SAS 34—that is, that a company will 
have zero or better net cash inflow, without identifying any specific amount 
thereof. To this extent, one would expect the forecast guide procedures to be 
more penetrating. Accordingly, this paper knowingly makes a more aggressive 
case than probably is applicable for audits today. 
The views expressed in this paper are a priori, fortified by experience with 
several practice cases where the auditor recognized the problem and aimed at 
the forecast guide levels of attainment, believing this was the prudent approach 
in the clients' circumstances. In this sense, the author offers thoughts on what 
he perceives to be an emerging problem facing the auditing profession. 
Experienced accountants can be expected to disagree on whether a problem is 
emerging, and if so, how to solve it. 
A Gathering Storm 
In the current economic environment, businesses face an unprecedented 
and sustained liquidity crisis; failures are common and increasing. Consider for 
example the thrift industry, which in an unregulated environment (without 
FSLIC or FDIC assistance) would be faced with cataclysmic disaster through 
having lent long and borrowed short. Should the auditor be exceptionally alert 
in these circumstances? How much responsibility will have to be borne for 
these failures? 
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The authoritative auditing literature is liberally sprinkled with exculpations 
declaring that the auditor is not a fortune teller. For example, SAS 34, 
paragraph 9, says: 
The auditor's function, however, does not include predicting the 
outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the auditor 
that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period 
beyond the date of his opinion. 
Experience shows that auditors should not take too much comfort in soothing 
passages of this type. The litigable issue will not be identified as the future 
orientation, but rather as the proper assessment of available facts (with 
"available" meaning discoverable through the "right" inquiries and investiga­
tion). 
Legal Framework 
Legal precedent over the years has developed to a point that auditors can 
expect to be called to task in the event a company fails. This is especially so for 
publicly held companies, given the opportunity to assert misrepresentations in 
the financial statements and the accompanying auditor's report under Section 
11 of the 1933 Securities Act. This puts the burden of proof on the auditor as 
not being a party to whatever is alleged to be wrong with the financial 
statements (i.e., the auditor did not determine that the company was about to 
fail); and the test for auditor non-culpability is stringent: 
After making reasonable investigation (i.e., exercising "due dili­
gence"), he had reasonable ground to believe, and did in fact believe, 
that the statements in his audit opinion were true; in effect, the auditor 
will be held liable unless he can prove that he exercised due care, i.e., 
was not negligent either in the performance of his audit or in the 
expression of his audit opinion (which is indeed a rigorous standard 
though not insurmountable).1 
When considering going concern situations, the focus is on the future, or 
the post-balance-sheet period. If a company files a registration statement, 
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Securities Act is unique in continuing the audit opinion 
responsibility to the effective date of the registration statement, rather than 
only to the date of the audit opinion. "It is possible that the information 
available to the auditor at the audit opinion date might justify one audit opinion, 
but that additional information available to the auditor at or near the effective 
date might then require a different audit opinion."2 The professional literature 
does not require a post-balance-sheet investigation to be as rigorous as the 
audit examination, but how much should have been enough is always debatable 
in the aftermath of a collapse. 
Admittedly, companies in a noticeably precarious financial position and 
therefore candidates for going concern qualification are not likely to be filing 
1933 Act registration statements.3 But there is, as ever, an easy route that 
plaintiffs may take strictly based on periodic filings under the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. Section 10(b) prohibits the making of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omission of a statement of material fact necessary in order to 
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make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. Rule 10b-5 deals with any offer or sale of 
securities, and has been interpreted to apply to any action taken in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. Thus, the rule has been construed 
broadly enough so that auditors' opinions on audited financial statements, and 
unaudited financial statements with which auditors have become associated, 
may be statements in connection with purchases and sales of the corporation's 
securities. The auditor is clearly "in the soup" even though he is not in the 
securities brokerage business. 
The auditor is also not required to actively participate in or know about the 
presentation of misleading statements. The profession's euphoria over the 
Hochfelder decision, requiring the auditor to have scienter or "knowledge" to 
be held responsible, has rapidly dissipated. Scienter has been transmogrified 
into recklessness, a form of negligence, a prevalent definition of which is found 
in McLean vs. Alexander4: 
Reckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct], 
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an 
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to 
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it. 
This may sound safe—what good auditor does that?—but in terms of going 
concern situations, one must at least wonder about whether some of today's 
situations will be deemed after the fact to have been "so obvious that the actor 
must have been aware of it." 
One last bit of relevant law: a determination of failure to have made the 
inquiry that might have revealed a deficiency is negligence; if it is sufficiently 
extreme it could be recklessness. 
It is tempting to assert that today, SEC enforcement is rapidly waning, and 
that litigation for the most part is running much in the accountants' favor. That 
would be, perhaps, foolhardy; the SEC retains all its powers and must be 
counted on to reactivate enforcement if a serious failure of auditors is 
perceived. Once the SEC "rings the gong," the litigants will swarm. 
Auditors and Uncertainties 
Uncertainties clearly existed in financial reporting long before auditors 
came into being. Thus, the consideration of effects of uncertainties on clients' 
financial statements has been an evolutionary process. An early exposition of 
this subject is contained in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 32, "Qualifi­
cations and Disclaimers," issued in 1962 for purposes of clarifying reporting 
standards called for under what was then Rule 2.03 of the AICPA's Code of 
Professional Ethics. That ethical conclusion was intended to add further 
specification to the fourth standard of reporting (which was subsequently added 
to the nine original Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) indicating that "the 
report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's 
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking." 
The language of SAP 32 was carried forward into SAP 33, "Codification of 
Statement on Auditing Procedures," and, in substance, remained relatively 
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intact in the recodification in SAS 1 in 1972. However, the recodification 
procedure and the litigation against auditors in the early 1970's revealed a need 
for further attention to the auditor's forms of reporting including uncertainties. 
The result was the issuance of SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial 
Statements," in 1974. These are essentially the reporting formats we practice 
under today. 
SAS 34, "The Auditor's Considerations When a Question Arises About an 
Entity's Continued Existence," does not alter the basic format in SAS 2; the 
SAS 34 exemplary report showing a qualification ("subject to," as contrasted 
with disclaimer) in a going concern situation is built on the preexisting SASs and 
gives specification to what otherwise might be a stock "fill-in-the-blanks" form 
of report. 
Prior to SAS 34, auditing pronouncements seemed to heavily emphasize 
the financial statements—much as if they were disembodied from the company. 
SAS 34 appears to aim much more directly at the company itself—will it make 
it, or will it not? While SAS 34 necessarily hinges the auditor's concerns to the 
only outlet he controls—his audit report—and thus to the financial statements, 
it is apparent by reading SAS 34 that the issue of how to report is simple in 
comparison with what the auditor has to consider and do in relation to future 
oriented information, almost all of which is not incorporated in the client's 
accounting records. Only then can a conclusion be reached about including or 
not including a going concern qualification (or disclaimer) in the auditor's 
report. 
SAS 34 vs. the Forecasting Guide 
The basic premise of SAS 34 is that, any time up to the date of the report, 
once the auditor becomes aware (through what is referred to as "contrary 
information"), that the going concern assumption may be in question, regard­
less of the source of the information, the auditor had better investigate to de-
termine whether (and how) the report needs to be amended to make reference 
to the situation. 
Let us assume that auditors today are especially conscious about and 
inquire into a client's continued viability, rather than awaiting inspiration or 
evidence to come marching in. Whether or not such preconditioning is true, the 
focal issue is, once the auditor is concerned, what procedures should the 
auditor follow in considering a client's continued viability. Further, recognizing 
that prognostications could be wrong (i.e., some going concerns will become 
non-going concerns), what will the courts decide about the reasonable level of 
performance? Said differently, auditors make judgments and some judgments 
are invariably wrong. The auditor needs to support judgment with the proper 
defense, which could very well be something more penetrating than having 
followed SAS 34. That "something" probably will be the AICPA's 1980 Guide 
for Review of a Financial Forecast. 
Some questions that might be asked about SAS 34 and the forecast guide 
are: 
• What "forecasting" procedures are implied by SAS 34? 
• In a SAS 34 situation, can the auditor simply "throw in the towel" 
and issue his "going concern" opinion after coursing through minimal 
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procedures, or are there situations in which review must be con­
ducted to the extent contemplated in a review of a financial forecast? 
• Under what circumstances would a prudent auditor expand SAS 34 
procedures to incorporate some or all of the procedures for review of 
a financial forecast? 
• How large is the gap between what the auditor already knows and 
does in an SAS 34 engagement and the knowledge and procedures 
called for in the forecast guide? 
A comparison of the relevant forecast guide requirements with SAS 34 
considerations follows, stated in terms of the forecast guide procedures, with 
reference to the substance of coverage in SAS 34. Particular reference should 
be made to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34, reproduced in Appendix A. 
Forecast Guide SAS 34 
Definitions 
• The forecast and underlying as­
sumptions are the responsibility of 
management, regardless of the ac­
countant's participation. 
• The accountant may assist in the 
formulation of assumptions, but 
management must evaluate them 
and make decisions as to their rea­
sonableness. 
The Accountant's Review 
• In general, the forecast reviewer 
should: 
-have adequate technical training 
and expertise 
-maintain an independence of men­
tal attitude 
-exercise due professional care 
-adequately plan and supervise the 
engagement 
-understand the forecasting proc­
ess 
-obtain adequate support for the 
conclusions reached. 
• The scope of the accountant's re­
view is governed by the following: 
-knowledge of the business, focusing 
on its operating characteristics, 
the nature and condition of sales 
• This would be a given in any en­
vironment, whether in an audit ex­
amination or review of a forecast. 
• Nothing revelationary. Just as in an 
audit, the auditor can assist the 
company and management in se­
lecting accounting policies, but 
management makes the decision. 
The Auditor's Considerations 
• Except for the possibility that the 
level of technical expertise needed 
in a forecast engagement is greater, 
the remainder of these qualities are 
GAAS-oriented and would be im­
plicit in a SAS 34 engagement. 
-This is required by SAS 1, Plan-
ning and Supervision (AU 311). 
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• A forecast is the "most probable" 
estimate. 
• A projection may or may not be 
representative of the "most proba­
ble" estimate. 
No definitions of forecast or proj­
ection; mentions both. 
Management's Responsibilities 
markets, unique industry charac­
teristics and patterns of past per­
formance. 
-management's forecasting experi-
ence, including review of past fore­
casts and related actual results. 
-forecast period, including consid­
eration of the forecast period's 
length and extent of inclusion of 
historical results. 
-forecasting process, the knowledge 
of which is based on inquiry, ob­
servations and review of docu­
mentation. 
• Procedures to evaluate assumptions: 
-based on knowledge of the busi­
ness, identify key factors that in­
fluence the company's financial 
results. This considers their rele­
vance, completeness, sensitivity 
in relation to financial results, and 
pervasiveness. 
-evaluate whether the assumptions 
are suitably supported. 
-no conclusion can be drawn by the 
accountant as to whether the fore­
cast is the "most probable" out­
come. Management's intentions 
and inherent uncertainties of fore­
casts necessarily place this conclu­
sion on management's plate. 
-the assumptions to be focused 
upon are those that are material, 
especially sensitive to variations, 
deviate from historical trends, or 
are uncertain. 
-the adequacy of support for as­
sumptions is based on: 
(1) existence of sufficient perti­
nent sources. 
(2) whether assumptions are con­
sistent with their sources. 
(3) whether historical or other fi­
nancial information and data 
are reliable. 
(4) whether the historical financial 
or other data are comparable 
or whether differences were 
factored in. 
There is nothing here that the auditor 
shouldn't already know to a certain 
degree. 
-No specific requirement, but it is 
common sense. Would an auditor 
look at and believe a cash forecast 
without some level of inquiry 
about management's forecasting 
experience. 
-Again, this would seem to be in 
the area of logical inquiry by the 
auditor. 
-This is not required in SAS 34; it 
requires more than inquiry by the 
auditor. 
-In view of the "knowledge bank'' 
possessed by the auditor, these 
factors should probably already be 
known, even in a non-SAS 34 en­
gagement, though undoubtedly in 
a less formalized way than con­
templated in the forecasting guide. 
-This is not REQUIRED by SAS 34 
and would require some digging by 
the auditor. 
-Same under GAAS. Rule 201 of 
the AICPA Code of Professional 
Ethics prohibits vouching for the 
achievability of a forecast. 
-SAS 34 emphasis is identical. 
-SAS 34 requires review and com­
parison of the prospective infor­
mation with past prospective 
information, historical financial in­
formation, and the accuracy of 
past prospective information. Fur­
ther, omissions of relevant infor­
mation and assumptions should be 
noted. This would encompass at 
least points (3) and (4) at left. 
Further, points (5), (6) and (7) 
would seem a logical extension of 
any review of a forecast. 
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(5) whether the assumptions are 
consistent with each other. 
(6) whether the logical argument 
or theory, considered with the 
assumptions, is reasonable. 
(7) whether alternate approaches 
support the reasonableness of 
the assumptions. 
In a SAS 34 situation, the auditor must address all of the factors considered 
in that statement prior to drawing a conclusion about an entity's continued 
existence. This implies that the auditor's procedures for review of forecasts, 
projections, etc. prepared in conjunction with an audit of financial statements 
should be thorough and complete. 
As the table above suggests, the detailed procedures called for in the 
forecast guide can be viewed as simply a logical and necessary articulation of 
the generalized procedures contained in SAS 34. In most cases, it would seem 
imprudent of the auditor to ignore the guide's suggested approach and 
procedures—they are formalized in an AICPA document written for account­
ants, not management consultants, and arguably should serve as the basis for 
the general procedures described in paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34. 
The only procedures stated in the forecast guide that are not direct and 
logical articulations of the SAS 34 approach are (a) knowledge of the forecasting 
process, and (b) evaluation as to whether the forecast assumptions are suitably 
supported. Something to keep in mind—the forecast guide implies the auditor 
should possess a certain level of knowledge about the entity and about 
forecasting. With the possible exception of a technical aptitude for forecast 
reviews based on experience, the knowledge required of an auditor in a 
forecasting engagement is not different from the knowledge required by GAAS 
in a SAS 34 engagement (or, for that matter, any audit).5 
Analysis of Differences 
The dimensions of the difference between SAS 34 and the forecast guide 
can be classified into four areas: 
1. Nature of procedures 
2. Extent of procedures (degree and quality of evidence obtained) 
3. Severity of opinion (or lack thereof) 
4. Extent of client disclosures. 
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Management Representations 
• Should be in writing and acknowl­
edge management's responsibility 
for both the forecast and underlying 
assumptions 
• SAS 34 does not mention written 
representations. However, such 
representations would seem called 
for anyway in an audit engagement 
representations letter, at least to 
back up management's disclosures 
within the financial statements 
about the effect of uncertainties on 
the company's future. 
Overall, the nature of procedures in either document is not that different, 
but SAS 34 is sufficiently non-imperative (i.e., "consider this; consider that") 
to permit a sincere case to be made by an auditor that reasonable procedural 
compliance with SAS 34 consists simply of a grasp of the situation and oral 
management representations. 
Nature of Procedures. Differences between SAS 34 coverage and the 
nature of forecast review guide procedures lie in, (i) knowledge of the client's 
forecasting system, and (ii) the extent of articulation of the assumptions. 
The audit client may not even have thought about having a forecasting or 
projection system, having no intention of ever publishing any such prospective 
data. Given that the auditor likewise is not planning on publicly reporting on the 
client's forecast, the extent (or lack) of sophistication of the forecasting 
"system" is probably secondary. What has to be of most concern to the 
auditor is the thoroughness, logic and credibility of the assumptions, and the 
correctness of calculations. While these are more difficult to deal with absent a 
formal system, they are nevertheless susceptible of analysis and understand­
ing. Hopefully, the courts will not hold an auditor (or the company) deficient for 
the company's failure to have developed a formal forecasting system that 
generates data designed to show that the company will or will not go out of 
business. Being on the brink of disaster does not usually warrant the 
expenditure to establish and run a forecasting system. Thus, we will leave this 
issue, simply recognizing that without a system, the numbers and assumptions 
become more subjective. 
To be able to better understand the client's conclusion, a good deal more 
articulation of assumptions might be needed. Though management may intuit 
an assumption, the numerous subassumptions must be communicated to an 
auditor, explicitly or implicitly, to permit focusing on their reasonableness and 
the type of evidence that may be available. 
Extent of Procedures. SAS 34 identifies its procedures as "considerations.'' 
Most are listed in terms of "may" rather than "should." The exception lies in 
paragraph 9, requiring discussion with management about available forecasts, 
projections, budgets or other prospective data, particularly data relating to 
future cash flows. However, this paragraph does not require management to 
actually produce this information; the only standard is that it must be 
information that can reasonably be developed and that whatever is proffered is 
relevant. "Reasonable" will remain undefined except when a situation is 
litigated to a conclusion. 
Paragraph 9 addresses the auditor thus: "The auditor should consider the 
support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective data and should 
give particular attention to assumptions that are material to the relevant 
forecasts or projections, [are] especially uncertain or sensitive to variations, 
[and that deviate] from historical trends." This sounds imperative, but it is 
immediately diluted by directing the auditor to base his considerations on: 
a. Reading, 
b. Knowledge of the entity, its business and its management, and 
c. Analytical comparison of past, present and future data. 
Even after doing these minimal procedures, the only admonition is this: "If 
the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors, the effects of which are not 
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reflected in such prospective data, he should also take those factors into 
account." 
The forecast guide is much more specific about what the accountant must 
do. He must consider the following matters (page 9): 
1. Whether sufficient pertinent sources of information about the as­
sumptions have been considered. Examples of external sources the 
accountant might consider are government publications, industry 
publications, economic forecasts, existing or proposed legislation, 
and reports of changing technology. Examples of internal sources are 
budgets, labor agreements, patents, royalty agreements, engineer­
ing studies, historical financial statements and records, sales backlog 
records, debt agreements, and board of directors actions involving 
entity plans. 
2. Whether the assumptions are consistent with the sources from 
which they are derived. 
3. Whether the assumptions are consistent with each other. 
The remaining three considerations (not listed above) are equivalent to those in 
SAS 34. 
After this list of considerations in the forecast guide, there are two 
particularly incisive paragraphs about items probably infrequently considered in 
performing SAS 34 procedures. These state (page 10): 
Support for assumptions may include market surveys, engineering 
studies, general economic indicators, industry statistics, trends and 
patterns developed from an entity's operating history, and internal data 
and analyses, accompanied by their supporting logical argument or 
theory. The accountant may also obtain support during the evaluation of 
the forecasting process. Support for a forecast can range from informa­
tion based on informed opinion (such as economists' estimates of the 
inflation rate) to data that can be tested in traditional ways (such as 
completed transactions). 
In addition to evaluating management's assumptions and their sources 
of information, the accountant should consider using alternative ap­
proaches to the development of assumptions in evaluating the fore­
casted amounts. For example, to test management's forecast of 
aggregate sales developed from individual salesmen's estimates, the 
accountant may employ a historical trend estimate. 
The forecast guide also contains detailed illustrative procedures, many of 
which would be most apropos in a going concern situation. 
It is almost obvious that SAS 34 studiously avoided a requirement that 
evidence be obtained. There are striking similarities between the going 
concern discussion in Auditing Research Monograph 1 and the content of SAS 
34, but ARM 1 ". . . deals almost entirely with the going-concern concept as it 
affected the evidence-gathering aspects of the examination."6 A typical 
passage about evidence reads: 
Evidence that financing or operating problems have been mitigated may 
remove the immediate threat to the continued existence of a company. 
Financing problems may be mitigated by a waiver or default or an 
anticipated influx of funds. If there is sufficient competent evidential 
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matter that the terms of indebtedness will be adjusted or if an 
arrangement actually deferring payment is obtained, the peril to the 
continued existence of the company may be removed. An anticipated 
influx of funds—if supported by evidential matter—may also remove the 
peril of liquidation. The influx may be from a variety of sources, such as 
demonstrated ability to continue borrowing, the obligation or desire of a 
related entity not to allow liquidation, or viable alternatives open to 
management in financing operations. 
Evidence indicating successful future operations may be in the form of 
reliable company plans or budgets, or operational or management 
changes essential to a "turn-around" of operations. To a large extent 
the auditor's ability to evaluate operating problems will depend on the 
extent of his past experience with the company's operations. The 
auditor's ability to determine the reasonableness of management's 
estimates will be influenced both by the company's experience and his 
own evaluation of management's objectivity and knowledgeability con­
cerning the subject of estimation.7 
Accountant's Forecast Report Vs. Auditor's Report. It is logical that the 
major difference between SAS 34 procedures and forecast guide procedures 
lies in the extent of evidentiary support obtained, because the form of forecast 
report does not allow for degrees of related uncertainty to be reflected in the 
wording. The forecast guide states (page 25): 
Limitations on the scope of the review, whether imposed by the client 
or by other circumstances, may require the accountant to state in his 
report that he cannot evaluate the presentation of the forecast or assess 
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's 
forecast. 
Further, a scope limitation includes one that is imposed "by circumstances, 
such as the accountant's inability to evaluate significant assumption(s) because 
they are not suitably supported." What this effectively amounts to is a 
disclaimer of opinion on the forecast—no "subject to" opinions. 
When this condition occurs, the accountant is required to state: 
Since, as described in the preceding paragraph, we are unable to 
evaluate management's assumption regarding . . . and other assump­
tions that depend thereon, we express no conclusion with respect to 
the presentation of the accompanying financial forecast. 
If this is where the auditor would end up after applying the forecast guide 
procedures in an audit going concern situation, should he say so, in addition to 
expressing a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion? 
It could be asserted (perhaps it was even intended) that the auditor's SAS 
34 approach in reporting on the examination of financial statements affords an 
appropriate opportunity to do less—because the auditor of historical financial 
statements seems to have more options about how much uncertainty he should 
accept before expressing other than an unqualified opinion. 
SAS 34 seems to excuse the auditor from doing a great deal of work before 
considering the effects of going concern conditions on his report. Paragraph 11 
states: "After making any substantive tests that the auditor considers 
necessary and practicable to assess such information, factors, and plans" the 
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auditor could reach a conclusion that the audit report need not be modified; 
then again, modification might not be necessary. Further, paragraph 11 alludes 
to what the auditor might do upon concluding that the company is not a going 
concern: "Identifying the point at which uncertainties about recoverability, 
classifications, and amounts require the auditor to modify his report is a 
complex professional judgment." An example follows in paragraph 12 of an 
opinion qualified for going-concern reasons, perhaps hinting at that course of 
action. 
SAS 34 is silent on whether a disclaimer of opinion might be appropriate 
because of the magnitude of uncertainties, but defers, by reference to SAS 2 
(including the particular paragraph that [by footnote] does not prohibit the 
auditor from expressing a disclaimer). SAS 2 indicates: 
The committee believes that the explanation of the uncertainties and 
the qualification of the auditor's opinion contemplated by this section 
should serve adequately to inform the users of financial statements. 
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor 
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties. If 
he disclaims an opinion, the uncertainties and their possible effects on 
the financial statements should be disclosed in an appropriate manner, 
and the auditor's report should give all the substantive reasons for his 
disclaimer of opinion. (AU 509.25, footnote 8.) 
Thus, there is absolutely nothing in the professional literature demanding a 
disclaimer of opinion as a signal for increasing the user's perception of the 
severity of the situation. 
Assume that following SAS 34 procedures, the auditor does not gather a 
great deal of independent evidence about the veracity of the client's assump­
tions used in a projection that indicates a workout of the going concern 
situation. Also assume that the auditor issues a "subject to going concern" 
opinion as exemplified in SAS 34. After all, SAS 34 does not contain mandates. 
Will it be sustainable by the auditor, should the company shortly thereafter 
enter bankruptcy, that all professional standards applicable to the audit were 
fully adhered to? Would this be true if inquiry outside the company, such as 
with suppliers, customers, trade associations, etc., or analysis of competitors' 
strengths, could have indicated rather clearly that the company was going to be 
unable to achieve the assumptions indicated in its projections? Would, in such a 
circumstance, it be a better defense to have expressed a disclaimer of opinion? 
A disclaimer may not serve to further insulate the accountant if procedures 
were, under the circumstances, less than might have been expected (i.e., "the 
Standard of practice in the community"). Said differently, the auditor could 
argue the impossibility of objectively auditing the future (so why try too hard?); 
and that therefore there was justification for expressing such inability through a 
stronger form of negative opinion—i.e., a disclaimer. 
If indeed the major assumptions are opaque—for example, a certain level of 
interest rate must be achieved on the company's borrowings or financing needs 
in the future, or the company's new product needs to be a success in order for 
the company to survive, the auditor is well advised to spell out these problems 
in his report, regardless of which kind of opinion or non-opinion is expressed. It 
is not as though the courts would hold the auditor responsible for having 
attested to such items if there was a failure to express the inability to do so, but 
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it could be held that readers were not sufficiently informed of the sensitivity of 
the assumptions to have been able to reason along with the auditor towards the 
conclusion reached. In the end, failure to have adequately communicated to 
users can be as fatal as the unlikely determination that the auditor should have 
used a crystal ball. 
Extent of Disclosure 
Naturally, the client should make all the necessary disclosures attendant to 
its circumstances. In those situations where neither the company nor the 
auditor express any concern about ability to continue to operate, and the 
company shortly thereafter fails, both are undoubtedly in jeopardy. What if, 
however, the company expresses (in its Management Discussion and Analysis 
portion of the annual report) that it foresees serious problems in the future, and 
while not being fatalistic about it in detail, puts in enough clues about dangers to 
continuation of the business? If under those circumstances the auditor 
addresses the situation via SAS 34 and concludes that a going concern 
qualification is not necessary, the auditor could be targeted in the event of 
business failure. It would seem that the auditor's opinion should be no better 
than the company's representations wherever made, even if it takes some 
effort to sort out exactly what the company is saying. 
Sometimes the auditor in reviewing the company's situation may decide it 
is in sufficient danger to merit a going concern qualification, but the company 
does not agree, and refuses to paint the picture nearly so black as does the 
auditor's report. In the event of subsequent failure, presumably the company 
would then be in greater jeopardy than the auditor. 
Forecasting has evolved a great deal in the past 10 years, commencing with 
the SEC's removal of its fiat against forward-looking information. Despite SEC 
allurements (e.g., safe harbor provisions) to companies to publish forecasts or 
prospective financial information, very few companies have done so. The SEC 
recently came at it in other ways, by encouraging companies to put prospective 
data in the MD&A section, as well as by permitting prospective information in 
pro forma statements. 
A question worth asking is whether companies should regularly begin 
publishing, or at least preparing, forecasts in a uniform manner, making it 
possible for the auditor to apply a consistent set of procedures. Given the 
current economic malaise, most corporate managers must be thinking as far 
forward as possible, even if on scraps of paper. It would be far better that these 
be formalized. 
Conclusion 
Under today's conditions, is it reasonable for an auditor, when considering 
a client's going concern status, to do less than the "maximum" for which the 
profession has provided guidance? I believe there is a significant chance the 
auditor will be held responsible for not doing this, and it is time for the 
profession to close the gap. 
There are numerous faltering companies today, whose entire asset/liability 
structure may be inconsequential in view of the risks involved in non-
continuation as a going concern in the future. It seems the auditor is in a 
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precarious position if the forecast guide procedures are not performed— 
complete with market research, use of outside economists, industry data, etc. 
Admittedly, an auditor would not be in a position to report on the forecast 
because the reporting requirements thereunder allow only positive opinions or 
no opinions. But perhaps the auditor should be permitted to report, using a 
qualified forecast opinion, when in an audit framework. Such an approach might 
even qualify for SEC safe-harbor treatment—far preferable to the expertised 
status of an accountant's report containing merely a going-concern qualifica­
tion. Likewise, forecasts need not be updated if there is no stated undertaking 
to do so. Perhaps this feature could somehow blunt the impact of the auditor's 
responsibility for subsequent events. 
The auditing profession indeed faces a gap in GAAS. At a minimum, a 
pronouncement is needed explaining the difference between SAS 34 and the 
forecast guide; the situation is not clear to auditors as it now stands.8 
Footnotes 
1. This annotated excerpt from Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act is taken from Cormley, R. 
James, "Auditing and the Law," Chapter 46 in Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, edited by 
John C. Burton, Russell E . Palmer and Robert S. Kay. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981, 
p. 46-26. Several other thoughts in this brief overview of legal considerations also come from this 
source. 
2. Ibid., p. 46-29. 
3. ASR 115 excludes companies that have an imminent threat of failure from offering securities 
under the 1933 Act. Yet, firms not reported to be in immediate danger can (and do) register for 
"shelf" purposes even though they might not be strong enough to have a public offering for cash. 
4. 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-1197 (3d Cir. 1979). 
5. For example, SAS 22, Planning and Supervision, states that: 
The auditor should obtain a level of knowledge of an entity's business that will enable him 
to conduct his examination in accordance with GAAS. That level should enable him to 
understand events, transactions and practices that may significantly affect the financial 
statements. Knowledge of an entity's business helps the auditor in evaluating the 
reasonableness of estimates and management representations. In addition, the auditor 
should have knowledge of the nature of the entity's business, organization and operating 
characteristics and matters affecting the entity's industry. Sources of this knowledge 
encompass data internal and external to the entity (AU 311.06-.08). [Emphasis added.] 
6. Carmichael, D. R. Chapter 6, "Pervasive Uncertainties—Going Concern Problems," in The 
Auditor's Reporting Obligation, Auditing Research Monograph 1. New York: AICPA, p. 109. 
7. Ibid., p. 99. 
8. Kent St. Pierre and James Anderson, in "An Analysis of Audit Failures Based on 
Documented Legal Cases," Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Spring 1982, state (p. 
243): 
The [Cohen] Commission's staff concluded that audit failures were not a result of 
deficiencies in auditing standards. Fifteen percent of the errors classified in this study 
pertained to the interpretation of auditing standards. Although the interpretation of 
accounting principles and the implementation of auditing procedures accounted for a 
larger percentage of errors, the 15 percent figure is significant. The staff stated that 
failures in this area were most frequently traceable to departures by auditors from the 
standards. 
The key issue seems to be whether the departure was intentional or whether the auditor 
misinterpreted what the study group felt was a clear set of standards. The staff's 
conclusion cannot be refuted based upon the analysis conducted here, but there is enough 
available evidence to question the statement that no deficiencies exist in the standards. If 
the standards are vague and open to misinterpretation, it is difficult to accept the 
argument that the standards are adequate and raise the level of auditor performance. The 
results of this study indicate that interpretation errors are common, even for auditors 
familiar with the general standards. 
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Appendix 
SAS 34 Excerpt 
Consideration of Contrary Information and Mitigating Factors 
7. The auditor's initial consideration of contrary information focuses on the 
underlying conditions that resulted in the contrary information (for example, 
whether the conditions are indicative of a rapid or a gradual deterioration, 
whether they are temporary or recurring, whether they are susceptible of 
corrective actions solely within the entity, and whether they are applicable to 
identifiable elements or segments of the entity or are pervasive). The auditor's 
initial consideration of mitigating factors is based primarily on (a) knowledge of 
matters that relate to the nature of the entity's business and its operating 
characteristics and of matters affecting the industry in which it operates, 
including an awareness of the specific effects and general influence of 
international, national, and local economic conditions, (b) discussions with 
principal officers having responsibility for administration, finance, operations, 
and accounting activities, and (c) understanding of possible legal implications, if 
any, based on discussions with appropriate legal counsel when that is deemed 
necessary. 
Consideration of Management Plans 
8. Additional considerations often are necessary; they generally focus on 
management plans that are responsive to the observed conditions that resulted 
in the contrary information. The relevance of such plans to an auditor generally 
decreases as the time period for planned actions and anticipated events 
increases, although longer time periods may be more meaningful in industries 
with a lengthy operating cycle. Particular emphasis ordinarily is placed on plans 
that might have a significant effect on the entity's solvency within a period of 
one year following the date of the financial statements on which the auditor is 
currently reporting. The auditor's considerations relating to such management 
plans may include the following. 
a. Plans to liquidate assets: 
• Apparent marketability of the assets that management plans to sell. 
• Restrictions on the disposal of assets, such as covenants limiting such 
transactions in loan or similar agreements or encumbrances against 
assets. 
• Possible direct and indirect effects of the disposal of assets. 
b. Plans to borrow money or restructure debt: 
• Availability of debt financing, including existing or committed credit 
arrangements, such as lines of credit and arrangements for factoring 
receivables or sale-leaseback of assets. 
• Existing or committed arrangements to restructure or subordinate 
debt or to guarantee loans to the entity. 
• Possible effects on management's borrowing plans of existing re­
strictions on additional borrowing and the sufficiency of available 
collateral. 
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c. Plans to reduce or delay expenditures: 
• Apparent feasibility of plans to reduce overhead and administrative 
expenditures, to postpone maintenance or research and development 
projects, or to lease rather than purchase assets. 
• Possible direct and indirect effects of reduced or delayed expendi­
tures. 
d. Plans to increase ownership equity: 
• Apparent feasibility of plans to increase ownership equity, including 
existing or committed arrangements to raise additional capital. 
• Existing or committed arrangements to reduce current dividend 
requirements or to accelerate cash distributions from affiliates or 
other investees. 
9. The auditor also should discuss with management any forecasts, 
projections, budgets, or other prospective data, particularly data relating to 
cash flows, that are available or that can reasonably be developed and that are 
relevant in relation to the plans discussed in paragraph 8. The auditor should 
consider the support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective 
data and should give particular attention to assumptions that are 
• Material to the relevant forecasts or projections. 
• Especially uncertain or sensitive to variations. 
• In deviation from historical trends. 
The auditor's considerations should be based on (a) reading of the prospective 
data and the underlying assumptions, (b) knowledge of the entity, its business, 
and its management, and (c) comparison of prospective data in prior periods 
with historical results and of prospective data for the current forecast period 
with results achieved to date. If the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors 
the effects of which are not reflected in such prospective data, he should also 
take those factors into account. The auditor's function, however, does not 
include predicting the outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on 
the financial statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the 
auditor that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period 
beyond the date of his opinion. 
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Discussant's Response to 
SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews: 
The Gap in GAAS 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of Iowa 
Let me begin by reminding everyone that my comments are conditioned by 
my background as a professor. I am not constrained by practical experience 
with going-concern qualifications, and I do not face legal liability for audit 
deficiencies with respect to going concerns. Thus, my comments may seem 
naive since they are based on only my reading of SAS 34 and not on attempts to 
judiciously apply it. 
My interpretation of the words of SAS 34 differs from that expressed by 
Bob Kay. Also, my interpretation is that SAS 34 has clarified and extended the 
meaning of SAS 2.1 presume that the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) wanted 
to clarify the meaning of going concern qualifications and specify desirable audit 
procedures. Whether the ASB has succeeded in changing the requirements 
and meaning in the accounting (and legal) practice environments is another 
question. 
My comments on Bob Kay's paper will be organized into three related 
categories. These are: 
1. An alternative interpretation of the reporting focus of SAS 34. 
2. An alternative interpretation of audit procedures required or implied 
by SAS 34, and 
3. The elimination of the "subject to" qualified opinion as it relates to 
going-concern situations. 
Reporting Focus of SAS 34 
The focus of the reporting requirements of SAS 34 is clearly on re-
coverability and classification of assets and classification of liabilities, and not on 
the entity's ability to continue in existence per se. In paragraph 1, SAS 34 
states "When the continued existence of an entity is imperiled, there is 
heightened concern about the recoverability and classification of recorded asset 
amounts and the amounts and classification of liabilities." That is, the auditor 
may question the basis of accounting or whether generally accepted accounting 
principles are appropriate or a liquidation basis is required. The auditor has no 
responsibility to search for evidential matter relating to an entity's continued 
existence. If the auditor does not become aware of any contrary information, 
then under APB Statement No. 4, he or she may assume that the entity will 
continue as a going concern and not question whether a liquidation basis is the 
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proper basis of accounting. When the auditor is aware of contrary information 
for which sufficient mitigating factors are not present, then the auditor's 
opinion may be qualified as to recoverability and classification. The qualification 
is not for the ability to continue in existence per se, however (see SAS 34, 
paragraphs 11 and 12). In other words, under SAS 34, the going concern 
question is not an end but a means to an end which is the validation of an 
entity's basis of accounting. 
The focus on the basis of the historical accounting of the assets and 
liabilities is consistent with the view that financial accounting reflects the past. 
Such reflection may require disclosure relating to the basis of accounting for 
those past events and transactions or, indeed, the presence of subsequent 
events relating to the past. The focus on the past is in contrast to the future 
oriented thrust of Bob Kay's paper in which the auditor must predict the 
future—i.e., predict whether an entity will continue to exist. This view would 
require forecasting and some attestation related to future events or states. 
I realize that the focus expressed by the ASB in SAS 34 may differ from the 
common interpretation of a going-concern qualification (or the lack thereof) in 
the financial community. Also, the courts may indeed, in some cases, interpret 
the auditor's responsibilities differently than SAS 34 seems to indicate. 
Certainly, such predictions about the future of the company would be of 
potential benefit to users of financial statements. The question is whether the 
auditors are well situated to take such responsibility. Since they do not seem to 
be so situated, I suggest that we should drop discussion of how the financial 
community might misinterpret SAS 34 and try to reinforce its "correct" 
interpretation, perhaps through an education program. 
Audit Procedures Required or Implied by SAS 34 
SAS's are interpretations of generally accepted auditing standards and as 
such are related to the legal requirements of a "standard" quality audit 
required under the securities acts and most contracts for audits. Thus, the 
SAS's (and SAS 34) are important in assessing the auditor's responsibilities. 
Also, according to its charge the ASB must consider the cost and benefits of 
particular statements on standards. Bob Kay seems to say that 1) SAS 34 is too 
vague as to required procedures; 2) the auditor may be held to a standard of 
more work than is explicit in SAS 34 and, 3) the level of work is likely to be the 
level indicated in the AICPAs forecast guide. 
Most of the audit procedure requirements of SAS 34 are preceded by a 
"should consider" modifier. The "should consider" modifier is generally used 
when the ASB believes that the cost benefit test does not support the conduct 
of the procedure in every case. In some cases the conditions may, indeed, 
warrant the application of the forecast guide's level of procedures and the 
auditor "should" apply that level. In other (and probably most) cases, the 
guide's level of procedure is not needed and the auditor would be justified in 
using his or her judgment to perform at a lesser level. The "should consider" 
requirement places the auditor on notice that substantial work may be needed 
in some cases, however. 
Even if we accept the premise that audit procedures at a level greater than 
that set by SAS 34 are needed, it is not clear that the forecast guide is 
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particularly relevant since 1) in SAS 34, the auditor's considerations relate to 
management's plans which may not include specific forecasts and, 2) the object 
of prediction is different. In a SAS 34 situation, the immediate object of 
prediction is the entity's "ability to continue in existence" which is much 
different from a predicted number for earnings or assets. The continuation in 
existence prediction is in some cases easier and in other cases harder than 
prediction of a future accounting number. For example, some firms may need 
to justify a prediction of positive short term cash flows—it is easier to predict 
that cash flows will be greater than or equal to zero than it is to predict the 
exact amount of such flows as in a forecast. In other cases, future short-term 
cash flows may clearly be positive but the continued existence of a firm may 
depend on the willingness of bankers and other creditors to continue to provide 
a line of credit. Examples of both types of cases can be provided from the 
current financial press. 
If auditors are to be held to a higher level of procedure than is required for a 
particular purpose by a particular pronouncement, then chaos may result. Allan 
Winter has conducted an analysis of current AICPA-sanctioned services by 
auditors and has found 19 different levels of assurance. These include 
assurance from "full" audits, SAARS compilations and reviews, quarterly and 
segment reviews, reviews of supplemental information and reviews of fore­
casts and projections, among others. One could argue that an auditor 
conducting a SAARS compilation is well advised to conduct "full" audit 
procedures since some court may inappropriately construe such a standard 
after the fact. I believe that the appropriate approach is for the standards 
setting body to reason out the economical level of procedure required ex ante, 
educate the users (and courts) as to the responsibility the practitioner is taking, 
and then ex post vigorously defend the practitioner who has applied the 
predetermined level of service. 
Elimination of "Subject to" Opinions and the Non-going Concern 
The ASB's current proposal to eliminate subject-to opinions for uncertain­
ties would also apply to going-concern uncertainties. Basically, the proposal 
says "If in the auditor's judgment the financial statements are prepared in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, including informative 
disclosure of uncertainties, then he or she should give an unqualified opinion." 
A lack of GAAP presentation would continue to require an "except for" 
qualification. The same requirements would apply in going-concern situations. 
Footnote disclosure of the question of the basis of accounting and the potential 
effect on recoverability and classification of assets and classification of liabilities 
would suffice. 
Thus, the proposed elimination of subject-to opinions for uncertainty would 
require little change in thinking for those who believe that the correct focus of 
financial statements is on the past with prediction of the future only to assess 
the appropriateness of the basis of accounting for the past. These persons will 
not be disturbed by the proposed elimination. Those who believe that the 
auditor should take more responsibility for predicting the continued existence 
of firm per se will probably be quite disturbed by the proposed elimination. 
In summary, I thank Bob Kay for stimulating my thinking about the 
particular question at hand and the relationships between GAAS, SASs, less 
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authoritative pronouncements, and the law. I believe that I have clarified some 
of my own thinking about these relationships. My conclusions as to the 
particular issues raised, however, differ substantially from those expressed in 
Bob's paper. 
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8 
Developments in Governmental Auditing: 
Their Impact On the Academic and Business 
Communities 
Richard E. Brown 
Legislative Post Auditor, State of Kansas 
Thank you very much for inviting me here tonight. The opportunity for a 
state official to give advice to representatives of the private and university 
worlds was an invitation I could not pass up! As Mark Twain was supposed to 
have said: "To do good is noble; to instruct others in doing good is just as noble 
and much easier." 
My comments this evening will be in two parts. First, I want to tell you 
about what I know best: auditing in Kansas and the developments that I have 
witnessed here during the past nearly eight years. I believe you will find, as I 
always tell the classes I teach in auditing, that Kansas is indeed in the 
mainstream of what is happening nationally in governmental auditing. Second, 
based on this experience, I want to suggest some areas of concern in 
governmental auditing for all of us, problems which I believe will need our 
attention in the years ahead. 
The Evolutionary Changes in the Kansas Audit Operation 
The audit operation in the State of Kansas gets its basic mandate from the 
Legislative Post Audit Act of 1971. This is a well-researched document that 
was developed and written with a great deal of care and only after considerable 
expert testimony was received. That care and attention to detail shows in the 
legislation. 
Under the terms of the statute, the audit operation in Kansas has two key 
units. The first is the Legislative Post Audit Committee. The composition of 
that Committee is made up of the bipartisan leadership of the two houses of the 
Kansas Legislature and includes the Speaker of the House, the President of the 
Senate, the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the two houses, the 
chairmen of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees, and a 
minority member of each Ways and Means Committee appointed by the 
Minority Leader. The duties of the Legislative Post Audit Committee include 
appointing the Post Auditor to a four-year term of office, choosing performance 
audit topics, and receiving and acting on all audit reports. The second main 
component of the audit operation in Kansas is the Legislative Division of Post 
Audit, which is the administrative arm of the audit operation. The Division is 
headed by the Post Auditor, who has complete management responsibility over 
the 40-member staff and all audit activity. 
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The day-to-day functioning of both the committee and the Division are 
guided by the Legislative Post Audit Act and by a fairly elaborate set of 
Committee rules covering all major aspects of operations, including media 
contacts, the release and distribution of audit reports, the availability of 
working papers, etc. The Legislative Division of Post Audit in Kansas performs 
financial audits, sunset audits, and performance audits. 
As is true in most states, there have been a number of changes in the 
operations of the Kansas Post Audit machinery throughout the last decade. 
Formerly an elected State Auditor headed the operation. Many of the staff 
members were hired without degrees or other professional certifications. Now 
the Division of Post Audit has a diversified staff of CPAs, MBAs, lawyers, 
MPAs, EDP experts, and other professionals. Formerly the Division really had 
no financial audit cycle, leading to audit coverage, at best, over an extended 
period of time. Now the State is basically on a two-year financial audit cycle. As 
recently as just a few years ago, the Division did no financial auditing to satisfy 
federal audit requirements. In the belief that federal revenue sharing audit 
requirements might go away, they were largely ignored. Today the State is 
among the leaders in implementing the new single audit concept. Using our 
own staff resources, we have just completed a single audit of our Department 
of Social and Rehabilitation Services. The Department is one of our largest 
State agencies, spending in the neighborhood of $500 million annually. We have 
contracted out to private firms a number of other single audits and will continue 
to do so in the future. 
As recently as 1975, the Legislative Division of Post Audit did little or no 
performance or sunset auditing. Now, I think it is fair to say, we are considered 
a leader in the field, having completed dozens of performance audits in recent 
years, including audits of social services, highway maintenance, university 
construction, off-campus courses, duplication of higher education courses, the 
transferability of courses from community colleges to four-year institutions, 
and school district performance audits. The latter are among the first in the 
nation to be completed. Kansas is also a leader in sunset auditing—auditing 
which in essence examines the need for regulation, the fairness of that 
regulation, and whether the regulation is being performed in the interest of the 
public or in the interest of the regulated activity. Sunset audits completed 
range from audits of small licensing groups like the cosmetologists and barbers, 
to the larger concerns of nursing home and utility rate regulation. 
Indeed, legislative interest in more and more performance and sunset audit 
work, coupled with increased federal requirements for financial audits, has 
created such a strain on the audit resources in the State of Kansas that, with 
the approval of the Legislative Post Audit Committee and the Legislature, the 
Division has arrived at a solution of contracting more financial audits. In fiscal 
year 1980, our Division will contract roughly $300,000 of financial audit work to 
help accomplish that work and to make available resources for more perfor­
mance audit activity. And that figure is likely to increase in the future. It is 
important to mention in passing that in the State of Kansas a decision has been 
made, at least for the time being, to avoid a statewide financial audit and instead 
conduct financial audits on an agency-by-agency basis. 
These developments and changes have been significant, and to a great 
extent parallel the changes in auditing in other states in the country. The time 
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has not been without its anxious and even humorous moments. Let me give 
you a couple of illustrations. Back in 1975, we completed our first performance 
audit dealing with the regulation and use of water in Kansas. It is important to 
remember, of course, that this is a topic of grave concern in what is still very 
much an agricultural state. The audit was quite critical of the manner in which 
the State program was being operated, generating the following letter from a 
Senator: 
Dear Mr. Brown: 
I understand that your staff worked hard trying to understand and 
evaluate the operations of the . . . Act. However, when I looked over 
the members of the committee and learned the background of your 
staff, I realized the problem . . . 
Water is a highly emotional issue. I believe that I can best illustrate 
it thus: There are three ways to get shot: (1) fool with a neighbor's 
wife; (2) claim three feet of his worthless land; and (3) cut his water off. 
Another elected official was equally sensitive about an audit we completed 
of her operation. Actually, the report was not that critical, but she certainly 
took it that way. She wrote: 
Dr. Brown: 
I have received a copy of your report . . . I hereby demand . . . an 
evaluation of. . . your office by an unbiased public accounting firm, free 
of political control and intervention. The report is grossly incorrect. It is 
malicious, prepared for purely political uses. It violates the code of 
ethics of your field. It is an attempt to discredit me personally. 
I remind you that although you were hired by a controlled commit­
tee, you are paid by the citizens. I demand you account to them for your 
actions. 
But the letter was not the worst part of the whole process. When our audit 
manager and I visited this official to discuss the draft report, we found that she 
had invited the TV cameras and other media representatives into the meeting. 
We immediately reminded her that our Committee rules prohibited discussing a 
draft audit report in a public setting. At this point she literally jumped out of her 
chair and shouted at us "to get out of the office and never return." As 
embarrassing as this was, I was pleased that she was a woman and that she 
was located on the ground floor of the building. In this business one learns to 
take his blessings where he can find them. I could not help but be thankful that 
the then Secretary of Transportation did not receive his audit report in the 
same manner since he was a former All-American football player and has his 
offices on the seventh floor of the State Office Building. 
Other Changes in Government Auditing 
As I have already indicated, these developments and experiences in Kansas 
are virtually identical to those taking place in many other state governments. 
There has been a considerable increase in the authority and visibility of audits 
and of auditors. There has been a tremendous increase in the expectations for 
good useful audit work. And there has been a great increase in the quality and 
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influence of state audit officials and their staffs. The state auditors now meet on 
a regular basis to discuss issues of professional interest including pending 
legislative changes, and even have their own representative in Washington. 
Intertwined with these developments are a number of other important 
related changes. The U.S. General Accounting Office has recently revised its 
"Yellow Book," the Comptroller General's governmental audit standards 
followed by most auditors engaged in governmental audit work. The revised 
standards cover many changes and place a great deal more emphasis on EDP 
audit work and on fraud and abuse. While no final decisions have been made, 
various proposals relating to the creation of a governmental accounting 
standards board are circulating—an idea which is certainly long overdue. There 
is considerable pressure on governmental jurisdictions from bond-rating firms 
for government to get its accounting and auditing systems in order, including 
the threat of a negative impact on bond ratings if they do not. Just a couple of 
year ago, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sponsored, in 
cooperation with the U . S. General Accounting Office, a conference in Cherry 
Hill, New Jersey, to discuss a variety of problems including the government's 
general dissatisfaction with the work quality on governmental audits by CPA 
firms. 
All of these developments are hopeful signs for the future. The only 
question one might have is why did it take so long for all this to occur, and why 
did we have to wait until financial problems in government became so pervasive 
and so critical? And there is a related concern, a fear that the progress we are 
now making may not be permanent and that the cycle may swing again the 
other way. 
Problems and Opportunities Suggested by the Kansas Experience 
One senses some important questions and concerns beneath this great 
record of change. With regard to the financial audit in the public sector, there 
are many questions which still need to be resolved. In a State like Kansas 
where there is no general obligation bonded indebtedness, what is the value of 
the financial audit in such a setting—to whom does it convey information, and 
what is that information? If it is for "the investor" (the taxpayer), does this 
somehow suggest that the taxpayer may decide whether, on the basis of the 
audited financial statements, additional "investment" (taxes) should be with­
held? Are these audits in any sense cost-beneficial? In our little State we are 
paying about a million dollars annually for financial audit work. The question is, 
what are we accomplishing—what if anything does a financial audit tell 
policymakers and the taxpayers about governmental performance? To illus­
trate the dimensions of the problem, it is not lost on any of us in Kansas that 
despite the fact that financial audits of the State's retirement system's financial 
statements had been conducted for a period of years, it was not until we did a 
performance audit of the system that we really learned anything about its then 
dubious investment performance. 
A related question has to do with the matter of what is the best—most 
economical and effective—way to conduct a financial audit of state government. 
What are the trade-offs of the efficiencies of a statewide financial audit such as 
that conducted in states like Maryland and Minnesota vis-a-vis the value of the 
186 
audit presence provided by Kansas' agency-based approach? What of any 
importance is lost if the auditors do not conduct test work in a number of small 
agencies, presumably based on materiality concerns? Indeed, the whole issue 
of materiality in a government setting may need careful re-examination, since it 
is a setting which places great emphasis on compliance with law and regula­
tions. In so many of these areas one senses that we are simply following 
tradition, piling on audit requirements instead of thinking these traditional audit 
concepts through for their application in a governmental setting. 
As we in our state and local jurisdictions move to contract more and more 
audit work, other questions must also be addressed: 
—Should the legislative or executive branch of government, the city council 
or city manager, do the contracting? 
—What, if any, difference does it make? 
Our experience in Kansas thus far indicates that this is an important area of 
concern, clearly impacting on the quality and objectivity of the final audit 
report. 
The old "Yellow Book," under "Organizational Impairments," had some 
interesting language in it on this issue: 
When independent public accountants or other independent profes­
sionals are engaged to perform work that includes inquiries into 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, efficiency and economy 
of operations, or achievement of program results, they should be 
engaged by someone other than the officials responsible for the 
direction of the effort being audited. This practice removes the 
pressures that may result if the auditor must criticize the performance 
of those who engaged him. To remove this obstacle to independence, 
governments should arrange to have such auditors engaged by officials 
not directly involved in opertions to be audited. 
Unfortunately, this language has been dropped from the revised standards. 
The issue as to who does the contracting with CPA firms is an important 
matter because it may have a great deal to do with the difficulties that have 
arisen over quality control of contracted audits in government. It is possible, 
for example, that those doing the contracting at this point in time do not have a 
great deal of knowledge about audit requirements or what they anticipate 
receiving from an audit. 
Some Educational Concerns 
This leads me to my final area of concern, at least for tonight. I detect a 
great lack of interest at our universities in addressing these kinds of issues in 
governmental accounting and auditing. I understand that we in government are 
not alone in our complaints in this regard. For example, those concerned with 
internal auditing have similar difficulties in getting universities to offer course 
work in their area. The business schools seem to have a preoccupation with 
public accounting and with financial auditing, and do little or nothing for the rest 
of us in accounting and auditing. 
The problem takes many serious forms. The courses in governmental 
accounting and auditing, if they exist at all, are small portions of other already 
compressed courses. Courses in performance and operational auditing are 
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lacking. A little attention may be given to management or operational auditing, 
but there is almost no coverage of program results or effectiveness auditing. 
Courses are almost entirely lacking in discussions of the "environment" of 
government, with the understandable result that students, given their lack of 
exposure and understanding, too often end up being unreasonably biased 
against government. This, in turn, leads to a situation in which the chances of 
students being successful in public sector work are greatly diminished. 
Government loses the trained attention of countless good, young minds while 
students lose considerable opportunities. 
This inattention to the nonprofit sector creates enormous problems for 
CPA firms which must assign such graduates to do work for them in the 
governmental sector. One must question the preparation of these graduates 
for such work. While some steps have been taken by accreditation bodies to 
improve the curriculum in the governmental area, a great deal more needs to 
be done. 
In conducting the research for my book, Auditing Performance in Govern-
ment (John Wiley and Sons, 1982), I found that little help or guidance has been 
given by the American Accounting Association or its committees on the 
questions I have raised above about accounting and auditing in the public 
sector. Again, this is very regrettable. There has been little attention given to 
the entire issue of the interplay of budgeting, accounting, and audit systems in 
government, or to the development of appropriate performance measures 
which then become the basis for financial reporting and auditing in government. 
For good or ill, most of the research and writing on performance auditing in 
government has been done by practitioners—Felix Pomeranz of Coopers and 
Lybrand, Leo Herbert, now of VPI and formerly with the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, and my book on performance auditing. Indeed, the whole 
development of performance auditing and evaluation in government has been 
far more a spontaneous groundswell on the part of policy makers than it has 
been a result of academic attention. It is clear that the profession has been 
most reluctant to play a leadership role in these innovative areas, suggesting a 
costly professional conservatism. 
Government accounting and auditing has to date clearly not been a good 
advancement path at most universities, causing many professors to avoid the 
field and recognize that their careers will not be enhanced by research, 
teaching, and attention to this area. Again, all of this is most costly and 
regrettable for government and government finance. 
Closing Comments 
I recall living in Tennessee in the 1960s and reading one of Ralph McGill's 
books on the South and southerners, a book about rapid changes in the racial 
scene in the South at that time. McGill made a comment about that situation 
which went something like this: "To be a southerner in these times is the most 
magnificent agony of all." 
I feel much the same way about governmental auditing and accounting in 
the 1980s. Those of us in the field have great power to do good. There is at the 
same time a great temptation to avoid the hard questions, questions like: 
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—How much auditing is enough? 
—What are its costs and benefits? 
—What forms should governmental auditing take? 
—Is traditional auditing by itself enough in the public sector? 
—Can we demonstrate to policymakers the value of public sector auditing? 
—And, finally, who will lead us in thinking through some of the old notions 
about these issues? 
In my judgment, while CPA firms may help find the answers to these 
questions, it is not their fundamental role to do so. And it is certainly not the 
role of the business community in general. But it is very much the role of the 
AICPA, the GAO, the FAF and FASB, the GASB and its predecessor, the 
National Council on Governmental Accounting. Most of all, the formal pro­
nouncements of such groups must result from the research attention of our 
universities. And, frankly, the lack of attention to date to these issues by these 
groups is astounding. 
If you will indulge me a moment, I will end on a light but I believe 
appropriate note coming out of a song. It strikes me as being most relevant to 
the fate of governmental accounting and auditing, and to the decisions that are 
before us in the 1980s and beyond: 
Thank you . . . for the time that is past, for all the values and 
thoughts that will last. May we all stagnant tradition ignore, leaving 
behind things that matter no more . . . 
. . . Make us afraid of the thoughts that delay, faithful in all the 
affairs of today; keep us . . . from playing it safe, thank you that now is 
the time of our life! 
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